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Three fundamental claims are defended in this dissertation. First, the influence of
Hume's epistemological program and his skepticism with respect to causal knowledge have
hindered the development of an adequate theory of scientific explanation. Second, Hume's
conception of causal knowledge is outdated, and knowledge of causation should be
relieved of the special epistemological burden placed on it by Hume's followers. Finally,
once relieved of this Humean epistemological burden, the causal theory of scientific
explanation is superior to alternatives lying in the tradition of Humean positivism.
Humean positivism places severe constraints on theories of scientific explanation,
and its influence on extant theories is reviewed. Recent positivist theories of scientific
explanation are discussed critically, and are shown to suffer serious difficulties. Particular
attention is paid to recent pragmatic theories (van Fraassen's and Sintonen's) and to
Kitcher's unificationist theory.
The causal theory of scientific explanation is developed through an examination of
theories of causation. Traditional views (e.g., the regularity view), recent statistical theories,
and Salmon's (1984) theory of causation are rejected in favor of Cartwright's thesis that
causal laws are best understood as capacity ascriptions. The essential features of scientific
explanations are then outlined: most prominent are the ascription of causal capacities
and
v
the description of causal interactions. The philosophical benefits of the causal theory are
also summarized.
Common objections to causal theories of explanation are treated. Of central
importance is Hume's skeptical argument. Once Hume's conception of causal knowledge
is modernized, however, his arguments yield no skepticism particular to the knowledge of
causation: causal knowledge is as defensible as are more respectable types of empirical
knowledge. Other important objections are also reviewed.
Finally, historical studies of two well-known explanatory controversies—the Jensen-
Lewontin debate concerning the heritability of IQ, and a dispute about the nature of cosmic
radiation—are presented. Positivist theories of scientific explanation can account for neither
the origin nor the manner of resolution of these controversies. In contrast, the causal theory
of explanation is shown to illuminate the controversies successfully. This success offers
additional evidence in favor of the causal theory of scientific explanation.
*
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv
ABSTRACT
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION
!
1.1 Explanation and Understanding 1
1.2 Some Philosophical Problems of Explanation 2
1 .3 The Forefathers of Modern Theories of Explanation:
Aristotle and Hume 4
1 .4 Two Approaches to the Theory of Explanation 5
1.5 Summary of Chapters 10
2. THE HUMEAN POSITIVIST TRADITION 12
2.1 Hume's Influence and the Positivist Tradition 12
2.2 Hume's Critical Philosophy: The Analysis of Causal Knowledge 13
2.3 Humean Positivism and the Philosophy of Scientific Explanation 13
2.4 Logical Positivism 17
2.5 The Impact of Logical Positivism's Demise on the
Philosophy of Science 20
3. POSITIVIST APPROACHES TO SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 23
3.1 Neo-Positivist Theories of Scientific Explanation 23
3.1.1 The Covering-Law Model of Explanation 23
3.1.2 Kitcher's Unification Theory of Explanation 35
3. 1.2.1 Explanatory Patterns 38
3. 1.2. 2 Unifying Power 42
3. 1.2. 3 Evaluation of Kitcher's Theory 46
3.2 Paleo-Positivist Theories of Scientific Explanation 55
3.2.1 The Pragmatics of Explanation: Scriven's Contributions 55
3.2.2 The Pragmatics of Explanation: Van Fraassen's
Theory of Why-Questions 60
3.2.2. 1 Bengt Hannson: The Necessity of a Pragmatics of
Explanation 6"!
3. 2. 2. 2 Van Fraassen's Theory of Why-Questions 63
3. 2. 2. 3 Evaluation of Van Fraassen's Theory of Why-Questions 65
vii
3.2.3
Further Developments in the Pragmatics of Explanation:
Explanation and Epistemic Context (Gardentors, Sintonen) 69
3.2.3. 1 Gardenfors: The Dynamic Epistemic Context of
Explanation 71
3. 2. 3. 2 Sintonen's Theory of Explanatory Commitment 75
3. 2. 3. 3 Evaluation of Sintonen's Account 80
4. THE CAUSAL THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 82
4.1 What is a Cause? 83
4.1.1 Traditional Views of Causation 84
4. 1.1.1 Causation As Regularity 84
4. 1.1. 2 Probabilistic Theories of Causation 90
4. 1.1. 3 The Counterfactual View 99
4.1.2 Salmon's Theory of Causation (1 984) 101
4.1.3 Dowe's (1 992) and Salmon's (1 994) Theory of Causation 107
4.2 Causal Knowledge: Causal Capacities and Interactions 110
4.2.1 The Nature of Causal Capacities and Their Ascription 113
4.2.2 Causes As the Operation of Capacities v.
Causes As Regularities 117
4.3 The Causal Theory of Explanation 121
4.4 Theory, Explanation, and Causal Knowledge 125
4.5 A Summary of the Benefits of the Causal Theory of
Scientific Explanation 127
5. OBJECTIONS TO THE CAUSAL THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC
EXPLANATION 131
5.1 The Importance of Causes in Science 132
5.2 Dispositions 134
5.3 Knowledge of Causal Capacities and Interactions 140
5.4 The Grounds of Hume's Skepticism 140
5.5 The Perception of Causation 147
5.6 Michotte's Experiments 13°
5.7 Hume's Argument Again 154
5.8 More Epistemological Worries 156
5.9 Epistemology and Science 157
5.10 Testing (Bootstrapping) Causal Claims 158
5.11 Non-Causal Explanations I 66
5.11.1 Laws of Coexistence ^7
5.11.2 Brody's Essential-Property Explanations 167
5.11.3 Kim's Non-Causal Connections 170
viii
5.11.4 Other Non-Causal Laws 173
5.11.5 Identity Explanations
-| 75
6. EXPLANATORY CONTROVERSIES AND THEIR RESOLUTION 177
6.1 Explanatory Controversy in Science 1 77
6.2 First Case Study: Controversies over the Explanation of
Differential IQ-Test Performance 181
6.2.1 Jensen's Argument 183
6.2.2 Heritabi I ity 185
6.2.3 Lewontin's Criticism 187
6.2.4 Jensen's Reply 190
6.2.5 Lewontin Again 192
6.3 Second Case Study: Controversies over the Nature of
Cosmic Radiation 1 93
6.3.1 Cosmic Radiation: Photons or Particles? 195
6.3.2 Crisis and Resolution of the Explanatory Controversy 199
6.4 A Comparison of the Two Case Studies 203
6.5 The Covering-Law Model and Explanatory Controversy in the
History of Science 203
6.6 Pragmatic Theories of Explanation and Explanatory Controversy
in the History of Science 207
6.7 Kitcher's Unification Theory and Explanatory Controversy
in the History of Science 209
6.8 Explanatory Controversy and the Causal Theory of Explanation 217
NOTES 220
BIBLIOGRAPHY 248
IX
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Explanation and Understanding
Science begins with the desire to understand. Understanding, in turn, requires
knowledge, but it demands more than the collection of bare facts. Contrast the scientist's
goals with those of other knowledgeable persons, such as fishermen. An experienced
fisherman knows a lot about the ocean tides. He knows, for instance, that the tide advances
and recedes roughly twice per day, as well as when the tide will change tomorrow. This
knowledge of tidal patterns is sufficient for the fisherman's work: with it, he can estimate
when clams can be dug, or when and where to anchor his boat so that it will not be
beached the next time he wishes to use it. In his philosophical moments, he may wonder,
or even theorize about, why the tides change. But for the fisherman's purposes, this
knowledge is unnecessary. The scientist, in comparison, would be dissatisfied with the
fisherman's level of knowledge: for the scientist desires to know not only that the tides
advance and recede, and when they do so, but why and how they change. The scientist
aspires, in other words, to understand the tidal changes. If scientific inquiry has any
characteristic cognitive aim, it is to understand the phenomena of the natural world in
which we live.
In pursuit of understanding, scientists are not content with gathering vast quantities
of independent facts: they want to know how and why things happen the way they do.
Understanding a phenomenon thus demands a cognitive ingredient beyond plain
knowledge of it. But when does one understand a phenomenon as opposed to just having
knowledge of it? What are the markers of understanding?
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In science, the understanding of a phenomenon manifests itself in a number of
ways: most prominent are the ability to control and predict the phenomenon; to calculate
with precision some empirical quantities from others; and, finally, to explain the
phenomenon. 1 Those who have knowledge of a phenomenon are able to recognize or
describe it — the fisherman can, after all, describe the tidal patterns — but those who
understand the phenomenon are also able to explain or control it. Scientific understanding
and explanation are thus closely linked, for the provision of explanations is one
manifestation of scientific understanding. Not surprisingly, understanding and explanation
are linked in another way, too: both serve as major objects of scientific inquiry. Indeed, the
search for understanding is synonymous, in some contexts, with the search for scientific
explanation.
It follows that explanation is of interest to the philosophy of science for at least two
reasons. First, explanation is an important scientific objective and practice in its own right,
and, accordingly, the philosophy of science should try to provide some account of it.
Second, in virtue of explanation's close relation to scientific understanding and inquiry, a
good account of explanation promises to illuminate these areas of science as well.
1.2 Some Philosophical Problems of Explanation
The philosophy of scientific explanation confronts a number of problems, some of
which have already been suggested in this brief introduction:
(a) Wherein lies the difference between description and explanation, or
between descriptive knowledge and explanatory knowledge?
(b) What is the precise relation between explanation and understanding?
(c) Flow can we account for explanation as an objective of scientific inquiry?
(d) The ability to control processes and to explain phenomena both mark
scientific understanding: what is the connection between these two abilities?
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(e) What is the distinction between theoretical prediction and explanation?
Attempts to answer these questions have brought further difficulties into view. One
common philosophical approach, for instance, locates scientific understanding in
knowledge of the network of logical relations among accepted scientific theories, laws, and
phenomena. Explanation is then said to consist in the exhibition of this logical relation by
means of a valid deduction of the fact-to-be-explained from theories, laws, and additional
relevant facts. There is a difficulty in this view, however, which commentators from
Aristotle to van Fraassen have pointed out. The difficulty arises from the fact that while the
instances of theories and laws are often logically symmetrical, the explanatory relation is
usually asymmetrical.' To illustrate, suppose I light a match under a sealed balloon filled
with air, which, as it warms, begins to expand. Using the ideal gas law, one can derive the
increase in the balloon's volume from the increase in gas temperature caused by the match.
Fully developed, this derivation is not an implausible explanation of the balloon's
expansion. But the ideal gas law is an equation, and thus logically symmetrical.
Consequently, one can also derive the change in gas temperature from the change in
volume. Intuition tells us that the change in volume fails, however, to explain the change in
temperature, despite our ability to derive the latter from the former.
Examples like these seem to show that there must be more to explanation than
deducing facts from theories, laws, and other facts. In any event, the examples generate a
problem: assuming that laws and theories play a role in explanations, how can we account
for the asymmetry of explanatory relations in the face of the logical symmetry of some
theories and laws in their instances?
The study of scientific texts and episodes in the history of science also generates a
number of problems for the philosophy of explanation. For instance, there seem to be
differences between fields of science with respect to the practices and styles of explanation
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that predominate within them. In physics textbooks, for example, explanations of
phenomena often include deductions, from theory, of precise empirical quantities. In the
social sciences, in contrast, deductively valid arguments are uncommon, as is the
calculation of precise empirical quantities. Can the theory of explanation elucidate why
explanatory styles and practices should be distinct in different areas of science? In addition,
explanatory styles and practices seem to diverge not only across scientific fields, but also
across historical periods. What can the theory of explanation say about this? Finally, the
nature of explanatory controversy in the history of science also seems to vary. Some
explanatory controversies rage on for decades without resolution. Other controversies, in
comparison, are resolved decisively within a rather short period of time . 3 Can the theory of
scientific explanation illuminate such historical contrasts?
1.3 The Forefathers of Modern Theories of Explanation: Aristotle and Hume
One solution to the problems of explanation was put forth early in the history of
philosophy by Aristotle, who suggested that to understand a phenomenon is to know its
causes. On this proposal, explanation consists in citing the factors causally responsible for
the phenomenon, though other requirements may also have to be met.
The causal proposal is intuitively promising. In the world of everyday experience,
we often cite causes to explain events, and scientists seem to follow this practice, as well.
In addition, the causal proposal provides a basis upon which to distinguish descriptive
knowledge from explanatory knowledge of a phenomenon: on the causal proposal,
explanatory knowledge contains a description of the explained phenomenon's causes;
explanatory knowledge is thus a special kind of descriptive knowledge. The causal
proposal also recommends a feasible solution to the problem of explanatory asymmetries.
According to the causal proposal, explanatory asymmetries reflect the causal asymmetries
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between the entities, processes, etc. cited in symmetrical laws; the causal asymmetries thus
restrict the use of laws in explanatory contexts.
Yet despite its intuitive force and potential for handling asymmetries and other
problems of explanation, the causal theory of explanation has not met with uniform favor in
modern philosophy of science. The primary source of this disfavor has been David Hume's
critical analysis of scientific knowledge
.
4 Hume argued forcefully that so-called
"metaphysical" beliefs, including beliefs about causes and natural laws, cannot be justified
on grounds acceptable to science. The repercussions of Hume's conclusions for the
philosophy of science cannot be overstated: it is fair to say that every post-Humean theory
of science, including theory of scientific explanation, has confronted Hume's skepticism as
a fundamental constraint, and has had to approach causation with caution.
Humean philosophies have dominated the philosophy of science for over a
century . 5 This holds true for the philosophy of explanation, as well: the field of extant
theories of scientific explanation consists, for the most part, of Humean theories that diverge
only in the degree to which they adhere to Hume's conclusions. Not surprisingly, given
Hume's influence, causal theories of explanation have, until recently, been largely
dismissed from consideration, and relegated to the trash bin of unjustifiable metaphysics.
1.4 Two Approaches to the Theory of Explanation
Recent philosophies of scientific explanation can be divided into two groups —
positivist and causal — according to theoretical approach. Positivist theories of explanation
are distinguished by the following characteristic: they begin with a stringent epistemological
program — namely, some version of Humean positivism — and then elaborate a theory of
explanation consistent with it. Such theories avoid the notion of causation, or set severe
limits on its applicability. Positivist theories of explanation are themselves divisible into two
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groups, according to the stringency with which each group adheres to the Humean
program:
(1) Humean and Paleo-positivists maintain a strong distinction between the
theoretical and the observable, and they follow Hume in denying all inferences from
observation to the existence of theoretical entities, causes, and other varieties of
metaphysical entities. Humean and paleo-positivists thus accept Hume's strong
requirement of verifiability, though paleo-positivists reject it as a criterion of meaning. As
for scientific explanation, Humean and paleo-positivists advocate one of two conclusions: (i)
explanation plays no role in science (e.g., Duhem); or (ii) explanation is merely a pragmatic
application of scientific knowledge in specific contexts (e.g., Mach and van Fraassen).
(2) Neo-positivists relax Hume's rigid border between the theoretical and the
observable. Theories, laws, and causes are all acceptable to neo-positivists, though they are
conceived in ways that limit their disruption of the Humean epistemological program. In
general, laws and causes are conceived either (i) as Humean regularities, or (ii) as general
statements satisfying non-empirical criteria such as simplicity, unifying power, etc. Neo-
positivists thus refuse to assume Hume's strict criterion of verifiability, as well as his strong
anti-inductive, anti-theoretical, and anti-metaphysical stances. Neo-positivists generally
believe scientific explanation to consist in the valid deduction of the phenomena-to-be-
explained from known theories or laws. 6
Causal theories of scientific explanation, which stand in sharp contrast to positivist
theories, constitute the second major approach to scientific explanation. In general, these
theories maintain that explanation requires description of the causes of the phenomenon-to-
be-explained. At the foundation of causal theories is the recognition that causal knowledge
is fundamental and ineliminable. Because of the lasting influence of Hume, however,
causal theories have emerged as serious contenders only recently, most prominently with
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the publication of Wesley Salmon's book, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of
the World. Though the number of causal theories is proliferating, Salmon's book represents
the first major attempt to shrug off the lasting effects of Hume's skepticism regarding causal
knowledge.
Against Hume and his followers, this paper offers an extended defense of the causal
theory of scientific explanation. The theory presented here differs in certain respects from
other causal theories, however, including Salmon's. Some comments about the origins of
my views will bring out some of the differences.
My studies of scientific explanation were launched from two points of departure:
first, the conviction that positivist attempts to elucidate scientific understanding and
explanation had failed; and, second, the vague idea that metaphysical (including causal)
beliefs play an important role in scientific reasoning and experiment. Salmon's work, as
well as that of Nancy Cartwright, had a strong influence on the development of my views.
Salmon (1984) and others have argued convincingly that positivist theories (which
correspond, more or less, to what Salmon calls "epistemic" theories) are doomed to fail. I
remained unpersuaded, however, by Salmon's (1984) causal theory of explanation: though
intuitively plausible, his theory of causation relied upon further causal concepts, and where
these concepts were analyzed in non-causal terms, they were clarified by reference to
counterfactual conditionals. Salmon's reference to counterfactuals, it seemed to me, was ill-
advised, for I could find no good reason to accept that scientific beliefs should be
understood as beliefs about what happens in possible (non-actual) worlds.
In an important 1980 paper, Nancy Cartwright also argued that positivist theories of
explanation (especially Hempel's Covering-Law Model) were inadequate. Her argument
relied on two plausible premises. First, she maintained that there are few true laws
available from which to construct sound covering-law explanations of phenomena, the great
7
majority of laws used by scientists, she argued, are true only ceteris paribus
,
at best.
Second, she insisted that despite the lack of true covering-laws, perfectly good explanations
of phenomena are nonetheless provided in science. She concluded that explanation has
little to do with the truth of laws used in the explanation.
Cartwright's argument was persuasive, but I resisted her conclusions, too.
Explanation, it seemed to me, requires information that is true. Rather than separate truth
and explanation, I thought, it would be better to deny that laws entail true descriptions of
regularities. But I was unsure of how to talk about laws, if they were not to be understood
as describing regularities. I was thus persuaded that metaphysical beliefs, including causal
concepts, play an important role in science, but I did not know how to talk about
metaphysics or laws, and I certainly had no theory of them.
Fortunately for me, by the time I got this far in my thinking, Cartwright had already
worked out some new ideas about the nature of science and scientific laws . 7 Strong
metaphysical assumptions are required, she now argued, to account for what scientists do in
the lab and elsewhere. Most important, scientists act as if objects have causal capacities,
and they assume that there is a contingent but permanent (brute fact) connection between
causal capacities and other (structural) properties. Many scientific laws are therefore best
understood as ascriptions of causal capacities, rather than as descriptions of regularities.
With the view of laws as capacity ascriptions comes a new perspective on the
nature of science. Scientists do not live, as the positivists would have it, in a world of
objects and properties that appear before us in patterns of regular succession. Rather,
scientists live, as laypersons always have, in a world of objects endowed with causal
capacities whose complex interactions are the phenomena with which we are familiar. The
basic aims of science, on this view, are to grasp (and measure) the causal capacities of
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objects, to know the structural properties with which they are associated, and to discern the
operation of particular capacities in specific interactions.
The causal theory of explanation that I defend applies Cartwright's account of the
nature and role of causal knowledge in science. Cartwright has, I believe, provided
philosophers with a way to talk about metaphysics and causation that has a number of
advantages for the causal theory of explanation. For example, reading causal laws as
ascriptions of causal capacity allows one to describe causation without reference to
counterfactual conditionals. In addition, Cartwright's view allows one to reassert the
connection between truth and explanation: laws that are untrue as regularity descriptions
can be accepted as true as capacity ascriptions. Other advantages follow, and they will be
canvassed in Chapter 4. 8
This dissertation has goals that lie beyond the theory of explanation. First and
foremost, my arguments support the conclusion that causal knowledge in science is
essential, fundamental, and ineliminable. Put bluntly, one can explain neither what
scientists do in the lab, nor what phenomena do on their own, without reference to causal
concepts. This point is related to a second goal — the elucidation of scientific
understanding, especially in its relation to explanation and experimentation. It was noted
above that two markers of understanding are the abilities to explain, and to control
processes. The causal theory of explanation shows us why this is so. The abilities to
explain and to control processes, including those of the laboratory experiment, mark
scientific understanding because understanding has a causal component: understanding is
the ability to do things in a world of objects endowed with causal capacities. Once
scientific understanding is recognized as having an essential causal component, a strong
link between explanation (and other linguistic activities in science) and process control
(including the activities of experimental and applied sciences) can be affirmed.
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1.5 Summary of Chapters
A fundamental claim of this dissertation is that philosophical allegiances to Hume's
epistemological program and its skepticism with respect to causal knowledge have hindered
the development of an adequate theory of scientific explanation. A second is that Hume’s
conception of causal knowledge is now outdated, and that knowledge of causation should
be relieved of the special epistemological burden placed on it by Hume's followers. In
pursuit of these claims, the historical development of Humean positivism in the philosophy
of science is traced in Chapter 2. Humean positivism places profound constraints on
theories of scientific explanation, and these constraints and their influence are also
discussed in detail in this chapter.
Chapter 3 offers a critical discussion of extant positivist theories of scientific
explanation. Particular attention is paid to recent pragmatic theories (especially van
Fraassen's and Sintonen's) and to Kitcher's unificationist theory, because these theories
have, as a result of their novelty, received relatively little critical treatment in the literature.
In Chapter 4, the causal theory of scientific explanation is developed through an
examination of theories of causation and of the nature of causal laws. Building on this
examination, features essential to any successful causal theory of explanation are then
outlined. The philosophical benefits of the causal theory of explanation are also laid out.
In Chapter 5, common objections to causal theories are treated. Of central importance here
is Hume's skeptical argument, which is examined in detail. It is argued that once Hume's
conception of causal knowledge is modernized, his arguments yield no skeptical
conclusions particular to the knowledge of causation: causal knowledge is as clear and
defensible as are more respected kinds of empirical knowledge. Other important
objections, such as the claim that some scientific explanations are non-causal, are also
considered.
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In Chapter 6, a series of historical studies are presented in defense of the causal
theory of explanation. The history of explanatory controversies in science is a rich source of
"data" concerning the nature of scientific explanation, and it will be argued that certain
episodes in this history are unintelligible when approached from the viewpoint of positivist
theories of explanation. More specifically, positivist theories of scientific explanation can
account for neither the origin nor the manner of resolution of many historical explanatory
controversies. It will be shown, moreover, that the causal theory of explanation successfully
illuminates those same historical episodes that are unintelligible under positivist theories of
explanation. These differences, it will be argued, constitute further evidence in favor of the
causal theory of explanation.
CHAPTER 2
THE HUMEAN POSITIVIST TRADITION
2.1 Hume's Influence and the Positivist Tradition
It has already been noted that despite its intuitive force and potential for handling
the asymmetries and other problems of explanation, the causal theory of explanation has
met with little favor in modern philosophy. The source of this disfavor is, above all, David
Hume's critical analysis of causal knowledge. Hume's influence has been so great that the
current terrain of the philosophy of explanation cannot be understood independently of his
doctrines. It would thus be useful to rehearse the main points of the Humean heritage —
what I call Humean positivism — and to trace its historical development. In tracing this
development, I will discuss work by Hume, Mach, Duhem, and the logical positivists. In
addition, the consequences of Humean positivism for a theory of explanation will be
discussed with respect to Duhem's and Mach's remarks on scientific explanation. Later in
this paper, I will also discuss the views of Carl Hempel (whose work on scientific
explanation remains an important touchstone for current debate), Philip Kitcher, Bas van
Fraassen, and other contemporary standard bearers of the positivist tradition in controversies
over scientific explanation. 9
Understanding the current theoretical terrain is not my only motive for rehearsing
Hume's arguments and influence. I will ultimately argue that the causal theory provides the
only satisfactory account of scientific explanation. Because this argument requires a
reevaluation of Hume's conclusions and the evidence he offers in support of them, it is
important to be sure that we understand his arguments in some detail. In addition to
sketching Hume's influence, therefore, Hume's arguments will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 5.
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2.2 Hume's Critical Philosophy: The Analysis of Causal Knowledge
Humean positivism may be characterized by a set of six key doctrines: 10
(1) Duality of knowledge
:
there are two distinct kinds of knowledge — logical-
mathematical and empirical.
(2) Verifiability, significant propositions must be verifiable; verifiable propositions
are those whose truth value can be settled.
(3) Pro-observation: empirical propositions are best verified by observation (sensory
experience).
(4) Anti-cause: there are no knowable causal connections in nature. There are only
the regular associations of objects in experience.
(5) Anti-induction: ampliative inference in empirical matters — that is, the inference
from observed cases to those that have not been observed — has no epistemic
foundation.
(6) Anti-metaphysics: metaphysical propositions are unverifiable and therefore
meaningless.
There are other important doctrines in Hume — his copy theory of ideas, for example, and
his important thesis that causal judgments are ultimately founded on mental propensities —
that are tangential to the theory of explanation. 11 (1)-(6) summarize only those doctrines of
Hume that have had the most profound influence on subsequent philosophy of science.
Hume's arguments in support of these doctrines, especially those underlying (4), will be
discussed below in Chapter 5. Our present aim is to track the influence of Humean
positivism in the work of later positivists.
2.3 Humean Positivism and the Philosophy of Scientific Explanation
Hume's philosophy — especially his demanding empiricism and distrust of causes
and other "metaphysical" notions — has had a profound influence on subsequent
philosophers of science. It has also left them in a quandary. For Hume's critical inquiry
into the foundation of causal knowledge ends, it would seem, in radical skepticism.
u His
own solution to skepticism, moreover — a theory of mental propensities — places scientific
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knowledge on the foundation of a theory of human psychology, which hardly seems to do
justice to the explanatory power and objectivity of scientific theories such as Newtonian
mechanics or the Darwinian theory of natural selection. Indeed, much of subsequent
philosophy of science may be understood as an attempt to reconcile Humean positivism
with an adequate picture of scientific practice and its impressive results.
This is true in the philosophy of explanation as well, where the constraints imposed
by Hume's analysis have had a strong impact. The most obvious constraint is imposed by
Hume's conclusion that there are no verifiable causes in nature, but only a regular
association of objects in experience. This conclusion precludes any causal theory of
explanation.
Other constraints have been important, too. Science provides theoretical treatments
of phenomena, and it is often remarked that the explanatory power of scientific knowledge
resides in these theoretical treatments. A theory of scientific explanation could thus
approach explanation as theoretical treatment, and try to specify the relation between
theory and fact wherein such treatment consists. But Hume's analysis presents obstacles to
this approach, too, for it leads to a downplaying of the importance of theories. Hume's
doctrine of verifiability and rejection of ampliative inference entail that empirical theories
are significant only insofar as they describe the facts of past experience. Theories add
nothing, in other words, to the empirical facts themselves. Accordingly, Humean positivists
tend to conceive of theories as no more than precise and economical summaries of
empirical facts. Duhem, for example, defines a physical theory as "an abstract system
whose aim is to summarize and classify logically a group of experimental laws" (1914/1954,
7).
13 This is not to say that theories are identical to the empirical facts subsumed under
them. Both Mach and Duhem emphasize that theory construction is a process of
abstraction from the empirical facts, and that this process of abstraction is necessarily
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simplifying. In theory-building, completeness of description is traded for the convenience
of simplification
.
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As a result, no theory represents the empirical facts in their entirety.
Nevertheless, the significance of theories cannot extend beyond the empirical facts,
and they tell us nothing of the "reality" or "causes" that underlie experience.
Correspondingly, the view of Mach, Duhem, and other Humean positivists is that theories
derive their importance only from their pragmatic virtues: above all else, theories are
simpler and easier to work with than vast collections of disjointed empirical facts . 15
It becomes puzzling, on this conception of theories, how theoretical treatments
could be enlightening or explanatory, for theories are empirically redundant, adding no
significant information to the empirical facts themselves. Hume's anti-causal stance is thus
not the only obstacle his philosophy places in the path of a theory of scientific explanation:
Hume's analysis also discounts the value of theories, and this hinders any theory of
explanation that would rest on the theoretical treatment of phenomena.
How, then, can a Humean positivist account for scientific explanation? We'll
consider the remarks made by two of the most prominent Humean positivists, Ernst Mach
and Pierre Duhem . 16 Not surprisingly, given their disparagement of metaphysics and
discounting of theories, Mach and Duhem were inclined to depreciate explanation as well.
Duhem rejected scientific explanation outright. To explain, he said, is to reveal the reality
or causes of the phenomena as they appear to us. But reality lies forever beyond the efforts
of scientific theory. Theology provides explanations; science does not. Explanations thus
play no role in science, on Duhem's view . 17 Obviously, this makes quick work of the
philosophical problems of explanation.
In contrast to Duhem, Mach recognized that scientists do seek explanations, and
that some account of this effort must be provided. He sought to account for the search for
explanation in the following way:
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In the manifold of natural processes, some things seem familiar, while others
seem unfamiliar, confusing, surprising, indeed, even contradictory to that
which is familiar. So long as this is the case, one has no stable, unified
conception of nature. There thus arises the task of searching out those
elements present in every manifold that are of a similar kind. In this way,
the shortest and most economical description and statement can be
obtained.
..If one has fulfilled this task of recognizing everywhere the same
few simple elements that are joined together in familiar ways, we then
encounter them as something familiar, we are no longer surprised by them,
their appearance is no longer strange and new, we feel ourselves at home
with them, they are no longer confusing to us, they are explained
(1883/1976, 5ff.).
Mach s view of explanation is distinctly psychological: to have a phenomenon explained is
to alleviate the feelings of surprise, confusion, and discomfort produced by an unfamiliar
phenomenon. These feelings are diminished, and the phenomenon explained, when we
recognize that the phenomenon is similar in certain respects to others already encountered.
This view suggests an explanatory role for theories (or laws): when an unfamiliar
phenomenon can be subsumed under a theory, it is thereby classified as belonging to a
certain class of experiences, and is recognized to be similar to other experiences in some
respects. The phenomenon is thus explained for us via its subsumption under a known
theory. Subsumption under a known theory promotes the goal of having a unified,
economical, and stable conception of nature. 18 Yet despite the role played by scientific
laws and theories, explanation remains psychological: explanation, for Mach, is literally the
relief from feelings of discomfort.
For positivists such as Mach and Duhem, explanation has no fundamental role in
the proper practice of science. This discounting of explanation in science is a direct legacy,
moreover, of Hume's critical analysis of causal knowledge: as we have seen, Hume's strong
anti-metaphysical and anti-theoretical stance offers a meager foundation for any theory of
explanation.
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2.4 Logical Positivism
The tradition of Humean positivism was continued in the first half of the twentieth
century by the logical positivists. The logical positivists had little to say about explanation
in science, for they, like Hume, were concerned with more fundamental issues, viz., the
foundations of knowledge. But the logical positivists developed Humean positivism in a
precise and vigorous manner, and therein lies our present interest. The legacy of their
efforts was two-fold. First, the methods of the logical positivists, which were the methods of
logical and linguistic analysis developed by Frege, Russell, and others, had great influence
in philosophy, especially in England and the United States. Second, their efforts to clarify
and develop the Humean position encountered significant difficulties. These difficulties led
philosophers of science to renounce certain aspects of Humean positivism, or, at least, to
seek out new ways of avoiding Hume's conclusions. In particular, Humean positivism was
deemed too restrictive to develop an adequate notion of scientific theory. As a result, many
philosophers questioned the doctrine of verifiability, at least in the strong form urged by
Hume and the early logical positivists. Others openly sought theories of ampliative
inference of the kind rejected by Hume, including theories of induction and confirmation.
These changes had the effect of opening up new possibilities in the philosophy of
science, one of which was a theory of scientific explanation. We have seen in the work of
Mach and Duhem that the constraints of Humean positivism preclude any significant role
for explanation in science. When the failures of logical positivism led philosophers to
jettison various Humean doctrines, however, intellectual space for interests in scientific
explanation was created. This interest was pursued, above all, in the work of Karl Popper
and Carl Hempel. We will next consider some details of this historical development.
The approach of the logical positivists was stringently Humean. Hume wrote:
When we run over our libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc
must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school
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metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning
concerning quantity or number
?
No. Does it contain any experimental
reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to
the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion (1 977, 1 1 4).
This statement, noted A.J. Ayer, could very well have served as the credo of logical
positivism. Like Hume, the logical positivists divided significant propositions into two
classes: purely formal and factual. Purely formal propositions were tautological, while
factual propositions were required to be verifiable. Uses of language that were neither
tautological nor verifiable were ruled to be meaningless and therefore illegitimate in science
or philosophy. The logical positivists hoped that, by drawing a sharp line around the
boundary of scientific discourse, metaphysical disputes in science could be eliminated.
There was, nevertheless, a focus in the work of the logical positivists that
distinguishes it from that of Hume: the logical positivists believed that the traditional
problems of knowledge could be reduced to problems in the representation of knowledge,
i.e., to problems of language. Thus, while Hume was concerned with what can be known,
the logical positivists were concerned with what can be said. The problems of language
were to be clarified and resolved, in turn, by applying the new methods of formal logic
developed by Frege, Russell, and others. 20
The logical positivists' famous slogan — the meaning of a proposition is its method
of verification — is a stronger, linguisticized version of Hume's doctrine of verifiability. For
Hume, a proposition represents a comparison of ideas or impressions in thought, e.g., "the
ball is red" represents a comparison of the ideas of "ball" and "red." An empirical
proposition is significant, and can become knowledge, only if the ideas contained in it
correspond to impressions, which are the discrete components of immediate sensory
experience. The logical positivists had a similar conception of empirical significance, one
which, however, reflected their linguistic focus. For the logical positivists, all meaningful
language was to be constructed out of some set of simple, "atomic" statements. These
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statements were to correspond to absolutely simple facts. In the case of empirical
propositions, the atomic facts were to correspond to observation reports by which they
could be verified.
There were many disputes about the nature of observation reports and of
verification. Ultimately, however, the verifiability criterion had to be abandoned. The
logical positivists argued at first that all (non-analytic) scientific propositions should be
reducible to observation reports in the following sense: a proposition is significant if and
only if it is logically deducible from some finite (and logically consistent) set of observation
reports/ 1 Hempel called this the requirement of complete verifiability. In an influential
paper in 1 950, he criticized this criterion on a number of grounds. 22 He showed, for
example, that the criterion is not up to its supposed task of distinguishing significant from
insignificant propositions: For any statement S that is deducible from a set of observation
sentences O, there are an infinite number of statements of the form 5 v N, such that N and,
therefore, 5 v N, are insignificant. Yet S v N is deducible from O, and therefore significant
according to the criterion.
Most importantly, Hempel argued that there are a great many statements that are
both significant and true, but which are not deducible from any finite set of observation
sentences. These are the universal empirical laws and theories of science. The requirement
thus rules out as insignificant many integral components of scientific theories. 23 This is the
criticism that was most damaging to the requirement of complete verifiability.
After considering and rejecting a number of alternative criteria, Hempel concluded:
I think it is useless to continue the search for an adequate criterion of
testability in terms of deductive relationships to observation sentences. The
past development of this search — of which we have considered the major
stages — seems to warrant the expectation that as long as we try to set up a
criterion of testability for individual sentences in a natural language, in terms
of logical relationship to observation sentences, the result will be either too
restrictive or too inclusive, or both (1959, 1 1 6).
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In place of requirements of complete verifiability or falsifiability, Hempel proposed
a requirement of translatability, according to which a sentence has cognitive meaning if and
only if it is translatable into an empiricist language. This criterion also fails, however, at
least as a criterion of meaning. The problem with the criterion, argued Hempel, is that it
can give no satisfactory account of the meaning of disposition terms, and he showed that
appeal to counterfactuals or Carnap's "reduction sentences" does not provide sufficient
support here. Hempel concluded:
The content of a statement with empirical import cannot, in general, be
exhaustively expressed by means of any class of observation sentences
( 1959
,
122 ).
Hempel thus declared the logical positivist criterion of meaning to be dead. At most,
Hempel concluded, we can demand that cognitively significant scientific propositions refer
in some way to observables. This demand says nothing, however, about the meaning of
these constituents, and does not imply that their meaning can be exhaustively given by
reference to observable phenomena. Hempel's criticism applies equally to Hume's
doctrine of verifiability, which demanded that significant propositions be reduced to the
content of impressions. This tenet of Humean positivism was therefore condemned as well,
to be replaced by a weaker requirement of empirical import.
Decisive in Hempel's criticism was the recognition that scientific laws cannot be
reduced to any set of possible observations: in an important way, scientific laws (and
theories, therefore) transcend actual experience. Laws and theories were thus recognized as
having significance above and beyond the set of observational facts subsumed under them.
2.5 The Impact of Logical Positivism's Demise on the Philosophy of Science
Hempel's reassertion of the significance of theories opened the way for new areas of
development in the philosophy of science. Two important areas were the studies of
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confirmation and induction. If scientific laws and theories are accepted as true, and yet
cannot be reduced to any set of observation statements, then some sort of ampliative
inference is needed to justify our belief in such theories. Philosophers such as Hempel thus
set out to develop theories of ampliative inference (confirmation and induction) to fill this
gap. Whether the pursuit of this goal reflected a dismissal of Hume's conclusions about
ampliative inference, or simply a retreat from the common view that the philosophy of
science is a normative, and not merely a descriptive, project, the result has been that a
second of Hume's doctrines — the denial of ampliative inference — has fallen into doubt, or
has, at least, been ignored when it is convenient to do so.
The revival of respect for scientific laws and theories also raised again the questions
of metaphysics that the logical positivists had tried so hard to remove from science and
philosophy. In particular, questions arose concerning the ontological commitments of
theories. Once it is accepted that the significance of theories cannot be reduced to that of
any set of possible observations, then one can no longer demand, on grounds of
unverifiability, that the metaphysical entities mentioned in theories be banned from the
discourse of science. There thus arose an extended discussion, which continues today,
about the ontological (and methodological) status of theoretical entities. The positivists'
rejection of metaphysics has thus also become controversial.
One of Hume's doctrines, however, has remained relatively untouched by the wake
of logical positivism's demise. This is Hume's analysis of causal knowledge. Most
philosophers of science were no longer interested, as many positivists had been, in
removing causal concepts from science. Yet most continued to accept the Humean view
that knowledge of causation is reducible to that of the regular association of events. This
view has an advantage of economy. Once laws and theories are accepted as an essential
and irreducible part of science, and if laws describing the regular association of events
21
suffice to characterize causal relations, then it would seem imprudent to add causes to the
reservoir of concepts or ontological entities necessary for the philosophy of science.
Finally, and most important for our discussion, the fall of logical positivism had
strong repercussions in the philosophy of explanation. Nearly all philosophers of
explanation have acknowledged with FHempel that the verifiability criterion of meaning
must be abandoned. In addition, most have agreed that Hume's regularity conception of
causation should be retained. Beyond these two points, however, there has been sharp
disagreement. The various approaches to explanation that arose out of the demise of logical
positivism will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
POSITIVIST APPROACHES TO SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
They are ill discoverers that think there is no land
,
when they can see
nothing but sea (Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, II, vii, 5).
3.1 Neo-Positivist Theories of Scientific Explanation
3.1.1 The Covering-Law Model of Explanation
Hempel's work played an important role, as we have seen, in the turn from Humean
positivism. Hempel was also instrumental in emphasizing the new role of explanation in
the philosophy of science. After years of repression under Humean positivism, explanation
reassumed, in the work of Hempel, its position as a leading objective of scientific inquiry:
To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the
question "why?" rather than only the question "what?", is one of the
foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research
in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject
matter by providing as explanation of the phenomena it investigates
(Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948, 135).
Following Popper and others, 24 Hempel and Oppenheim construed the general
question, "Why does the phenomenon happen?" as meaning, "According to what general
laws, and by virtue of what antecedent conditions does the phenomenon occur?" 25 This
construal is quite broad, and allows many possible avenues of approach. One’s approach
depends most importantly on how one understands "general laws" and "occurs in virtue of."
A causal interpretation of "occurs in virtue of," for example, offers one approach. Hempel
and Oppenheim pursued another avenue: they aspired to clarify these ideas largely (though
not exclusively) in terms of logical syntax.
The Covering-Law Model of scientific explanation emphasizes a basic feature: to
explain a phenomenon is to derive a statement asserting its occurrence from other
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statements, at least one of which is a universally quantified scientific law. Explanatory
relevance is thus a function of a special kind of logical dependence. More specifically, the
model requires explanations to satisfy four principle conditions:
(I) An explanation is a valid argument, the conclusion of which is a description of
the phenomenon to be explained.
(II) The argument must contain at least one premise that is a general law.
(III) Some premises of the argument must be empirical, i.e., testable by observation
or experiment.
(IV) The premises of the argument must be true. 26
A number of different kinds of general laws can satisfy requirement (II). All of them share
four basic features:
(i) they are sentences consisting of one or more quantifiers followed by an
expression containing no quantifiers;
(ii) they are not logically equivalent to any singular sentence;
(iii) they contain only "purely qualitative" predicates; 27
(iv) they are true.
The weakest kind of general law — which Hempel and Oppenheim call a "derivative
theory" — satisfies these features plus the additional requirement that it be derivable from a
set of general laws that contains no individual constants. The strongest kind of law—
a
"fundamental law"—has the four basic features plus two: it contains no individual constants;
and all of its quantifiers are universal.
In Hempel and Oppenheim's original paper (1948), requirement (I) restricts
explanations to those arguments that are deductively valid. Later, with a view towards
accommodating certain kinds of statistical explanations, this restriction was loosened by
Hempel to allow statistical inferences that confer a high degree of probability on the
conclusion. 28 Both approaches embody the idea that a phenomenon is explained if it is
demonstrated that a statement describing the phenomenon must be (or is likely to be) true,
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given that certain laws and antecedent conditions are true. A certain kind of epistemic
necessity is thus bestowed upon the phenomenon. A demonstration is more forceful, of
course, if its inferences are truth-preserving. Hence, Hempel requires that the inferences in
an explanatory argument either be deductively valid, or, in the case of statistical
explanations, bestow a high degree of probability on the conclusion.
Why would one think that scientific explanation consists of logical deduction from
general laws? One motivation for the view has just been suggested: on Hempel's account,
an explanation of a phenomenon demonstrates that the phenomenon occurs with a kind of
necessity, albeit logical (or epistemic) necessity. The account also fits the deductive
theoretical treatments often found in science textbooks, especially those of physics, which
show a law or set of laws to be a consequence of higher-order laws.
The Covering-Law Model has been thoroughly discussed and criticized in the
literature. Hempel and Oppenheim themselves realized that these conditions alone provide
an incomplete, if not, in their view, unsatisfactory, characterization of explanation. The
major problem areas are the following: 29
(1) The account depends on a satisfactory account of "lawlikeness," which Hempel
and Oppenheim conceded they could not provide. 30 They recognized that restrictions must
be placed on the predicates admissible in the construction of general laws. These
predicates, they suggested, must be "purely qualitative," but they were unable to specify
clearly what this means. There are other problems as well, the most basic of which is how
to distinguish laws from accidentally true generalizations.
The problem of constructing criteria of "lawlikeness" is not endemic to the
Covering-Law Model of scientific explanation, but its solution is important to the success of
that model. Indeed, one may be tempted to think that other serious problems of the
Covering-Law Model, such as the problem of explanatory relevance, could be resolved by a
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satisfactory account of "lawlikeness." 31 The discussion below will indicate, however, that
problems of explanatory relevance remain even after questions of lawlikeness are settled.
(2) The Covering-Law Model is too restrictive: many respectable scientific
explanations fail to satisfy the requirements of the Covering-Law Model, because they
cannot be reconstructed as deductive (or statistical) arguments from true premises. Some
scientific explanations — generative or narrative explanations, for example — are simply not
deductive in form. Other scientific explanations, though deductive in form, rely on laws
that are, at best, ceteris paribus generalizations, which cannot be accepted as true. 32
Science contains few, if any, exceptionless generalizations. 33 As a result, even where
deductive explanations appear in science, e.g., in physics textbooks, the laws employed in
these deductions are true only under conditions that are left unspecified or are
unspecifiable. Often the conditions required are ideal (i.e., never realized) or contrary-to-
fact. A good example of the latter is Coulomb's Law, which tells us the attractive force
experienced by two charged bodies that have no mass. 34 As a result, valid deductive
arguments can usually be formulated from laws only if the laws employed are false as
written, or if ideal or contrary-to-fact assumptions are made.
An example of a generative or narrative explanation is the explanation of how North
America came to be populated by human beings (their ancestors traveled across the Bering
Strait from Asia). The explanation indicated here is a narrative description of a sequence of
events, supported by statements of evidence affirming the occurrence of various events in
the sequence. The explanation may refer to general laws, but there is no deduction of the
fact that North America is populated by human beings. Narrative explanations 35 are
common not only in social sciences such as anthropology and sociology, but also in
evolutionary biology and astronomy.
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As a further example, consider Kettlewell's explanation of the evolutionary success
of melanic species of Lepidoptera in industrial England (Kettlewell, 1955
,
1956 ). According
to Kettlewell, the spread of melanic forms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries is due in part to the adaptive advantages held by melanic moths over their non-
melanic counterparts. In particular, melanic coloring enhances moths' ability to avoid
predatory birds by hiding on tree trunks and boughs darkened by industrial pollution. An
improved ability to avoid predation has resulted, in turn, in higher rates of survival and
reproductive success. This is a simplified sketch of Kettlewell's explanation, but it is
adequate for our purposes. It is difficult, to say the least, to discover in this explanation any
true laws from which the differential reproductive success of melanic moths may be
inferred. In addition, even though no such laws are specified, the explanation is
convincing.
Of course, one could extract candidate laws from Kettlewell's explanation. One
such law might be:
(P) If species a is better able to avoid predation than is competitor species b, then
species a will outreproduce species b.
Speaking strictly, however, it cannot be said that this law is true. First, the connection
between predation avoidance and reproductive success is stochastic: in any finite
population, there is always a chance that better adapted groups will be outreproduced by
lesser adapted groups. But even if (P) were formulated as a stochastic law, it would still be
false. Assuming a causal connection between predation avoidance and reproductive
success exists, there remain any number of factors that can intervene to inhibit the
(probability of) reproductive success of species a, or to promote that of species b, bringing
about the consequence that (P) is falsified in particular cases. In addition, the intervening
factors are peculiar to each biological case. To specify all possible intervening conditions
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would be impossible, and it thus appears that (P) cannot be revised in any way that will
make it true. 36
Another type of explanation for which the Covering-Law Model cannot account are
statistical explanations in which the probability of the phenomenon explained is very low,
e.g., the quantum mechanical explanation of events with low probability. 37 Such cases are
not captured by Hempel's requirement that the explanandum be granted a high degree of
probability by the explanans. 38
In response to these sorts of counterexamples, Hempel has argued that many
explanations in science are simply incomplete, and are therefore not easily put into
deductive argument form. In some cases, the additional premises required for a valid
deductive inference are so obvious or so widely known that they are simply left unstated.
In other cases, the additional premises needed are not available in the body of science, but
can, in principle, be garnished by further experiment and theorizing. 39 We should thus not
be troubled by the fact that many actual scientific explanations fail to satisfy the criteria of
the Covering-Law Model, argues Hempel, for the model represents only an ideal that all
scientific explanations are intended to meet, even if some of them must fall short.
This view, which I will name Hempel's radical normativism, suggests a kind of
optimism, according to which there is a law (or small set of laws) covering every
phenomenon that occurs. This kind of optimism is dubious: there are no laws that describe
most of what happens in the world. Hempel's radical normativism, however, entails such
optimism:
The idea here suggested is that the logic of all scientific explanation is
basically of the covering-law variety, but not that all empirical phenomena
are scientifically explainable. ..(Hempel, 1 965, 425, note 1 7).
While all scientific explanation is intended to meet the ideal presented by the Covering-Law
Model, there is no guarantee, suggests Hempel, that all phenomena are scientifically
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explainable. Here Hempel's analogy between the concepts of "explanation" and of "proof"
may apply. While all actual mathematical proofs seek to meet the requirements of formal
proofs (e.g., deductive validity), and, therefore, a metamathematical description of "proof"
may be useful in elucidating the logical structure of actual proofs, it does not follow - nor
should we assume — that all mathematical facts can be proven. Similarly, Hempel's theory
entails no optimism about the lawlike behavior of natural phenomena. Hempel's theory of
explanation is thus represents an ideal limit of human understanding: insofar as natural
phenomena can be understood and explained, then the explanations will meet the criteria
of the Covering-Law Model. There is no guarantee, however, that all natural phenomena
can be understood and explained.
If we take the Covering-Law model to be an ideal model of scientific explanation,
Hempel is correct to emphasize that we should not expect every proffered scientific
explanation to meet its conditions. Ideals are often unobtainable, in science as in other
areas, and this is not inconsistent with the notion of being an ideal, nor does it detract from
the information that ideal models can provide about the important properties of actual
things. For example, some people carry in their minds an ideal model of a morally
righteous person, e.g., a Christian ideal of one who is pious, humble, benevolent, honest,
trustworthy, etc. Perhaps no one satisfies all the criteria of this Christian moral ideal, but a
description of the ideal can nonetheless tell us a lot about Christians' moral judgments of
other people's behavior.
Yet Hempel’s radical normativism can be criticized on grounds other than
unjustified optimism. Of most ideal models we expect the following: that when something
has all the properties of the ideal model, then it instantiates the ideal itself. For example, if
someone were to come along who happened to have all the properties of the Christian
ideal, e.g., a Jesus Christ, then one would have to conclude that this person is morally good.
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Logical consistency would require one to reject the ideal if he or she could not accept this
conclusion.
This is the situation with the Covering-Law Model. One can accept that, as an ideal
of scientific explanation, many actual scientific explanations fail to meet its standards. What
one cannot accept is that many arguments meet all of its standards, yet intuitively fail to be
explanatory. Countless arguments without explanatory value satisfy the requirements of the
Covering-Law Model. The Covering-Law Model thus is not only too restrictive, but is too
liberal, as well.
(3) Here we will cite a number of examples so that the full extent of the failure of
the Covering-Law Model can be appreciated. Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague (1961)
demonstrated formally that for any given fundamental theory T and explanandum £, a
theory V can be derived from T that will explain £. What follows is an informal
presentation of one of Eberle eta/.' s arguments (Eberle eta/., 1961, 420f.):
We take as given an explanandum £ and any true empirical theory T. For example:
T : (x) Fx
£: Ha.
There are a theory T', which is derivable from T, and singular conditions C:
T': (x)(y)[Fx v (Gy 3 Hy)]
C: (Fb v nGa) 3 Ha.
It follows from the hypotheses (that T is empirical and both T and £ are true) that T' is
empirical and both V and C are true. Yet, £ is deducible from T and C, though not from C
alone. T' therefore satisfies the Covering-Law Model with respect to £ (and thereby
"explains" £), although T was chosen arbitrarily.
It is sometimes maintained that Eberle et a/.'s arguments demonstrate only that the
Covering-Law Model suffers from technical difficulties, which can perhaps be remedied.
4"
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But more intuitive examples show that the Covering-Law Model's deficiencies are deeper. A
rich source of problem examples are laws that are symmetrical with respect to time or
logical form. Symmetrical laws include those in the form of universal biconditionals or
mathematical equations, i.e., A - B or A = B. Biconditional laws engender a special
problem of explanatory relevance — the problem of explanatory asymmetries, which was
already introduced the first chapter. The difficulty arises because biconditional laws are
logically symmetrical but, in actual explanatory contexts, explanatorily asymmetrical. If
explanation consists in the deduction of the explanandum from testable, true laws, as it
does according to the Covering-Law Model, then explanatory asymmetries cannot be
captured. As a result, the Covering-Law Model counts as explanations many intuitively
non-explanatory arguments.
The Ideal Gas Law provides a good example. The Ideal Gas Law says that the
pressure and volume of a gas are proportional to the gas's temperature (except when the gas
is at very low temperatures):
PV = nRT,
where K is a constant and n is the number of molecules of gas present. Suppose water is
placed in an aluminum pressure cooker outfitted with a pressure gauge. The pressure gauge
reading is 0 kg/cm 2 initially. The cooker is placed on a stove, and then heated at 1 10
degrees C. until the pressure gauge levels off at 200 kg/cm 2 . Why did the gas pressure in
the cooker go up to 200 kg/cm 2 ? One could argue, consistent with the Covering-Law
Model, that the correct explanation requires a deduction of the precise value of the pressure
of the gas in the cooker from the Ideal Gas Law and information about the volume and
temperature of the gas. This approach to the explanation is not implausible. But consider,
in contrast, the explanation of why the temperature of the gas in the cooker went up to 1 1
0
degrees C. The Covering-Law Model suggests that to explain the temperature of the gas, we
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should deduce its value from the Ideal Gas Law and the values of the gas's volume and
pressure. But this deduction would not explain the temperature of the gas: intuitively, the
change in temperature of the gas is not due to changes in its pressure or volume, though the
gas's pressure does change concurrently with its change in temperature.
Many such examples can be given. 41 The point is not that deductions from the Ideal
Gas Law (or other equations or biconditional laws) cannot participate in intuitively forceful
explanations. Information contained in symmetrical scientific laws is often explanatorily
relevant. The difficulty arises because laws and deductive logic alone do not tell us which
of the factors cited in laws, if any, are relevant to a given fact-to-be-explained.
In discussing an example like that of the Ideal Gas Law, Hempel warns that we
should not be mislead by everyday intuitions (Hempel, 1965, 352ff.). He suggests that
where everyday intuition conflicts with scientific treatments, then everyday intuition should
be suppressed, and science should be taken at face value: scientific explanation
(understanding) is whatever is presented in scientific theoretical treatments, and is nothing
more or less. But there is a tension, to say the least, between the proposal to take science at
face value, and the attempt to put the Covering-Law Model forth as an explanatory ideal
that is often unsatisfied by examples of actual scientific explanations. Ignoring this for the
moment, it is clear that the proposed counterexamples clash not only with everyday
intuition, but with the explanatory practices of scientists as well. Newton's laws of
mechanics and information about the present position of the earth, its velocity, etc. can be
employed to deduce the earth's position in the past. Surely no one, scientists included,
would accept such a deduction as an explanation of the earth's past position.
42 Hempel
may be willing to swallow some unnatural consequences of the Covering-Law Model, e.g.,
the explanation of the length of a pendulum from its period and a law for simple
pendulums, 43 but he cannot accept retrodictive explanations in general.
44
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The inadequacy of the Covering-Law Model as a criterion of explanatory relevance
is exposed nicely in cases where phenomena are covered by more than one law; these
cases can be termed instances of nomic overdetermination. Consider the scenario of Mr.
Jones, a heavy smoker, who suffered from both terminal lung cancer and advanced heart
disease. When he was diagnosed, the physicians decided that both of the following laws
applied to poor Mr. Jones:
(I) All persons with stage x lung cancer die within 5 years.
(II) All persons with stage y heart disease die within 5 years.
Mr. Jones was diagnosed, in other words, as having lung cancer in stage x and heart disease
in stage y. Not surprisingly, Mr. Jones succumbed six months after this diagnosis. The
question arises, why did Mr. Jones die? The Covering-Law Model suggests two
explanations: one consists of a derivation from (I); the second of a derivation from (II). Each
of the explanations, according to the Covering-Law Model, is complete in itself. Suppose
that Mr. Jones died, in fact, as a result of a heart attack. As a result, only one of the
deductions suggested by the Covering-Law model represents the correct explanation. The
Covering-Law Model provides no grounds, however, on which to judge which deduction is
the correct explanation. Knowledge of laws and logic is not sufficient, in other words, to
settle explanatory relevance.
Judging from his response to a similar objection proposed by Scriven (1 962),
Hempel would respond in the following way: Surely the lung cancer explanation is
unacceptable because its explanans requires the assumption that the patient does not die of
other causes before the lung cancer kills him. This assumption, in the case of Mr. Jones, is
clearly false. Hence, the explanation founded on (I) is false, and can be ruled out (Hempel,
1965, 420).
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This reply seems inadequate. In what way does the explanans require the
assumption that the patient does not die of other causes before the lung cancer kills him?
This is not a logical requirement of the deduction, for the deduction goes through without
this premise. There may be good grounds for requiring this assumption, but these grounds,
whatever they are, are not supplied by the Covering-Law Model. The Covering-Law Model
thus provides no resources to settle explanatory relevance in the case of Mr. Jones's death.
One could also reply to the objection as follows. The problem of explanatory
relevance suggested by the example of Mr. Jones's death is a false one, for the conclusions
of the alternative explanatory deductions say nothing about the specific cause of Mr. Jones's
death, but only that he will die within five years. Hence, both are consistent with Mr. Jones
having died of a heart attack, and neither should be ruled out as irrelevant by this fact.
This reply is no more convincing than Hempel's. When we ask, "Why did Mr.
Jones die?", we are clearly looking for a causal explanation of his death. In addition, the
Covering-Law Model presumes to include causal explanations in its repertoire: causal
explanations are covered, Hempel says, because causal statements describe lawlike
regularities. Indeed, (I) and (II), which express lawlike regularities, are causal laws from the
view of the Covering-Law Model. Therefore, we both have a right to expect the Covering-
Law Model to provide a causal answer to the question about Jones's death, and reason to
believe that deductions from (I) and from (II) are just the sort of causal explanations supplied
under the requirements of the Covering-Law Model. The Covering-Law Model thus fails in
this case because either (1 ) it does not yield the kinds of causal explanation demanded or
(2) it provides too many inconsistent causal explanations.
To summarize, a Covering-Law explanation provides grounds for believing an
empirical claim to be true. Providing grounds for an empirical belief, however, neither
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necessarily nor sufficiently explains why the empirical phenomenon is the case. This is the
fundamental flaw of the Covering-Law Model.
3.1.2 Kitcher's Unification Theory of Explanation
Unificationist theories of scientific explanation, like the Covering-Law Model,
attempt to gloss scientific explanation without invoking causation. On the unificationist
view, the overriding goal of scientific theorizing is the unification of scientific knowledge —
often understood as the reduction in the number of basic assumptions of the body of
knowledge. The explanation of phenomena is achieved when the phenomena can be
subsumed under the logical network of laws or patterns of derivation that most unifies the
existing body of scientific knowledge.
Unificationist theories have two points of departure, one historical and one
philosophical. First, scientists have at times judged unifying power to be an important
virtue of scientific theories. Darwin, for example, wrote of his theory of natural selection:
It can hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain, in so
satisfactory a manner as does the theory of natural selection, the several
large classes of facts above specified. It has recently been objected that this
is an unsafe method of arguing; but it is a method used in judging of the
common events of life, and has often been used by the greatest of natural
philosophers . 45
This passage is often cited as a textbook example of inference to the best explanation:
Darwin is arguing that the explanatory power of the theory of natural selection is evidence
of its truth . 46 Yet part of Darwin's point seems to be that the theory of natural selection
should be accepted because it provides a unified account of large and diverse sets of facts.
Historical examples of appeals to the unifying power of a theory are easily multiplied .
47
Because it is a commonly acknowledged virtue of many impressive theories in the history of
science, unifying power is thus an attractive focus for philosophical theorists.
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In addition, unificationist theories of explanation have origins in neo-positivist
philosophies of science that reflect a distrust of causes and other metaphysical entities, even
as they avoid the severe constraints of logical positivism. Following Hempel, unification
theorists acknowledge that scientific theories provide explanations. Yet while Hempel's
Covering-Law Model emphasizes the epistemic connection between laws and the
phenomena explained by them, unification theorists locate the explanatory power of
theories in the ability to systematize logically, and with great economy, the phenomena that
fall under them. Kitcher and other unificationists thus carry forth the philosophical standard
of neo-positivism in the tradition of Hempel, but with a distinctive emphasis: for them, the
logical relation important to explanation is not just subsumption, but unification.
The most important current unificationist theory is that of Philip Kitcher. Kitcher's
approach is ecumenical, making use of ingredients from many recent theories of
explanation. Following Hempel (and many others), Kitcher makes deductive argument
central to explanation. Inspired by Friedman, he believes both that explanatory power is a
function of unifying power, and that in unification lies the connection between scientific
explanation and understanding. From van Fraassen, he borrows a theory of why-
questions. 48 Finally, Kitcher accepts and incorporates an insight from Kuhn's work
concerning the nature of scientific knowledge, namely, that grasping a scientific theory
(including its explanatory power and scope) requires a "cognitive ingredient" beyond
acquaintance with the theory's principles and formulas, and the rules of logic.
Kitcher credits Friedman's 1 974 paper with fundamentally redirecting his thinking
about scientific explanation, but his concept of unification differs from Friedman's.
49 He
describes his intuitive conception this way:
Understanding.. .is not simply a matter of reducing the "fundamental
incomprehensibilities" but of seeing connections, common patterns, in what
initially appear to be different situations... Science advances our
understanding of nature by showing us how to derive descriptions of many
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phenomena, using the same patterns of derivation again and again, and in
demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduce the number of facts we have
to accept as ultimate (or brute) (Kitcher 1989, 432). 50
A fundamental thesis of Friedman's view — that understanding is obtained by reducing the
number of "ultimate" facts that must be accepted — is retained by Kitcher, but a new
ingredient is added: reduction (and thus unification) is achieved not by the reduction of one
set of laws by another, smaller set, but through the recurrent use of patterns of derivation.
Unification consists, on Kitcher’s view, in the systematization of a great set of facts by a set
of schematic patterns of derivation: an explanation is simply an instantiation of any of the
patterns of derivation that belong to the best current systematization.
The most important concept employed in Kitcher's account is that of "explanatory
pattern." To understand it we must first grasp another basic concept: the "explanatory
store." Suppose there is, at a given time, a body of knowledge, K, sanctioned by the
scientific community. Although he does not say this, Kitcher conceives of K as a set of
sentences. The explanatory store, E(K), is that set of explanatory patterns that best
systematizes K, where a systematization is any set of arguments that derives some members
of K from others. The best systematization of K displays certain properties. Most important,
E(K) must have unifying power greater than any other set of explanatory patterns. 51
A preliminary statement of Kitcher's account of scientific explanation may already
be formulated: a derivation is an explanation if and only if the derivation instantiates a
pattern in the explanatory store, E(K). Next, two obvious questions must be answered:
What is an explanatory pattern? And what is it to instantiate an explanatory pattern? Once
Kitcher's answers to these questions are laid out, a larger, more important question will
surface in their place.
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3. 1.2.1 Explanatory Patterns
On Kitcher's view, a general argument pattern consists of:
(a) a schematic argument, which is a sequence of schematic sentences; a
schematic sentence is, in turn, an expression obtained by replacing some of
the nonlogical expressions with dummy letters;
(b) a set of filling instructions, which are instructions for replacing the
dummy letters of each schematic sentence;
(c) a classification, which tells us which sentences of the schematic
argument are to be considered premises, and which are to be inferred from
others.
As suggested above, an argument is an acceptable explanation if and only if it instantiates
an argument pattern in E(K). An argument instantiates a general argument pattern exactly if:
(i) the argument has the same number of terms as the schematic argument of
the general argument pattern;
(ii) each sentence or formula in the argument can be obtained from the
corresponding schematic sentence by applying the appropriate filling
instructions;
(iii) the sentences of the argument fulfill the roles required by the
classification of the general argument pattern (1989, 432-433).
One of Kitcher's many detailed examples will clarify these abstract conditions. The
example, which employs Darwin's theory of natural selection, is supposed to be
implemented in response to questions of the form, "Why do almost all the organisms in C
have P?" The schematic argument, filling instructions, and classification of the Simple
Selection Pattern are as follows:
Schematic argument:
(1 ) The organisms in C are descendants of the members of an ancestral population
G* that inhabited an environment E.
(2) Among the members of G* there was variation with respect to 7: some members
of G* had P, others had P#, P##,...
(3) Having P enables an organism in E to obtain a complex of benefits and
disadvantages C, making an expected contribution to its reproductive success w(C);
having P# enables an organism to obtain a complex of benefits and disadvantages
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C#' making an expected contribution to its reproductive success w(C#b etc w(C) >
w(C#), w(C) > w(C##), etc.
(4) For any properties Pu P2> if w(P,) > w(P2) then the average number of offspring
of organisms with P, that survive to maturity is greater than the average number of
offspring of organisms with P, that survive to maturity.
(5) All the properties P, P#, PM,... are heritable.
(6) No new variants of 7 arise in the lineage leading from C* to C (i.e., the only
variation with respect to 7 comprises the properties P, P#, P##,... already present in
G*). All the organisms in this lineage live in 7.
(7) In each generation of the lineage leading from G* to G the relative frequency of
organisms with P increases.
(8) The number of generations in the lineage leading from G* to G is sufficiently
large for the increases in the relative frequency of P to accumulate to a total relative
frequency of 1
.
(9) All members of G have P.
Filling Instructions: 7 is to be replaced by the name of a determinable trait (a
"character-type"), P, P#, P##,...are to be replaced with the names of determinate
forms of the trait, G* with the name of an ancestral species, E with a
characterization of the environment in which members of G* lived, C, C#,...are to
be replaced with specifications of sets of traits, and w(C), w(C#),... are replaced with
non-negative numbers.
Classification: (1)-(6), (8) are premises; (7) is derived from (1)-(6); (9) is derived from
(7) and (8) (444).
This argument pattern, says Kitcher, is implicit in the Origin of Species and other Darwinian
texts, though not all Darwinian explanations instantiate this pattern. Moreover, many
modern evolutionary arguments, he claims, are extensions of this pattern in which more
precise and detailed argumentation is provided in support of individual premises; in support
of (5), for example, specifications of the genetic basis of the trait under study might be
added.
A couple of comments on explanatory patterns are in order. First, Kitcher’s notion
of a classification appears to admit non-deductive arguments, which would accommodate
statistical and other kinds of non-deductive explanation (e.g., narratives), as well as outdated
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forms of explanatory inference that have been important in science (e.g., Aristotle's
syllogistic logic). The notion of classification is thus a feature that could be fit to a wide
range of examples from the history of putative scientific explanations.
Kitcher spurns this advantage, however, to defend a "deductive chauvinism,"
according to which membership in E(K) is restricted to deductive arguments. Kitcher
thereby invites the criticism that his account cannot accommodate non-deductive
explanatory patterns that have been important in the history of science. Indeed, the Simple
Selection Pattern exhibited by Kitcher is itself an unpersuasive model of deductive
derivation. Premise (4) is constructed so that the argument will be deductively valid.
Unfortunately, premise (4), so constructed, is also false. Group A of organisms may have
greater expected reproductive success than Group B, but it does not follow that Group A
will have greater actual reproductive success than Group B. It is possible, under any
number of chance circumstances, that the members of B will outreproduce the members of
A, even if the members of A are better adapted to their environment. Premise (4) should be
replaced with a stochastic premise. A stochastic premise, however, would destroy the
deductive validity of the argument.
Kitcher's worry is that he will not be able to construct a comparative criterion of
unifying power unless he restricts explanations to deductive arguments (448). For now, I
merely note that a classification need not restrict explanations to deductive inferences, and
that Kitcher introduces this restriction as an independent condition.
Returning to Kitcher's general theory, the nature and role of the filling instructions
must be clarified, for they determine what counts as an instantiation of an explanatory
pattern. It is clear that the filling instructions do much more than provide names for
variables in the schematic sentences of a pattern. Here it is helpful to recall Kitcher's (1 976)
criticism of Friedman's theory, which was illuminated by a discussion of Newton's laws of
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mechanics. Kitcher noted that in each of the many domains in which Newton's second law
may be applied, e.g., to explain the motions of planets, the pressure of gases, the motion of
a simple pendulum, etc., different auxiliary laws must be introduced to facilitate the
employment of Newton's second law
.
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This suggests an important role for filling
instructions. In the case of Newton's second law, for example, the filling instructions would
provide the various auxiliary equations to be employed to obtain a value for F, as well as
the conditions under which each auxiliary equation should be applied. Each of the
auxiliary equations would require, of course, its own set of filling instructions.
Consequently, the filling instructions could become quite complicated. This suggests,
nonetheless, that filling instructions are to be viewed as rules for the instantiation of
schematic sentences of explanatory patterns; these rules, together with the classification,
determine the scope of instantiation of an explanatory pattern.
What sorts of rules constitute filling instructions? In particular, does Kitcher view
these rules as explicit and complete instructions for instantiating patterns? Here the
clarification of Kitcher's intentions requires a detour. By featuring argument patterns in his
account of explanation, Kitcher believes himself to be articulating and developing some of
Thomas Kuhn's insights concerning the nature of scientific knowledge and understanding.
He writes:
When we conceive of scientific theories as sets of statements (preferably
finitely axiomatized) then we naturally think of knowing a scientific theory
as knowing the statements — typically knowing the axioms and, perhaps,
some important theorems. But, as Kuhn points out, even in those instances
where there are prominent statements that can be identified as the core of
the theory, statements that are displayed in the texts and accompanied with
names — as, for example, Maxwell's equations, Newton's laws, or
Schrodinger's equation — it is all too common for students to know the
statements and yet fail to understand the theory, a failure signaled by their
inability to do the exercises at the end of the chapter. Scientific knowledge
involves more than knowing the statements. A good account of scientific
theories should be able to say what the extra cognitive ingredient is.
I claim that to know a theory involves the internalization of the
argument patterns associated with it, and. ..an adequate philosophical
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reconstruction of a scientific theory requires us to identify a set of argument
patterns as one component of the theory (Kitcher 1989, 437-438)
Kitcher does not say exactly wherein this process of internalization consists, but one might
reasonably infer that he views it to be a Kuhnian process of learning: one grasps a theory,
not by memorizing any set of complete and explicit rules for instantiating the theory's
associated derivation patterns, but by applying the patterns in a variety of practice
exercises. For reasons soon to become evident, however, this interpretation is
inconsistent with Kitcher's intentions. In order to evaluate the unifying power of sets of
patterns, on Kitcher s account, one must be able to count, for every candidate set of
patterns, both the number of derivation patterns and the total number of instantiations of the
patterns.
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If the filling instructions are not explicitly and completely formulated, then such
counting is impossible. As a result, the unifying power of a set of patterns cannot be
measured, nor can that of competing sets be compared. Hence, Kitcher must maintain that
filling instructions are complete and explicit. To put it another way: The explanatory scope
of a theory, on Kuhn's view, is necessarily inexplicit and inexact. In contrast, the
assessment of a theory's unifying power demands that its explanatory scope be explicit and
precise. Kitcher's theory can thus hardly be regarded as a more precise development of
Kuhn's views. 55
3. 1.2. 2 Unifying Power
Kitcher replaces the question, "When is some information a scientific explanation?",
with the new question, "What are the conditions under which a derivation pattern is to be
accepted into the explanatory store?" Kitcher's answer is that a derivation pattern, 5, is to
be accepted into the explanatory store, E(K), if and only if E(K) u S has greater unifying
power than E(K). It is already evident that unifying power is a property of sets of
explanatory patterns, and not a property of particular derivations or individual patterns
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themselves; it is, in other words, a "global" property. On Kitcher's view, a set of patterns
has greater unifying power than another set if, other things being equal, it has (i) fewer
patterns, (ii) more stringent patterns, or (iii) a larger consequence set. 56
The consequence set of any set of patterns, S, is the set containing the conclusions
of all instantiations of all patterns of 5. Although Kitcher does not say this, the size of a
pattern's consequence set would seem to be a function of three features: the logical
structure of the pattern's premises (schematic sentences), the liberality of the filling
instructions for the pattern, and the rules of deductive logic. Later, we will see that Kitcher
adds a further constraint: the predicates used in the pattern must be projectible.
Concerning the stringency of patterns, Kitcher writes:
Derivations may be similar either in terms of their logical structure or in
terms of the nonlogical vocabulary they employ at corresponding places.
The notion of a general argument pattern allows us to express the idea that
derivations similar in either of these ways have a common pattern.
However, similarity is a matter of degree. At one extreme, a derivation is
maximally similar to itself and to itself alone; at the other, any pair of
arguments can be viewed as having a common pattern. To capture the
notion that one pair of arguments is more similar than another pair, we need
to recognize the fact that general argument patterns can demand more or
less of their instantiations. If a pattern sets conditions on instantiations that
are more difficult to satisfy than those set by another pattern, then I shall say
that the former pattern is more stringent than the latter (433).
Stringency is thus conceived as a measure of the similarity of the instantiations of a pattern
of derivation. Although Kitcher does not pretend to offer a complete account of stringency,
he provides two formal criteria of comparative stringency, the gist of which can be
summarized easily in informal terms. First, assuming that two explanatory patterns, P and
P*, have identical classifications, then
(T*) explanatory pattern, P, is more stringent than P* if P's filling instructions
are such that the set of substitution instances allowed for P's nonlogical
vocabulary is a proper subset of the substitution instances allowed for the
nonlogical vocabulary of P*.
43
The second criterion holds in some cases in which the classifications for two explanatory
patterns are roughly similar, but not identical:
(R*) suppose the classifications of explanatory patterns P and P* are
identical, except that the classification of P appeals in a certain place in the
derivation to certain kinds of general principles, while the classification of
P* articulates the inference in the corresponding place by specifying
schematic premises linked in definite ways. Then if the set of instantiations
of P* is a proper subset of the set of instantiations of P, then P* is more
stringent than P . 57
The limitations of these criteria should be obvious: they provide a comparative measure of
the stringencies of two derivation patterns only under the condition that the set of
instantiations of one pattern is a proper subset of the set of instantiations of the other. In
most actual comparisons this condition would not be met. Furthermore, whenever this
condition is satisfied by two patterns, the threat of tradeoffs between stringency and wealth
of consequences surfaces: the more stringent pattern will always have a smaller
consequence set (because it has fewer instantiations) than the less stringent pattern; and the
less stringent pattern will have a larger consequence set. So it seems that whenever
stringency comes into play in a comparison, alternative applications of Kitcher's criteria will
lead to contrary conclusions.
Why, then, does Kitcher believe that a measure of stringency is required for
explanatory patterns? Stringency is introduced, I think, to address a couple of related
concerns .
58 One concern is non-explanatory patterns that display great unifying power
according to the criteria of paucity of patterns and wealth of consequences alone. Here at
least two kinds of cases may be cited. First, there are patterns that are the result of
superficial conjunctions . 59 Schematic premises from distinct derivation patterns, e.g.,
genetic drift and Darwinian natural selection patterns, may be logically conjoined so as to
create a single pattern. The single pattern would seem, on grounds of paucity of patterns
and size of consequence sets, to have unifying power greater than that of the set containing
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the two distinct patterns. But the gain in unifying power would be superficial. An appeal to
stringency would block the inference to the conclusion that the conjunction pattern has
greater unifying power, for the conjunction pattern would also be less stringent than each of
the two distinct patterns. It is important to point out, however, that the appeal to stringency
does not rule out the superficial conjunction (it merely offsets the original appeal to paucity
of patterns) and Kitcher does not tell us how to decide in cases of tradeoffs.
A similar difficulty is introduced with the following sort of derivation pattern:
Everything that God desires, God creates.
Everything that God creates, exists.
God desires x.
Therefore, x exists.
Certainly, the objection would go, one's account of scientific explanation cannot accept
such explanatory patterns. Considerations of stringency, however, allow this pattern to be
rejected: one could argue that a scientifically acceptable pattern of explanation must be
more stringent than one that explains everything. Criteria of stringency also accommodate
the fact, noted by Kitcher, that scientists occasionally object to theories on the grounds that
they explain too much. Darwin's critics, for example, complained that Darwin's
explanatory reasoning could be applied to any conclusion whatsoever (Kitcher, 1981, 183).
Are Kitcher's criteria of stringency useful or adequate for these purposes? With
regard to the first objection, the weakness of an appeal to stringency has already been
stated: it fails to rule out superficial conjunctive patterns, although it does avoid the
conclusion that the conjunctive pattern has unifying power greater than that of its
component patterns. As for the second and third objections, one has the sneaking suspicion
that such hypothetical explanations should be ruled out, if possible, for reasons other than a
lack of stringency: the theological derivation, for example, is best rejected because its
premises lack empirical evidence (what scientific evidence is there, for example, of the
nature of God's desires?).
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The third concern that scientists occasionally complain that a proposed theory
explains too much - might also be handled differently. The complaint often seems to be
not that a theory explains too much, but that either it is unfalsifiable - that is, it is consistent
with all possible (or available) evidence — or it explains phenomena for which it is clearly
the incorrect explanation. One thinks, for example, of the tendency of some neo-
Darwinians to see every biological trait as an adaptation resulting from natural selection,
without even considering alternative explanations
.
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3. 1.2. 3 Evaluation of Kitcher's Theory
The notion of an explanatory pattern is the central feature of Kitcher's account, for it
is the ordering of premises in explanatory patterns that fix the relations of explanatory
dependence
.
61 The structure of patterns is determined, in turn, by Kitcher's criteria for
acceptance to the explanatory store: the paucity and stringency of patterns and their wealth
of consequences. Kitcher's main thesis, therefore, is that these criteria of unifying power, as
applied to competing sets of primary patterns of derivation, fix the relations of explanatory
relevance embodied in the explanatory derivations found in science. Here we arrive at the
primary question facing Kitcher's account: Are Kitcher's criteria of unifying power
adequate to account for the explanatory patterns found in science
?
Kitcher demonstrates the advantages of his theory of scientific explanation by
applying it to two sorts of philosophical problems: explanatory relevance and asymmetries
of explanation (which may be viewed as a special problem of relevance). A close look at
an illustration will be instructive. One example discussed by Kitcher is the notorious
derivation of the height of a tower from the length of its shadow, certain facts about light,
and some geometrical principles (call this the shadow-derivation ).
62 The common wisdom
among philosophers is that such a derivation, though deductively sound, does not
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constitute an explanation of the height of the tower. Assume that S is a set of explanatory
patterns acceptable to K (the current body of knowledge) and includes the pattern
responsible for the shadow-derivation, and that E(K) is the current explanatory store. Kitcher
argues:
Within E(K) there are derivations that yield conclusions about the heights of
towers, the widths of windows, the dimensions of artifacts and natural
objects alike, which instantiate a general pattern of tracing the present
dimensions to the conditions in which the object originated and the
modifications that it has since undergone. Sometimes, as with flagpoles and
towers, the derivations can be relatively simple: we start with premises
about the intentions of a designer and reason to an intermediate conclusion
about the dimensions of the object at the time of origin; using further
premises about the conditions that have prevailed between the origin and
the present, we reason that the object has persisted virtually unaltered and
thus reach a conclusion about its present dimensions. With respect to some
natural objects, such as organisms, stars, and mountain ranges, the
derivation is much more complex because the objects have careers in
which their sizes are substantially affected. However, in all cases there is a
very general pattern that can be instantiated to explain current size. I shall
call derivations generated by this pattern origin-and-development
explanations (485).
Now, 5 either includes the origin-and-development pattern, or it doesn't. If it does, argues
Kitcher, then 5 contains at least one more pattern than E(K), i.e., the pattern on which the
shadow-derivation is founded. If S does not include the origin-and-development pattern,
then 5 must have a consequence set that is smaller than that of E(K), for the pattern
instantiated by the shadow-derivation does not generate as many consequences as does the
origin-and-development pattern. In either case, the unifying power of E(K) would surpass
that of 5, and Kitcher's theory would thus account for the irrelevance of the shadow-
derivation.
Kitcher's introduction of an "origin-and-development" pattern should immediately
raise suspicions. First, it is doubtful that there is any actual pattern of explanation like
Kitcher's origin-and-development pattern. The phenomena he mentions — organisms, stars,
mountain ranges — are too diverse, it would seem, to be covered by any single pattern. As
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Eric Barnes (1992) points out, however, Kitcher's argument does not require there to be a
single origin-and-development pattern. For the argument from unifying power goes through
even if there are a number of origin-and-development patterns in the explanatory store, so
long as one covers the origin of towers.
Nonetheless, one cannot resist the suspicion that Kitcher is playing fast and loose
with his notion of a pattern. At the least, the vagueness and imprecision of Kitcher's
"origin-and-development" pattern belies the apparent precision of his description of
explanatory patterns in general, and of the variety of specific examples he cites (cf. the
Darwinian Simple Selection pattern above). One must remember that to be convincing,
Kitcher's theory of explanation requires precision in the determination of patterns and their
explanatory scopes. Without precision, one doubts that the unifying power (and
explanatory force) of theories can be assessed or compared in any meaningful way.
Putting these concerns aside for the moment, Kitcher's treatment of the problem
remains unpersuasive as it stands. First, unifying power is always the result of three
simultaneously present (and interdependent) properties: the paucity of explanatory patterns,
the stringency of patterns, and the size of the consequence set. Only two of these,
however, are considered in Kitcher's argument, and these are appraised only in isolation
under different conditions. Consider the premise: if S does not include the origin-and-
development pattern, then 5 must have a consequence set that is smaller than that of E(K).
The premise seems reasonable. The consequent suggests, however, that 5 could also be
more stringent than E(K) to some degree. Extrapolating from principles (T*) and (R*), 63 the
deviant pattern in 5 is more stringent than the origin-and-development pattern if the former's
set of substitution instances is a proper subset of the latter's set of substitution instances.
Whatever the filling instructions of Kitcher's origin-and-development pattern might be, the
filling instructions of the shadow-derivation pattern could be written such that its set of
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substitution instances would be a proper subset of that of the origin-and-development
pattern. S would thus be more stringent than E(K).
This is a general problem for Kitcher's account, and it results from the dependence
of a pattern’s stringency on the size of its consequence set. Roughly speaking, the degree of
stringency of a pattern (or set of patterns) is inversely proportional to the size of its
consequence set. Without explicit rules there is no way to judge the effect of a tradeoff
between different aspects of unifying power. Kitcher realizes that tradeoffs may exist, but
provides no guidance here (477-478). Faced with a tradeoff in the tower and shadow
example (and Kitcher s other examples as well), his solution to the asymmetry problem is
inadequate.
In any case, even if Kitcher could clarify both the nature of the origin-and-
development pattern and the apparent tradeoffs between stringency and wealth of
consequences, more serious difficulties confront his treatment of explanatory irrelevance.
First, the shadow-derivation is not as weak, on Kitcher's criteria, as he claims, for it
instantiates very general patterns of derivation — patterns which are probably already
members of Kitcher's explanatory store. One such pattern employs the Pythagorean
theorem to derive the length of any side of a right triangle from the lengths of other sides,
and might be called the Pythagorean pattern. 64 Intuitively, the Pythagorean pattern already
belongs to the explanatory store, for it is used extensively in mathematics. Moreover, the
Pythagorean pattern may be applied legitimately to derive values for the lengths of many
real and imaginary, as well as mathematical, objects. The Pythagorean pattern thus
exhibits, on Kitcher's criteria, an awesome contribution to the unifying power of the
explanatory store, E(K). But if E(K) contains a Pythagorean pattern, and the shadow-
derivation instantiates it, then Kitcher's account no longer rules out the shadow-derivation
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as deviant. Indeed, Kitcher's account would seem to sanction the explanatory force of the
shadow-derivation.
This discussion indicates, I think, a grand problem for Kitcher's view of explanation:
if unifying power is to be the ultimate and sole criterion of explanatory power, then there is
nothing to prevent purely mathematical or formal derivations from being employed as
explanations in many areas of empirical science. Furthermore, purely mathematical or
formal derivations would probably, on Kitcher's criteria, dislodge many legitimate kinds
(e.g., causal) of explanation, for there are few theories (or patterns of derivation) in the
natural sciences with the generality — and thus unifying power — of theorems of
mathematics and other formal sciences. The formal sciences would, on grounds of unifying
power, run explanatory roughshod over empirical science.
It is difficult to see how Kitcher could exclude a Pythagorean pattern from the
explanatory store, but Kitcher might develop his argument in any of a number of other
ways. He might plausibly argue that even if there is a Pythagorean pattern in the
explanatory store, it is not instantiated by the shadow-derivation. He could argue, for
example, that the statement describing the height of the tower is best placed as a conclusion
only of his origin-and-development pattern. But how could he defend this move? Certainly
not by appeal to unifying power: for the unifying power of E(K) is the same regardless of
which pattern is given responsibility for the derivation of the height of the tower, so long as
both the origin-and-development and Pythagorean patterns are already members of the
explanatory store. The dispute between the Pythagorean and origin-and-development
patterns is one of explanatory scope, and Kitcher's theory provides no resources with which
to settle such disputes . 65
There is another reply that Kitcher might try. In his discussions of problematic
examples, Kitcher often rejects patterns on the grounds that their predicates are
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unprojectible (480-2, 486-7; this is the extension of the theory I mentioned earlier). Perhaps
Kitcher could argue that the Pythagorean pattern can be applied broadly in the natural
sciences only by employing predicates that are unprojectible. In the shadow-derivation we
have assumed that the tower is straight, stands perpendicular to the ground, and casts a
shadow of a particular length. If the Pythagorean pattern is to be applied broadly in
science, however, such conditions will not always be met. Now, Kitcher claims that the
origin-and-development pattern will cover not only common middle-sized objects but also
atomic, cellular, and astronomical-sized objects, as well as objects of various shapes. To
cover an equal range of objects, the Pythagorean pattern would have to contain complex
predicates describing the disposition of objects to form right triangles when placed adjacent
to lines of determinable length. 66 Surely, Kitcher could argue, these predicates cut across
the distinctions made by the projectible predicates of our language, for the right triangles
and lengths cited in the predicates are of heterogenous kinds. That the predicates are
unprojectible suggests that the Pythagorean pattern is really an illegitimate fusion of many
different sorts of patterns. Once the illegitimate fusion was disintegrated into legitimate
patterns with projectible predicates, one would see that these patterns cannot match the
unifying power of the set associated with the origin-and-development pattern, and they
would thus be rejected.
This reply is not very promising. On the one hand, Pythagorean terms such as "right
triangle" and "length," when applied to the diameters of planets and cells, heights of towers,
etc., seem no less projectible than the terms "mass" or "velocity," when applied to the same
objects by Newtonian mechanics. On what grounds could Kitcher exclude the predicates
of the Pythagorean pattern yet include the predicates of legitimate general patterns of
explanation such as those of Newtonian mechanics?
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On the other hand, the predicates of Kitcher's origin-and-development pattern look
pretty messy themselves, for the pattern is a fusion of many radically different kinds of
origin-and-development stories, e.g„ those of trees, buildings, human beings, boulders,
viruses, and the moon. Thus, even if criticism of the predicates of the Pythagorean pattern
were accepted, there is reason to believe that Kitcher's origin-and-development pattern
would suffer equally under scrutiny of its predicates.
Equally important, Kitcher offers no theory of predicate projection, and there is
reason to doubt that he has an adequate theory of predicate projection at his disposal. In
his seminal discussion of the "new problem of induction," Goodman equates a theory of
projection with a theory of lawlikeness (1983, 121), and Kitcher accepts that an adequate
account of lawlikeness depends on a satisfactory analysis of predicate projectibi I ity. 67
Kitcher has a novel theory, however, about the nature of laws: laws are simply those
generalizations that appear in patterns in the explanatory store (1989, 447). Consequently,
one might surmise that projectibility, for Kitcher, is determined by the predicates used in
patterns of the explanatory store. But then his argument to rule out deviant patterns by
reference to the unprojectibility of their predicates begs the question, for it must assume that
the deviant patterns are not members of the explanatory store. 68
Let us turn to a perhaps more realistic case than the shadow-derivation, one
discussed recently by Eric Barnes in connection with Kitcher's theory (1992, 564-566). 69
The case rests on a fact about Newtonian mechanics, namely, that it is temporally
symmetrical: assuming that the system is closed, one can apply Newton's laws to
descriptions of the state of the world at some particular time and derive descriptions of
phenomena, e.g., of the motion of a planet, both forward and backward in time. Barnes
appeals to this symmetry to suggest that two patterns of explanation employing Newton's
laws of mechanics can be constructed: he calls them the Newtonian Predictive and
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Retrodictive Patterns. The only difference between these patterns is that the Predictive
Pattern employs information about the preceding state of the world to derive descriptions of
subsequent events, while the Retrodictive Pattern employs information about the
subsequent state of the world to derive descriptions of preceding events. It is easy to
imagine what such patterns might look like.
There is one further difference between the two patterns: the Predictive Pattern
provides derivations that are intuitively explanatory, 70 while the Retrodictive Pattern does
not, for phenomena cannot in general be explained by citing facts that occurred subsequent
to the phenomena themselves (Barnes, 1992, 565). Now suppose E(K) is the explanatory
store, which includes the Newtonian Predictive Pattern. 71 The set of explanatory patterns,
A, is identical to E(K), except that the Predictive Pattern is replaced by the Newtonian
Retrodictive Pattern. Barnes argues, in effect, that A has unifying power equal to that of
E(K). Each set of patterns has the same number of patterns, and the patterns are equally
stringent. Moreover, the consequence sets of each set of patterns are roughly the same size,
if not identical. E(K) is not, therefore, to be favored over A according to Kitcher's criteria.
Since A contains the nonexplanatory Retrodictive Pattern in place of the explanatory
Predictive Pattern, however, E(K) is to be preferred intuitively. Again, Kitcher's account
seems unable to distinguish explanatory derivations from non-explanatory derivations.
Kitcher might argue, as he did in the case of the shadow-derivation, that the
Newtonian Predictive Pattern is embedded in a more general pattern that cannot be
matched by the Retrodictive Pattern. This general pattern would have to be based,
however, on the sole difference between the Predictive and Retrodictive Patterns: the
opposite temporal orderings of their premises. The pattern Kitcher needs would be a very
general pattern in which events-to-be-explained are derived from descriptions of antecedent
events. Kitcher could then argue that the Predictive Pattern is to be preferred because it can
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be embedded in this more general pattern with even greater unifying power. But in science
inferences are made from consequences to antecedents (e.g., effects to causes) just as
frequently as from antecedents to consequences. One could therefore construct an
opposing very general pattern in which descriptions of antecedent states of the world are
derived from information about consequent states, and in which the Newtonian
Retrodictive Pattern could be embedded. Such a pattern would promise unifying power
comparable to that of Kitcher's more general pattern, yet would yield unexplanatory
derivations. This reply to Barnes's objection therefore seems unpromising.
Kitcher has another option: he could simply concede that, given the identical
unifying power of the Predictive and Retrodictive Patterns, they have equal explanatory
force. To this, Barnes replies:
This admission,. ..besides implying (absurdly) the explanatory force of the
Retrodictive Pattern, would entail (on Kitcher's antirealist account of
causation) that there is no causal asymmetry between earlier and later states
of a Newtonian system (566).
If Kitcher swallows this absurdity, says Barnes, it will bring additional problems. Here he
refers to Kitcher's hypothesis that relations of causal dependence are derived from the
explanatory ordering of things and processes. Speaking of the idea that explanatory
asymmetries signal causal asymmetries, Kitcher writes:
[T]his is not something that a proponent of the unification view ought to
deny. What is distinctive about the unification view is that it proposes to
ground causal claims in claims about explanatory dependency rather than
vice versa. So we account for the intuition that appeals to shadows do not
explain the heights of towers because shadow lengths are causally
dependent on tower heights, by suggesting that our view of causal
dependency, in this and kindred cases, stems from an appreciation of the
explanatory ordering of our beliefs (1989, 436). 72
But if Kitcher supposes that causal explanation is founded on a prior explanatory ordering of
beliefs, and also accepts that the Newtonian Retrodictive Pattern has explanatory power
equal to that of the Predictive Pattern, then it follows, argues Barnes, that Newtonian
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systems are causally symmetrical.” The first absurdity, on Kitcher's account of causation, is
thus compounded by a second.
This objection, though not decisive, highlights a further difficulty for Kitcher's view.
The objection is not decisive because it assumes that any ordering founded on criteria of
unifying power (or that class of orderings, at least, under which Newtonian mechanics
would fall) implies a causal ordering. Kitcher does not believe, however, that primary
explanatory orderings necessarily entail causal relations: they can also be the basis of
mathematical and other kinds of noncausal explanatory relations. But simply rejecting the
premise is insufficient: if causal, mathematical, functional, structural, intentional, and other
kinds of explanation are all to be derived from more primary relations of explanatory
dependency, i.e., from relations grounded on principles of unification, then Kitcher must
show how one is to distinguish these different varieties of explanation. How Kitcher might
draw such a distinction is unclear. Barnes's objection, which is founded on this unclarity,
retains its force so long as Kitcher cannot tell us how to distinguish different kinds of
explanatory orderings.
Kitcher's theory thus falters in the more interesting case of Newtonian mechanics as
well, and we are left with the strong suspicion that in one respect Kitcher's account is no
improvement on Hempel's: his theory simply cannot distinguish explanatory from non-
explanatory derivations. With this latest development, the neo-positivist intuitions about
scientific explanation seem to have run into a dead end.
3.2 Paleo-Positivist Theories of Scientific Explanation
3.2.1 The Pragmatics of Explanation: Scriven's Contributions
The proper application of scientific knowledge in explanatory contexts may require
attention to various pragmatic factors that logical models of explanation tend to ignore. The
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pragmatic aspects of explanation have been investigated by a number of authors/4 and
many important insights have come to light through these studies. At least three kinds of
explanatory pragmatic contexts have been studied: (i) the context of why-questions; (ii) the
intentional context; and (iii) the epistemic context, in which the focus is either broad
background beliefs, or gaps in knowledge. The insights of these approaches will be
discussed here. At the same time, it will be shown that, contrary to the views of some
authors, there is more to scientific explanation than pragmatics. It will be shown, in other
words, that although pragmatic aspects of explanation are important, scientific explanation
is not merely the pragmatic application of scientific knowledge. Scientific explanations
must contain a certain kind of information, namely, causal information.
We begin our discussion of the pragmatics of explanation with a discussion of
Michael Scriven’s work, which is notable in three respects: for his incisive criticism of the
Covering-Law Model of explanation, for his emphasis on the link between explanation and
understanding, and for his discussion of the pragmatic characteristics of explanation. As we
have completed a discussion of the inadequacies of the Covering-Law Model, only the latter
two respects will concern us here.
In discussing the relationship between explanation and description, Scriven writes:
The question we have to answer is how and when certain descriptions
count as explanations. Explaining how fusion processes enable the sun to
maintain its heat output consists exactly in describing these processes and
their products. Explaining therefore sometimes consists simply in giving the
right description. What counts as the right description? Tentatively, we can
consider the vague hypothesis that the right description is the one which
fills in a particular gap in the understanding of the person or people to
whom the explanation is directed. That there is a gap in understanding, or a
misunderstanding, seems plausible since whatever an explanation actually
does, in order to be called an explanation at all it must be capable of
making clear something not previously clear, that is, of increasing or
producing understanding of something. The difference between explaining
and "merely" informing, like the difference between explaining and
describing, does not, I shall argue, consist in explaining being something
"more than" or even something intrinsically different from informing or
describing, but in its being the appropriate piece of informing or describing,
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the appropriateness being a matter of its relation to a particular context The
distinguishing features will be found. ..in the known or inferred state of
understanding and the proposed explanation's relation to it (1 962 1 75
176). '
The function of explanation, on Scriven's view, is to fill a gap in understanding, which is
always a gap in the understanding of some specific person or persons. To judge whether an
explanation has been given demands attention, therefore, to the explanatory context in
which the gap in understanding has been noticed. An inquirer's lack of understanding can
have a number of sources, the remedy of which requires specific kinds of explanatory
information. Following is a survey of the kinds of explanatory information discussed by
Scriven in various places. 75
First, an inquirer may have false beliefs that obstruct his or her understanding of a
phenomenon. Accordingly, an explanation can provide information that corrects false
beliefs ("truth-justifying grounds" in Scriven (1962)). This includes the correction of false
presuppositions of why-questions, the importance of which, we will see below, has been
emphasized by van Fraassen. Corrective information is clearly pragmatic, for what counts
as corrective is a function of the false beliefs of the particular inquirer. Corrective
information has at least one feature that does not depend on context, however — it must be
true.
Second, an inquirer often lacks knowledge about the phenomenon or about
connections between it and other phenomena. Once the novel information is grasped, the
inquirer understands the phenomenon and its connections to other phenomena.
Explanation can thus provide novel information about the phenomena or their connections
(especially causal connections). The novel information provided by an explanation may, in
some contexts, be no more than that some x, which is already familiar to the inquirer, is the
explanation of y. This kind of explanatory information is called "role-justifying grounds" by
Scriven (1962).
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Viewed from the opposite angle, providing information that is already known to the
inquirer is never sufficient, in itself, to boost his or her understanding. This is not to say that
every piece of an explanation must be novel; the reiteration of known information can
improve the coherence and comprehensibility of an explanation. In addition, what is
already known usually plays an essential role in understanding the phenomenon in
question. Explanations must, nonetheless, include some information that is novel to the
inquirer.
Third, an inquirer may require information of a particular type or from a certain area
of interest. Explanations must therefore be of the intended type (e.g., type of cause) or from
the requested area of interest. For example, one seeking a psychological explanation of
behavior would be unsatisfied with a purely physical description of a sequence of actions.
Similarly, one seeking an evolutionary explanation of the melanic coloring of some moths
would not be satisfied with information about the physiological development of wing-
coloring in individuals or about the function of melanism, even if these kinds of information
were novel to the inquirer. The type-requirement seems to embody something like the
relevance relation discussed by van Fraassen, which we will treat in detail below.
Like van Fraassen, Scriven also cites implicit contrast or emphasis as a factor that
determines type-relevance. When a boy asks why his gun rusted when left in the basement,
it will not suffice to tell him that the oxygen of the air caused the gun to rust, for
the boy's question requests an explanation of why his gun rusted, his
specifically, and an answer which refers to a factor common to all guns,
including those which have not rusted, is not relevant, since it fails to
explain the distinction implicit in the request (1975, 14).
Fourth, an inquirer requires information at a suitable level of difficulty or expertise.
Consider again the boy seeking an explanation of his rusted gun. It would be inappropriate,
in this case, to provide an answer including the full molecular details of the process of
rusting. A proper explanation corresponds to the general level of understanding of the
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inquirer: providing information that is incomprehensible to the inquirer cannot fill a gap in
understanding.
Related to the fourth kind of information is the need for information of a suitable
precision. The need for a specific degree of precision has at least two distinct sources. First,
it reflects the inquirer's level of expertise. In addition, it serves functions of convenience,
e.g., ease of calculation or manipulability. Explanations that provide information of the
third, fourth, and fifth kinds are called "type-justifying grounds" by Scriven (1962).
Scriven (1 962, 1 975) thus cites evidence of at least five pragmatic features of the
provision of adequate explanations:
(i) Correctivity. information that corrects the false beliefs of the inquirer) correctivity
may be viewed as a special case of novelty;
(ii) Novelty: information about phenomena and their (causal) connections that is
unknown to the inquirer;
(iii) Type-specificity: information of the type or from the particular area of interest to
the inquirer.
(iv) Comprehensibility: information that is comprehensible to the inquirer.
(v) Precision: information at the level of precision desired or required by the
inquirer; precision overlaps comprehensibility.
Each of these features is a pragmatic, contextual function of the beliefs, interests, or level of
understanding of the person seeking the explanation, and is thus pragmatic.
These pragmatic features are prominent in explanations, and Scriven's work is
important for having emphasized them. Of special importance to pragmatic theories of
explanation is the notion of type-specificity. In the discussion to follow, it will be shown
that the development of this feature by pragmatic theories is insufficient to avoid crippling
difficulties. As for the other features mentioned by Scriven — novelty (including
correctivity), comprehensibility, and precision — they will be incorporated into the causal
theory that I develop later.
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3.2.2 The Pragmatics of Explanation: Van Fraassen's Theory of Why-Questions
Van Fraassen's theory is exemplary of the contemporary approach that considers the
context of why-questions to be crucial to understanding explanation. Van Fraassen, like
other Humean positivists (cf. Mach), began with a metaphysical and epistemological
program, and then, recognizing that explanation in science cannot be ignored, sought to
formulate an account of explanation consistent with his program. This pursuit has ended in
a pragmatic theory of explanation, according to which explanation is simply knowledge
drawn from the body of science that is fit into the contextual requirements of a given why-
question.
Van Fraassen's general program, which he has dubbed "constructive empiricism,"
declares that:
Science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate; and
acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically
adequate. 76
Van Fraassen acknowledges that science seeks to explain interesting phenomena, and that
the provision of good explanations is one criterion of theory acceptance (1 983, 1 69). He is
concerned to show, however, that although the provision of good explanations may be one
reason to accept a theory, it is no reason to believe the theory to be true. This argument is
offered in service of the fundamental doctrine of his program, namely, that empirical
adequacy alone provides evidence of a theory's truth. Van Fraassen's separation of
explanation and truth is also part of his defense of anti-realism concerning unobservable
entities, another tenet of his constructive empiricism. Van Fraassen maintains that if the
provision of good explanations is no reason to believe a theory to be true, then it is also no
reason to believe that the unobservable entities postulated by the theory exist.
So explanations provide information, on van Fraassen's view, but the explanatory
force of this information can in no way assume or confirm the truth of the theory on which
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the explanation is founded, or the existence of the entities postulated or presupposed by the
theory. Van Fraassen thus seeks an account of explanation that allows him to carry on the
tradition of Humean skepticism.
3.2.2. 1 Bengt Hannson: The Necessity of a Pragmatics of Explanation
What kind of information, on van Fraassen's view, do explanations provide, and
what are the benefits of explanatory information? The starting point of van Fraassen's theory
is an important unpublished paper by Bengt Hannson (1974), in which Hannson shows that
a successful theory of explanation requires a pragmatics of explanation. 77 To see this,
consider the proposition, Adam ate the apple," and the corresponding interrogative, "Why
did Adam eat the apple?" Upon reflection, remarks Hannson, this interrogative is
equivocal, for it can be interpreted in at least three ways, each of which can be indicated by
the use of emphasis:
(i) Why did Adam (i.e., and not Eve) eat the apple?
(ii) Why did Adam eat (i.e., and not save) the apple?
(iii) Why did Adam eat the apple (i.e., and not the pear or the banana)?
The emphasis expresses the focal aspect of the question, and the parenthetical remarks
suggest contrasting alternatives. An answer to a why-question, Hannson points out, must
respect the focus and contrastive force of the question, for an answer suitable for a question
with one focus may not be appropriate for one with a different focus (and contrastive force).
"Because he was hungry," for example, may be suitable as a response to (ii), but it probably
will not suffice as an answer to (iii), for it does not address the emphasis and contrastive
force of (iii): "Because he was hungry" does not tell us why Adam ate the apple instead of
the pear or the banana, the explanation of which is demanded by (iii). 78
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This point about the equivocality of interrogatives has significant consequences for
the theory of explanation: explanations must take account of the focus and contrastive force
of interrogatives (or of explananda). The Covering-Law Model, for example, is inadequate
in this respect. Under the formal model of language assumed by Hempel's theory, an
explanandum is always a proposition. A proposition, in turn, is characterized by a unique
set of truth conditions. On this view, the statements underlying questions (i)-(iii) express the
same proposition, and therefore the same explanandum, namely, "Adam ate the apple." A
Covering-Law explanation of any statement expressing this proposition is thus ipso facto an
explanation of any other statement expressing the same proposition, for any grounds for
believing one would be grounds for believing the others. The explanation of any one of (i)-
(iii) would, on the Covering-Law Model of explanation, automatically be an explanation of
the others. This does not, as Hannson shows, fit explanatory practice, and there must
therefore be more to an explanation than providing grounds for believing the explananda to
be true.
Hannson's point about focus and contrastive force is not restricted to interrogatives:
explananda in declarative form exhibit the same equivocality. Even if one believes that
explanation has little to do with why-questions, per se, one cannot thereby escape
Hannson's concerns about equivocality. The equivocality (focus and contrastive force) of
explananda is a problem for any theory of explanation.
Explanations must therefore respect the focus and contrastive force of why-
questions. /9 It is clear, moreover, that the focus and contrastive force of why-questions is a
function of context. To incorporate these aspects into his own theory, Hannson suggests
that all why-questions be taken to have the form, Why P in contrast to Q?, where P and Q
constitute a contrast class of alternatives . 80 The contrast class of question (iii), for example,
would be <Adam ate the apple, Adam ate the pear, Adam ate the banana >, while for (ii) it
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might be < Adam ate the apple, Adam saved the apple > . The contrast class associated
with a particular why-question, suggests Hannson, is determined by its (intentional) context,
and is usually left unmentioned because it is obvious within the context. 8 '
3. 2. 2. 2 Van Fraassen's Theory of Why-Questions
Why-questions and their answers (and explananda, in general, and their
explanations) thus have a pragmatic dimension unrecognized by previous theories of
explanation. Taking this cue from Hannson, and drawing on further work by Belnap (1963)
and Belnap and Steel (1976), van Fraassen embeds his theory of explanation in a theory of
why-questions. A question, he says, is an abstract entity expressed by an interrogative in
the same way that a proposition is expressed by a declarative sentence. An interrogative is
always expressed within a given context, and the why-question expressed by an
interrogative is determined by three factors:
(1 ) the topic of the why-question;
(2) a contrast-class; and
(3) a relevance relation.
The topic of a why-question is the proposition supposed to be true in the why-question, and
which is implied by all direct answers to the question. For example, the question, "Why
does the level of the ocean rise and fall?" presupposes that the ocean level does, in fact, rise
and fall. A question arises, or is in order, only if its presupposition is true. 82
A contrast class, as noted above, is a set of propositions that includes the topic and a
group of contrasting alternatives. The contrast class selects a why-question from the number
of possibilities suggested by an interrogative: the intended why-question is picked out by
looking at the contrast class of possible alternatives. Nonetheless, the topic and contrast
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class alone do not fully determine the interpretation of a why-question, nor the suitability of
an answer (explanation).
There is also a relation of relevance that must hold between an answer and the why-
question. The relevance relation may shift according to topic and contrast class, but these
alone do not determine the relevance relation itself. Take the question, "Why do certain
moths of the species Lepidoptera in England have melanic coloring?" The topic here is,
"Certain moths of the species Lepidoptera in England have melanic coloring." If we
suppose the contrast class to be < certain moths have melanic coloring, they have pale
coloring >, then the topic and contrast class rule out all potential answers directed toward
other contrast classes. 8 * But the topic and contrast class alone do not specify sufficiently the
explanation tequested. only one of a number of kinds of explanations, e.g., developmental,
evolutionary, functional, creationist, or even aesthetic (in the context, for example, of a
painting of English moths), might be relevant and required, even after the contrast class is
settled. It should be noted that most of these kinds of explanation are scientific, and thus it
cannot be assumed that relevance relations (or contrast classes) are determined
automatically in scientific contexts. 84
Van Fraassen thus argues that a question's relevance relation must also be taken into
account. A number of different relevance relations are important in science, he says,
including those that pick out descriptions of prior events, of standing conditions, and of
functions (1980, 1 42). This list is not exhaustive, but suggests that a topology of relevance
relations might be constructed to complete his theory of why-questions. 85
Van Fraassen thus arrives at the following theory: an explanation is an answer of the
form: Pk , in contrast to (the rest of X), because A, where Pk is the topic of the why-question,
X is the contrast class, and A bears relevance relation R to the couple < Pk , X> ,
86
Scientific
explanation is thus a three-place relation between scientific knowledge, fact, and question-
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context, and the pragmatic structure of the why-question (or the explanandum) determines
which part of the body of scientific knowledge will be explanatory in the given context.
Scientific explanations, on van Fraassen's view, are thus an application of scientific
knowledge to satisfy desires for descriptive information, and these desires are specific to a
question-context. Scientific explanations are scientific only insofar as they draw information
from the body of scientific knowledge, and they are explanatory only insofar as they satisfy
the constraints of the interrogative context.
Scientists not only provide explanations when asked questions, however, they also
search for explanations. Van Fraassen's theory provides a rationale for the search for
explanation. This search, says van Fraassen, is driven by two factors: the immediate
demands of question contexts and the general need for empirically strong theories to be
applied in question-contexts. The search for explanations is thus acknowledged to be a part
of science, but is described in terms consistent with van Fraassen's constructive empiricism:
the search for explanation is by no means a search for ultimate truth or reality; any
connection between explanation and metaphysics or truth is denied.
3. 2. 2. 3 Evaluation of Van Fraassen's Theory of Why-Questions
The degree of van Fraassen's success in capturing the notion of scientific
explanation is debatable. 8 " For one, it follows from van Fraassen's view that almost any
statement can, in some situation or other, constitute a suitable answer to any given why-
question . 88 This result is so counterintuitive that some philosophers consider it to serve as a
reductio of van Fraassen's theory . 89
Yet more concrete concerns trouble van Fraassen's theory. His talk of the "context"
of a why-question is ambiguous. There is the immediate question-context, i.e., the context
in which the why-question is posed, and in which the intentions and interests of the
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speakers play a significant role. This is the context in which a certain contrast class and a
certain relevance relation are specified, by the speakers, from sets of possibilities. As this
description suggests, however, there may also be sets of possible contrast classes and
relevance relations outside of and prior to any particular immediate question-context.
These sets, I submit, are determined in a context broader than that of the immediate
question-context - call it the wide historical context. What can be said about these sets of
possible contrast classes and relevance relations? It seems to me that three general
approaches are possible.'10 First, one could deny that there is anything to say about sets of
contrast classes and relevance relations outside of immediate question-contexts. Van
Fraassen seems to be taking this approach when he insists that explanation is purely
pragmatic, and that he has solved all the major philosophical problems of explanation.
Despite these claims, it should be noted that van Fraassen found it possible to furnish a
partial typology of relevance relations that includes events-leading-up-to, standing
conditions, and functions (1980, 1 42). Taking this cue from van Fraassen, it would seem
that much remains for a theory of scientific explanation to do: specifically, one could
attempt to construct a complete typology of possible relevance relations in science, and to
elucidate the foundations of this typology. 91 Here two general directions of pursuit are
possible. First, one could try to construct the typology of relevance relations believed to be
universal and immutable across scientific disciplines and throughout the history of science.
Most contemporary theories of explanation (e.g., Hempel’s, Salmon's, and Kitcher's) may be
viewed as attempts to do just this, though in all fairness it should be noted that many of
these authors recognize that explanatory practices differ across scientific disciplines,
especially between physics and the "softer" sciences. 92 A second approach would be to
attempt to demonstrate that typologies of possible relevance relations change across
disciplines, historical eras, paradigms, research programmes, research traditions, or
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whatever, and then try, accordingly, to construct and explain the typologies for these more
localized contexts. My own sympathies lie in this direction, although my discussion will
not emphasize the historically local features of explanation: I make successful explanation
dependent upon knowledge of causal capacities, and, although I have not stressed it, this
knowledge is always located within historical groups of scientists.
In any case, it seems that van Fraassen's theory of why-questions does not complete
the task of the philosopher interested in scientific explanation. Consider how van
Fraassen s theory might be applied to an individual case. Suppose one were to ask the
question, "Why do these butterflies have wings, rather than not?" The topic and contrast
class of the question are obvious from the (unnatural) manner in which the question is
posed, but to answer the question properly, the relevance relation must also be specified.
Now, to a biologist, various legitimate kinds of explanations based on distinct possible
relevance relations come to mind — functional, developmental, or evolutionary, for
example; other kinds of explanations based on other possible relevance relations, e.g.,
theological or aesthetic, are ruled out. The biologist might then question the inquirer to
discover what sort of explanation — functional, developmental, or evolutionary — the
questioner desires, before he or she provides the suitable explanation. In a different
context, e.g., if a questioner were to pose the question to an art historian while standing
before a Dali painting in which butterflies were depicted, the result would be quite
different. Different sets of possible relevance relations would come into play, and different
sets would be ruled out (including, it can be imagined, all those of interest to the biologist).
Now we come to the point: van Fraassen's theory tells us only that the explanation
provided by the expert must match the selected relevance relation, and proposes that the
relevance relation is determined by the context. I agree that the immediate context does
determine the relevance relation to a certain extent: The immediate context (i.e., the
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intentions of the questioner) determines, for example, whether a biological explanation is
sought, rather than some other, e.g., art historical. The intentions of the questioner may
determine, furthermore, what kind of biological explanation is sought, e.g., evolutionary,
developmental, or functional. But the intentions of the questioner and other aspects of the
immediate question-context do not explain the origins of these explanation-categories, nor
do they specify the content of each category, e.g., what counts as an acceptable
evolutionary explanation. The selection of a particular explanation-category (relevance
relation, in van Fraassen's terms) is selected locally in accord with the questioner's
intentions, but the origin, structure, and content of explanation-categories is not. Moreover,
the structure and content of these categories is not arbitrary, and should be accounted for by
the theory of explanation. FHere the wide historical context is decisive: the wide historical
context — not the immediate question-context — determines the structure and content of
the relevance relations that are significant for the biologist, for example, or for the art
historian.
Because van Fraassen's theory cannot account for structure and content of these
categories — for it suggests that these issues are settled by the immediate question-context
— it cannot clarify, to any degree of satisfaction, why it is appropriate for the biologist to
answer, for example, "The wings of these butterflies fulfill the following functions: they
allow the butterflies to regulate its body temperature by trapping warm air underneath them
as they sit on a heat-radiating surface; they allow the butterflies to fly, which is required if
they are to find nourishment, etc.," but inappropriate to answer, "The wings of these
butterflies embody the freedom of the human spirit, which, as represented by the remainder
of the work, is reduced to absurdity in the face of the crushing force of social repression." A
complete theory of scientific explanation should not only delineate the topology of possible
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relevance relations appropriate to each field of science, but also elucidate the origin,
structure, and general content of these relations in science.
The causal theory of explanation, I will submit, can do this: according to the causal
theory, the structure and content of possible relevance relations in a subfield of science falls
out of the scientists' knowledge of causal capacities operative in the phenomena described
by the subfield. The structure and content of the relevance relations in science is
determined, in other words, by scientists' knowledge of the causal structure of the world. 93
3.2.3 Further Developments in the Pragmatics of Explanation: Explanation and
Epistemic Context (Gardenfors, Sintonen)
We have seen that van Fraassen's theory of explanation is incomplete, at best. But
van Fraassen's theory is not the last contribution to our understanding of the pragmatics of
explanation. We will consider two further pragmatic theories to see if they provide pieces
to supplement the understanding provided by van Fraassen.
Sintonen (1989) agrees that the logic of why-questions is too weak to reconstruct the
rationale of question-posing and explaining in science. But he believes that pragmatics
contain the key to understanding explanation. He proposes to enrich the interrogative
approach with a more robust understanding of the explanatory context: in particular, he
supplements the logic of why-questions with an interesting theory of inquiry. His proposal
derives in part from Gardenfors (1980) suggestive discussion of the dynamic epistemic
context of explanation. It also makes use of the structuralist view of theories, which
provides him with a framework in which to develop a Kuhnian theory of inquiry. 94 Other
pragmatic theorists, as we have seen, have attended to contextual features of explanations.
The interest of Sintonen's proposal lies in his attempt to explain these contextual factors.
Sintonen begins by sketching some promising features of the logic of questions
(1989, 254-257). The logic of questions allows us to use epistemic logic to study the
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conditions under which an answer is conclusive for an inquirer. The idea works well,
argues Sintonen, so long as whenever a question is put, one knows what counts as an
answer. One's knowledge of what counts as an answer can be either strong or weak. In its
strong form, he says, the knowledge confers on one the ability to enumerate all possible
answers. In its weak form, one knows only what type of answer would count. In any case,
the logic of questions works best where a knowledge of language and its categories suffices
to insuie that both the questioner and answerer know precisely what would count as an
answer. Who, what, and where-questions (which are termed "wh-questions") offer the most
advantageous examples: When one asks, for instance, "Who killed the President?",
knowledge of language and its categories suffices to determine that the answer must be the
name of a person.
Unfortunately, argues Sintonen, the logic of why-questions cannot match the
precision of wh-questions
.
95 Take an example of Sintonen's: "Why did the radiator of my
car crack?" Knowledge of language and its categories alone does not yield any set of
possible answers to this question. Sometimes, of course, one has enough background
knowledge to be able to enumerate a set of potential answers to why-questions; in the case
of the cracked radiator, a mechanic will know that the possible answers include metal
fatigue, freezing coolant, faulty manufacture, etc. In cases in which strong background
knowledge is available, the search for an explanation becomes a search for evidence to
determine which of the set of potential answers is correct. It is clear in these cases,
however, that the background knowledge required extends way beyond that of language
and its categories. Moreover, in many cases — especially those of interest to science — the
set of potential answers cannot be delineated, even if extensive background knowledge is at
hand. Sometimes, the most we can say is that the answer must be a cause or a reason.
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Indeed, a why-question may even presuppose a fact that contradicts the inquirer's
background knowledge.
The significant differences between wh-questions and why-questions, argues
Sintonen, suggest that the logic of wh-questions will be of little use in understanding why-
questions or constraints on explanatory answers. What is needed to strengthen the
interrogative analysis, he believes, is a better understanding of the background knowledge
relevant to question and answer sequences. The goal of Sintonen's project is to clarify and
to put order into the background knowledge underlying why-questions and their answers.
The object of Sintonen's analysis is the explanation-scheme, S explains to H why E by
uttering u in problem context p, and its launching point is the knowledge-situations model
of Gardenfors (1980).
3. 2.3.1 Gardenfors: The Dynamic Epistemic Context of Explanation
Peter Gardenfors, like van Fraassen, takes Hannson's unpublished article as a guide,
but offers a theory of explanation that accounts for explanation in terms of the features of
dynamic epistemic contexts. The intuitive touchstone of Gardenfors' theory is the following
situation. The scientist is confronted with an event (or fact) that is surprising. The event
surprises the scientist because his or her background knowledge did not provide grounds to
expect the event to occur. The goal of explanation, on Gardenfors' view, is to bring the
unexpected explanandum into accord with the background knowledge, thereby reducing
the former's "surprise value." He proposes a model of knowledge situations that presumes
to make sense of this process. The basic idea of the model is that explanations provide
information that raises the expected probability of the explanandum, E, thereby reducing E's
"surprise value." In most situations in which an explanation is sought, naturally, the
explanandum, E, is already known to be true; its probability is therefore 1, and cannot be
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increased by the addition of explanatory information. Gardenfors' solution to this problem
is to distinguish various epistemic states, and to focus on the change in the expected
probability of £ across epistemic states.
Three epistemic states of the person inquiring after an explanation are distinguished
by Gardenfors. First, there is epistemic state KE, in which the inquirer knows that the
explanandum, £, is true, but does not know why. Second, there is epistemic state K, which
is identical to KE except for the minimal changes required to remove knowledge of £ from
K
e-
ln state K, E has expected probability B, where 0 < B(E) < 1
.
% Gardenfors calls B(E)
the belief value of £ in K. When £ actually occurs, the person who was in epistemic state
K is surprised to some degree (the degree of surprise is in inverse proportion to the size of B
in K), and, accordingly, seeks an explanation of £. An explanation is a set of sentences that,
when added to the inquirer's initial body of knowledge K, would increase the expected
probability of £, i.e., reduce £'s surprise value. Finally, there is epistemic state, /CTuC, which
is identical to K with the addition of potential explanans 7 u C (where 7 is a set of
probability statements and C a set of singular sentences). 7 u C explains £ if B TvjC(E) > B(E),
that is, if the expected probability of £ is greater in epistemic state KTl:( than it was in
epistemic state K. The best explanation, on this model, would be the set of information, 7 u
C, that maximizes the expected probability, or belief value, of £.
It should be obvious that explanatory relevance, on this account, is a pragmatic
property of sets of informative sentences, for it depends on the knowledge situations of the
inquirer. Without going into further details of Gardenfors' theory, some evaluative remarks
can already be made.
One achievement of Gardenfors' proposal is that it provides an account of contrast
classes: the information contained in contrast classes, he argues, reflects the epistemic states
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of inquirers. Consider the question, "Why did Adam eat the apple?", which, as we saw
above, may be interpreted in at least three ways:
(i) Why did Adam eat the apple?;
(ii) Why did Adam eat the apple?; or
(iii) Why did Adam eat the apple ?
Suppose that (in) is associated with the contrast class C„„ < Adam ate the apple, Adam ate
the pear, Adam ate the banana > . The inquirer who poses (iii) thus wishes to know why
Adam ate the apple instead of the pear or the banana. Now consider the situation of an
inquirer A who knows (in initial epistemic state KA ) that Adam likes apples but hates pears
and bananas. Inquirer A thus expects that Adam would eat the apple instead of the pear or
banana, and the fact that he did would not come as a surprise to, nor require an explanation
for, inquirer A. In other words, the potential explanandum E, "Adam ate the apple instead
of the pear or banana," has belief value (for A) sufficient97 to rule out (iii) and its associated
contrast class Cw . The epistemic state of an inquirer thus determines, in part, the contrast
class of a why-question (or explanandum) by ruling out alternative potential contrast classes.
If Adam were to eat the banana instead of the apple, however, inquirer A would
demand an explanation, for this outcome is unexpected under A's initial epistemic state KA .
A's initial epistemic state KA furnishes, moreover, the contrast class for A's why-question (or
explanandum): Since, according to KA
,
it was expected that Adam would eat the apple, the
question that arises for A is, "Why did Adam eat the banana instead of the apple?" The
contrast class of A's query thus consists of the outcome expected under A's initial epistemic
state KA
,
and the explanandum (i.e., the unexpected outcome that actually occurred). The
initial epistemic state of the inquirer thus not only rules out alternative potential contrast
classes, but also shows how questions (and their affiliated contrast classes) arise for an
inquirer.
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Gardenfors' account has, nonetheless, a major weakness: the theory cannot account
for explanatory relevance."8 Gardenfors' theory cannot account for explanatory relevance
because it, like Hempel's theory, rests ultimately on an epistemic conception of
explanation: to explain something, on Gardenfors' theory, is to give grounds for believing
(or for expecting) it to be true. This can be seen in a simple example. Assume I have the
following belief about the weather: when it is sunny in the morning I expect that it will not
rain in the afternoon. Suppose that today, however, it rained in the afternoon, although it
was sunny this morning. Since the rain was unexpected, the question arises for me, "Why
did it rain this afternoon?" An explanation of the rain, on Gardenfors' theory, would be
information that, when added to my original epistemic state, would increase the expected
probability of rain in the afternoon. It's obvious that information can be provided that will
increase the expected probability of rain, but does not, intuitively, explain why it rains.
Suppose, for example, that a friend shows me a barometer and informs me that whenever
the reading on the barometer drops more than one inch within a period of 24 hours, the
chance of rain increases. My friend points out, moreover, that within the 24-hour period
before this afternoon, the barometer had, in fact, dropped more than one inch. Clearly, this
information, if added to my original epistemic state, would have increased the belief value
of rain this afternoon. Equally clearly, this information does not explain why it rained. In
general, information that increases the expected probability of some explanandum does not
necessarily explain it." Gardenfors' proposed theory does not, therefore, escape the basic
problem of epistemic models of explanation.
Sintonen argues that Gardenfors' account suffers from further problems. First, there
are many phenomena that are quite familiar to scientists, yet remain unexplained. In such
cases, it is not possible to raise the belief value of, or, under Gardenfors' theory, to explain,
the phenomena by the addition of further information. Consider, for instance, the
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movement of the tides: Newton's theory of gravitation provided an explanation of the
phenomenon, but did not thereby increase the expected probability of the phenomenon. In
addition, Sintonen complains that even if one assumes that all there is to explanation is
raising the expected probability of the phenomenon, Gardenfors' account suggests no
rationale for searching for explanations. For if explanation (and understanding) are tied to
expected probability, why, if one already knows that E is true, should one seek out £'
s
explanation?
3. 2. 3. 2 Sintonen's Theory of Explanatory Commitment
The problem with Gardenfors' model, Sintonen believes, is that it does not tell us
why the scientist should keep an eye on past epistemic states (1989, 264). The key to
resolving the problem, he advises, is to recognize that scientists confront the phenomena
bearing pre-existing explanatory commitments. Gardenfors is correct to emphasize the
epistemic context of explanations. He is wrong, however, to assert that explanation and
understanding consist of changes in the expected probability of explananda. In Sintonen's
opinion, the tension addressed by explanatory information lies not in differences between
prior and posterior expected probabilities, but between prior explanatory commitments and
the as-yet-unexplained phenomena confronting the scientist. Accordingly, the impetus of
the search for explanation is the desire to fulfill one's explanatory commitments. The
question, then, is, what are one's explanatory commitments?, and where do they come
from? Sintonen's primary contribution is a theory of explanatory commitment, which he
attempts to extract out of Kuhn's notion of a "disciplinary matrix" and the structuralist
account of theories.
The structuralist view is one of at least three varieties of the semantic view of
theories. 100 In semantic approaches, theories are conceived in terms of models of formal
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systems: more specifically, the semantics of a theory is provided by defining a class of
models for the theory. According to semantic views, a theory is thus composed of some
abstract mathematical structures (laws) and a class of models, which are abstract
descriptions that satisfy the mathematical structure of the theory. Because these models are
isomorphic to classes of empirical phenomena, they also provide an interpretation of the
mathematical structure. The class of models defined for the theory may be viewed as
specifying the scope of empirical application of the theory. Differences between semantic
approaches are a function of the various ways in which the class of models of a theory may
be defined. Some approaches define the class of models by defining a set-theoretical
predicate; others define the class of models in terms of phase or state spaces. Structuralists
such as Sintonen allow the class of models to be defined intentionally through the
introduction of Kuhnian exemplars.
According to the structuralist view, a theory consists of a theory core, K, which
represents the conceptual apparatus of the theory, and a set, /, of the intended applications
of the theory. The theory-core K may be represented by the four-tuple, <M
pp ,
Mpl M,C>.
M stands for the set of (mathematical) laws of the theory. M
pp
stands for the set of potential
models of the theory. Potential models are abstract descriptions that have enough of the
right kinds of properties such that one can ask whether they satisfy the laws of the theory.
M
pp
is a subset of the set, M
p ,
the set of partial models of the theory. The partial models of a
theory satisfy the laws of the theory with respect to the non-theoretical quantities of the
laws. Theoretical quantities, roughly speaking, are those for which one must assume the
truth of the theory in order to measure them. Non-theoretical quantities are those whose
values can be obtained independently of the theory. The partial models of a theory are thus
those descriptions about which it makes sense to ask whether a theoretical expansion of the
model, i.e., the introduction of theoretical quantities, would yield a potential model of the
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theory. Finally, C stands for the set of constraints, which ensure that functions appearing in
distinct intended applications receive the same value.
A simple example will clarify all this terminology. Consider an Archimedean theory
of static equilibrium. 10 ' The theory applies to systems of objects that are balanced on a
pivot point, e.g., a beam balance with iron weights on one tray and apples on the other. In
each case, each object on the balance, o„ has a certain weight, g(o,), and a certain distance
from the pivot point, d(o). The theory consists of two laws: (I) All objects have a weight
greater than zero; and (II) the sum of the products of the weights and distances from the
pivot point of the objects on one side is equal to that on the other, i.e.,
g(o)d(o) + g(oi+1)d(oi+ ,) + g(oi+2)d(oi+2) + ...
= g(o
(
)d(0/ ) + g(o/+ ,)d{ol+ ,) + g{oj+2)d(ol+2 ) + ... .
Let s assume, for the moment, that weight is a theoretical quantity, i.e., that something like
our Archimedean theory of static equilibrium must be assumed in order to determine the
weight of any object. The set of partial models, Ma
p ,
would then include descriptions of
systems including apples, oranges, and iron weights, and their exact distances from pivot
points between them; it would not include, however, descriptions of the weights of any
objects. The set of potential models, /Vf
pp ,
would include those members of Ma
p
to which
we could add descriptions of the weights of particular objects such that we could ask
whether the descriptions satisfied the laws of the theory. Finally, the set of constraints on
our theory, Ca
,
might include the following condition: that the weight of any particular
object remains the same in distinct applications of the theory.
We have thus just described the core of an Archimedean theory of static
equilibrium. For our purposes, however, the most important part of the theory remains
uncharacterized: the set, /, of intended applications. In general, / is a subset of the set of
potential models of the theory, M
pp
.
Not every potential model, however, is designated to
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be an appl.cation of the theory. Here is the point at which the structuralists appeal to
Kuhn's understanding of scientific theories. According to Kuhn, there is no set of complete
and explicit rules for the application of a scientific theory. The scope of application of a
theory is delineated, argues Kuhn, by sets of paradigmatic exemplars, and one comes to
understand a theory and the scope of its application by working through the paradigmatic
examples and practicing the application of the theory in other problem contexts.' 02
Following this idea, the structuralists hold that the members of / are to be designated
intentionally through the introduction of paradigmatic exemplars. The complete set of
intended applications is determined by inexplicit relations of similarity between the
exemplars and other potential models. Obviously, the set of intended applications, /, and,
hence, the empirical significance of the theory of which it is a part, is therefore bound to a
particular scientific community's interests and aspirations.
The structuralists also develop the idea of a theory-net. A theory-net, N, contains a
fundamental theory, <K0 , lp > and a number of specialized theory-elements <K„ /,>
introduced to make specific claims about limited classes of applications. The fundamental
core of a theory may thus give rise to a hierarchical structure of specializations. Moulines
(1979) explicates Newtonian mechanics, for example, as a theory-net whose fundamental
theory includes the second law, F = ma, while its specialized theory-elements contain laws
that bring the theory to bear on specialized applications, e.g., the motion of pendula, the
motion of objects in gravitational systems, etc. With the notion of a theory-net, one can
describe the evolution of theories in the following way: a theory evolution is a sequence of
<K0/ lp > -based theory-nets in which each successive theory-net contains at least one
theory-element (or a specialization therefrom) of its preceding theory-net.
As was mentioned above, the set of intended applications, composed of l
p
of the
fundamental theory and the /, s of the other theory-elements of the theory-net, includes not
78
only the exemplary applications of the theory, but also the complete set of applications
designated by the exemplars. At any given time, however, only some of the intended
applications will have been shown to be models of the theory. Within a scientific
community, there is thus a constant tension between the claim that all the intended
applications picked out by l
p
and the I , s can be treated by the conceptual apparatus of the
theory K
n and the fact that, at any given time, some applications have not yet been
confirmed. Therein, argues Sintonen, lies the impetus for the search for explanation.
The set of intended applications displays, in other words, the explanatory
commitments of the theory. At any given moment, some intended applications have not yet
been shown to be models of the theory. The search for explanation is simply the search for
a demonstration that an as-yet-unexplained phenomenon is truly a model of the theory.
Sintonen thus argues that the rationale of the search for explanation — which is missing in
Gardenfors' and all other epistemic accounts of explanation — has its source in the
discrepancy between a theory's explanatory commitments and its explanatory
achievements.
Sintonen's account presumes to handle other puzzles of epistemic accounts, as well.
For example, it provides an account of the relative interest of unexpected phenomena.
Why do not all phenomena with low initial belief values motivate a search for explanation
upon their appearance? Sintonen's theory tells us that only those phenomena that fall in the
set of intended applications receive serious attention. Sintonen's proposal also leaves room
for explanatory pluralism in science, for it accommodates the possibility that there are
distinct types of inquiry, the demands of which are determined by distinct modes of
understanding and standards of intelligibility (1989, 274).
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3. 2.3.3 Evaluation of Sintonen's Account
Whatever insights the structuralist view of theories offers into the nature of scientific
theories and their evolution, Sintonen's use of it does little to elucidate the nature of
scientific explanation. The explanatory commitments of a theory, he argues, are
determined by the set of intended applications of the theory, which is delineated, in turn,
by a set of paradigmatic exemplars. A set of statements S is explained, therefore, if (1 ) S is a
model of an accepted theory; (2) S is similar (in the right way) to an exemplary application
of the theory (S is, in other words, an intended application of the theory); and (3) 5 had not
yet been demonstrated to be a model of the theory.
Unfortunately (for Sintonen's view), laws and theories have many applications in
science, only one of which is explanation. Other uses of theory include the calculation of
quantities, the prediction of events, the making of theoretical inferences, the control of
processes, and the design of experiments. Exemplars of these other kinds of applications
are often found in science textbooks, and they must be included in the set of intended
applications that defines the semantics of a theory. The set of intended applications
therefore displays a variety of theoretical commitments — both explanatory and non-
explanatory — and Sintonen's theory provides no means by which to distinguish between
them. 103 The set of intended applications thus does not demarcate the theory's explanatory
commitments.
Sintonen might reply that some applications of theory are intended by the scientific
community to be explanations, others calculations, still others predictions, etc. Granted,
scientists do intentionally distinguish between explanatory and other applications of theory.
One can even grant the Kuhnian thesis that explanatory applications are sometimes
delineated through the introduction of exemplars. But can we say nothing more about what
it is to be explanatory than that it is intended by the scientific community to be explanatory?
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Are there no general features of explanatory applications of theory that distinguish them
from other applications ? 104
Smtonen's account raises other concerns, as well. It seems doubtful, for example,
that all explanations are theoretical in the way required by Sintonen's account, which
demands that an explanation be a model of some theoretical structure. Some scientific
explanations, e.g., that the primary factor responsible for AIDS is the presence of HIV, do
not seem to be models of any formal theory.
Additional criticisms of Sintonen's structuralist-pragmatic account of explanation
will be introduced below in the chapter on explanatory controversy. Nevertheless, it
should already be apparent that Sintonen's theory achieves little success as a supplement to
the pragmatic theory of explanation. With this failure of the latest developed version of the
pragmatic account, both of the two major positivist approaches to accounts of scientific
explanation have encountered crippling difficulties. It is time to return to causal theories of
explanation, theories who promise is grounded not only in the failures of positivist
approaches, but in new theories of causation.
81
CHAPTER 4
THE CAUSAL THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, causes,
or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge and
understanding is attained (Aristotle, Physics, I, 1 84a 1 0ff.).
The treatment of causal explanation presented here owes much to the work of two
authors, Wesley Salmon and Nancy Cartwright. Salmon's Scientific Explanation and the
Causal Structure of the World (1984) was the first detailed and sustained defense of the
view that scientific explanation consists in the explication of causes and causal mechanisms.
Essential to Salmon's argument were the claims that an account of scientific explanation
requires a distinction between causal and non-causal laws, and that this distinction cannot
be captured in terms of epistemic — including statistical relevance — relations alone. 105 The
causal theory presented below differs from Salmon's (1984) in a number of significant ways.
First, Salmon's theory relies on an indefensible theory of counterfactuals. I will show that
the causal theory (including Salmon's) can be defended without the use of
counterfactuals. lll( ’ Second, although Salmon's theory of explanation is a causal theory, it
remains very much a covering-law theory as well: causal laws, though they are
distinguished from non-causal laws, are still conceived by Salmon to be laws of regularity;
and explanation is still the (logical) subsumption of phenomena under these laws. 107 Taking
a cue from Cartwright's recent work (1989, 1 992), I will argue that causal laws are better
understood as capacity ascriptions. As a result, causal explanation does not consist in the
(logical) subsumption of phenomena under causal laws, but in the assertion that certain
causal capacities are operative in particular cases (or kinds of cases).
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The causal theory of scientific explanation will be introduced via a critical
discussion of theories of causation and of the nature of causal laws. Although reasons will
be given to doubt that a universal theory of causation is possible, a theory recently offered
by Dowe and Salmon will emerge as the best current candidate. The important distinction
between causal capacities and causal interactions will then be proposed, and, pace
Cartwright, the interpretation of causal laws as capacity ascriptions will be defended. With
an improved understanding of causation and causal laws in hand, essential features of an
improved causal theory of explanation will be outlined. In addition, the relations between
scientific explanation, scientific theory, experiment, and process control will be elucidated
with respect to the causal theory.
The argument in favor of the causal theory of scientific explanation takes place in
four stages. The first stage was accomplished in Chapter 3, where it was demonstrated that
non-causal theories suffer from severe philosophical difficulties. The other three stages are
pursued in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. At the conclusion of Chapter 4, the philosophical
advantages of the causal theory will be rehearsed in detail. In Chapter 5, common
objections to causal theories of explanation — most importantly, those arising from Hume's
skeptical philosophy — will be shown to be innocuous. Finally, in Chapter 6, a series of
detailed historical studies will be invoked to adjudicate between causal and positivist
theories of explanation.
4.1 What is a Cause?
It is usually demanded of the causal theory of explanation that it provide an
adequate theory of causation. This demand is difficult to meet, for "cause" is a loose,
generic term (like "object," "evidence," or "theory") whose meaning is hard to specify with
precision. Common definitions of "cause," such as "a person, thing, fact, or condition that
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brings about an effect, or that produces or calls forth a resultant action or state," are
unsatisfactory as a basis for a theory of causation because they rely on terms (e.g.,
produces, or "calls forth") that, as vague synonyms, provide no analysis, and no
clarification, of "causes."' 08
I will introduce an interesting theory of causal interaction advanced by P. Dowe and
W. Salmon, but the causal theory of explanation does not rest on the success of this theory.
It is enough to demonstrate, as I will, that (1) the natures of particular causal capacities and
interactions can be specified in clear terms; (2) causal capacity and interaction ascriptions
are testable in specific cases; and (3) that causal capacity ascriptions are not reducible to
non-causal accounts such as those in terms of counterfactual conditionals, regularities, or
necessary and sufficient conditions. Of course, it would be nice if we had an adequate
theory of causation. But the causal theory of explanation should not be dismissed for lack
of a theory of causation so long as it can be shown that specific causal ascriptions are both
clear and testable.
4.1.1 Traditional Views of Causation
Causation, or causal ascriptions, are analyzed most often in one of two ways: as
statements about regularities, or as counterfactual conditionals. These and other traditional
analyses of causation will be discussed in this chapter.
4. 1.1.1 Causation As Regularity
Twentieth-century discussions of causality have been dominated by the regularity
view of causality. According to this view, which perhaps has its origin in Newtonian
philosophy of science, a causal ascription is equivalent to a claim that whenever, in fact, a
cause C appears, its effect E appears as well. In Hume's words,
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we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all
t e objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second
(1977, 51).' 09
A.J. Ayer formulates the regularity view as follows:
every proposition of the form "C causes E" is equivalent to a proposition of
the form "whenever C, then E," where the symbol "whenever" must be
taken to refer, not to a finite number of actual instances of C, but to the
infinite number of possible instances (1 952, 55).
The regularity view was also held by Hempel, who stated it this way:
Consider first the explanatory use of what may be called general statements
of causal connection: these are to the effect that an event of some kind
A. ..causes an event of a certain other kind
,
6. ..Without entering into a more
detailed analysis, we may say that in the simplest case a statement of this
type affirms a law to the effect that whenever an event of kind A takes place
then there occurs, at the same location or at a specifiable different one, a
corresponding event of kind B..."To say that X causes V is to say that under
proper conditions, an X will be followed by a V," as Scriven puts it (1965
348).
These various formulations are not identical. Hume's formulation recognizes only past
experience; for Hume, a cause is that which has been conjoined with the effect in the past.
Ayer expands the scope of the formulation to include all possible instances of the cause.
Hempel, in turn, adds that the conditions under which the cause appears must also be
specified. Despite these divergences, the basic idea in each case is the same: a cause, A, of
effect, B, is such that whenever A appears (under specified conditions, if necessary), B
appears as well.
There is another notable difference between the views of Hume and those of his
positivist followers such as Ayer and Hempel. Post-Humean positivists who adhere to a
regularity account of causation believe causation to be reducible to laws of association: they
consider, in other words, the regularity account to be a satisfactory account of causation.
Hume, on the other hand, did not: causal relations could not, on his view, be reduced to
laws of association because laws referring to unobserved instances could not be validated.
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As a result, he turned to a theory of mental propensities to account for laws of association,
including causal laws. 110
The regularity view has a number of inadequacies as an analysis of causation. First,
some well-known causal laws cannot be understood as regularities, for they are conditional
laws whose antecedent conditions are never instantiated in nature. 111 Two examples are
Coulomb s Law and the Law of Inertia. The Law of Inertia, for instance, describes the
behavior of any object with mass, so long as no forces act upon it. It therefore describes the
actual behavior (regular or otherwise) of no natural object, for all natural objects behave
under the action of forces.
The natural Humean response in such cases is to appeal to counterfactuals:
Coulomb s law tells us the force two charged particles would experience, argues the
Humean, if their masses were zero. Thus characterized, the law describes a counterfactual
regularity. The counterfactual theory of causation will be discussed shortly. For now, I will
point out two reasons why the move to counterfactuals will not save the regularity theory.
First, as Cartwright argues, the counterfactual account conceals a number of non-Humean
elements:
The first comes to light when we ask, "Why do we want the masses to go to
zero?" The answer: "Because we want to find out what the total force
would be, were there no other forces at work." It is the "at work" that one
should notice. Put in this blunt fashion, it suggests that the counterfactual
account itself is grounded in ideas about powers and their operation, as no
good Humean would allow...
My second concern becomes obvious when one asks the obvious
next question, "Why do we want to know what the force between charged
bodies would be were there no other forces at work?" This case is just one
particular case among all conceivable ones, and a peculiarly inconvenient
one at that [for it cannot be realized]. Why, then, are these circumstances
so special? They are special because these are the circumstances in which
all the hindrances are stripped away so that we can find out what charged
particles do "on their own" — that is, what they do by virtue of being
charged. This is how they would attract or repel one another were "only"
charge at work; and it is how they try to behave even when other factors
impede them (1 992, 49-49).
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Cartwright's point is that the rationale for postulating the counterfactual is incomprehensible
in any terms acceptable to the Humean. In addition, even if one could clarify the
counterfactual account in Humean terms, there remains a further problem: the
counterfactual, as a regularity, would be of no conceivable use to scientists, for its
antecedent is not realized in nature.
The regularity view suffers additional problems, as well. Most important,
regularities (including structural equations and statistical correlations) simply do not
describe completely the causal structure of the world in which the factors cited by the laws
are embedded
.
112 Given a true regularity between two events — a true positive statistical
correlation, for example — we may infer that the two events are causally related
.
113 The
structure of that causal relation, however, remains underdetermined. First, the direction of
causality is not determined by the associative relation; either one may be the cause of the
other. In addition, it may be the case that neither one is the cause of the other, for they may
be the result of a common cause . 114
Thirdly, even if a common cause can be ruled out, and the direction of causation
can be settled (by background information), the nature of the path from cause to effect —
knowledge of which is important not only in science but in using scientific results to make
practical decisions — remains incomprehensible from the view of the regularity. Equally
important, the regularity view provides no rationale for seeking to understand the nature of
the causal path, once the regularities are settled.
Fourthly, mixed causal capacities of factors cannot always be described by
regularities .
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This is related to the third point above: there may be two causal paths from a
causal factor to the effect, one of which contributes to the effect, the other of which inhibits
the effect. Under a regularity approach to causation, these two paths are blended (as a sum
or average of the mixed contributions of the cause) into a single law of association. Finding
87
the correct sub-populations can be of help in this kind of case: having isolated the correct
subpopulations, one can sometimes replace the single law of association with two laws with
distinct antecedent descriptions. To find the correct subpopulations, however, one must
have prior knowledge of the relevant additional causal factors. 116 In addition, there may be
no pair of subpopulations that allows one to distinguish the two causal paths under a
regularity analysis. Both causal paths may be operative, in other words, in every
subpopulation, which blocks the regularity theorist from distinguishing the two paths. 1,7
The general problem with regularity analyses is that many possible causal structures
are consistent with any given law of association. Lawlike regularities underdetermine
causal structure. This problem has a further consequence that should be mentioned here:
the regularity view of causes cannot provide an adequate distinction between causal and
non-causal laws of association. Many laws (especially mathematical laws such as the Ideal
Gas Law) express a purely functional relationship between quantities. Such laws cannot be
considered causal.
"
H The regularity view offers no grounds, however, on which to
distinguish purely functional laws from causal laws.
Hempel has introduced a distinction that is typically cited as a solution to this
problem: the distinction between laws of coexistence and laws of succession (Hempel,
1 965, 352). Laws of coexistence express a purely functional (especially mathematical)
relationship between properties or quantities. Laws of succession, in contrast, concern the
temporal changes in a system. Causal explanation, he notes, clearly "presupposes laws of
succession." Covering-Law explanations that use laws of coexistence exclusively, on the
other hand, cannot be said to be causal.
Unfortunately, Hempel's suggestion does not do the trick. On the one hand, a law
containing temporal references does not necessarily describe causal relations. Galileo's
Law (which is Hempel's example of a law of succession) may be written:
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V = At.
Employing this law, the acceleration of a body starting at rest may be derived from its final
velocity and the time of its motion. This derivation constitutes a Covering-Law explanation
of the body's acceleration, but this explanation (assuming, for the moment, that it is an
explanation) is surely not causal.
On the other hand, causal laws may contain no temporal reference at all. Consider
as evidence the following ascriptions of causal capacity:
(i) Metals conduct electricity.
(ii) Electrons carry a negative charge.
(iii) The heart pumps blood.
The difficulties of the regularity view are most evident in cases in which the
regularities are settled, yet scientists continue to argue about causal responsibility and the
nature of the relevant causal mechanisms. Such arguments are common where statistical
correlations play a strong epistemological role. A good example is the recurring
controversy about race and intelligence, which centers on statistical analyses of the
relationship between race and IQ test performance. Some contributors to the debate argue
about what the actual statistical correlations are, or about the significance of the factors
studied, such as the value of IQ-test performance as a measure of intelligence. These points
of contention are extremely important. Nonetheless, there are additional points of vigorous
dispute that arise even under the assumption that significant statistical correlations between
race and measured intelligence are settled. These disputes concern the causal origins of the
behavior in question: Is genetic endowment, economic well-being, education, racism, or
some other factor most important in determining measured intelligence? Even if we assume
that significant statistical correlations between race and IQ test performance are settled, and
that IQ test performance is an interesting measure of some aspects of intelligence, the causal
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path between race and measured intelligence is underdetermined by the statistical
correlations alone
.
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The regularity view is inadequate as an analysis of causation. It is not surprising,
then, that regularity theorists often submit the regularity view as an analysis of lawlikeness,
not of causation, and tend to downplay the importance of causation. At the same time, they
presume that causal laws are somehow contained among the laws they describe as
regularities, and that they will do their jobs when needed. Thus Hempel assumes that the
Covering-Law Model, which assumes causal laws to be a subset of laws of regularity, can
account for causal explanations
.
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4.1. 1.2 Probabilistic Theories of Causation
One of the most interesting recent developments in the theory of causation has been
the sustained pursuit of a probabilistic theory. Probabilistic theories of causation are
motivated by two facts about science. First, causal inferences in science often rely on
statistical information. Second, scientists believe that some natural processes contain
elements of inherent randomness, and are thus best described by stochastic theories. The
prominent role of statistics in science has encouraged philosophers to seek a description of
causation in terms of statistical relations.
All probabilistic theories of causation proceed from a basic postulate: the presence
of a cause increases the probability of its effect. This postulate can be expressed more
exactly in the following manner:
(S) An event B is a cause of an event A only if the conditional probability of
A occurring when B occurs is greater than the unconditional probability of
A occurring.
Nearly all authors defending probabilistic theories of causation recognize, however, that
more must be said if causation is to be characterized adequately. For the occurrence of
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every effect is statistically correlated with many factors that are not its causes. The falling of
mercury in a barometer, for example, increases the probability of a storm, though it cannot
be said to cause the storm. This general difficulty has been named the problem of spurious
correlations.
An especially striking class of spurious correlations has acquired the title of
Simpson s paradox: in these cases, background correlations result in the reversal of
statistical relations when one moves between populations. Consider a population in which
smoking is strongly correlated with a second factor, e.g., regular exercise, that prevents
heart disease, and assume that exercise is more effective at preventing heart disease than
smoking is at causing it . 121 For this population, the unconditional probability of getting
heart disease is greater than the conditional probability of getting heart disease for those
who smoke. If (S) were accepted as a theory of causation, then smoking would seem, in
this population, to prevent heart disease. Yet although there is a strong correlation between
smoking and regular exercise in the population, some smokers do not exercise, and some
regular exercisers do not smoke. As a result, the population may be divided up into
relevant sub-populations. Consider a sub-population containing two kinds of people:
people who do not exercise regularly and do not smoke, and those who do not exercise
regularly and do smoke. Within this group, the causal relation between smoking and heart
disease indicated by (S) will be reversed — the unconditional probability of heart disease
will be less than the probability of heart disease conditional upon smoking. Despite this
reversal in the probabilistic relation, however, there is no reason, intuitively, to believe that
the causal role of smoking is different in this subpopulation than in the population as a
whole.
Such reversals of statistical relations are found in many areas of science, the most
visible of which is medicine. Newspaper readers are often bewildered by the apparently
91
contradictory conclusions of medical studies that examine the relationship between the
incidence of some disease, e.g., breast cancer, and a variety of potential causal factors. The
frequent reversals of explanatory fortune (e.g., while one study shows a certain birth control
pill to increase the incidence of breast cancer, a second shows it to decrease it) leave
readers shaking their heads, and doubting the competence of medical researchers. In fact,
the problem is often not one of incompetence (or exaggerated claims on the part of some
researchers and reporters) but a result of the difficulties of recognizing and controlling for
background factors that are correlated with the factors under study. 122
The probabilistic theory of causation clearly requires additions to (S), if (S) is to be
the basis of a theory of causation. We will consider a number of representative and
influential additions to (S), although it must be noted that our discussion is by no means
exhaustive.
One popular addition to (S) is the "no-screening-off" condition. 123 The no-screening-
off condition demands that B be considered a genuine cause of A only if there is no other
factor, C, with respect to which B is made statistically irrelevant to /A. More specifically:
(NSO) Event 6 is a genuine cause of event /A only if there is no partition of
events including an event C such that the conditional probability of A, given
B and C, is the same as the conditional probability of A, given C alone. 124
We can see how screening off is supposed to work by looking at the barometer example.
Trouble appears in the barometer example because the conditional probability of a storm
given a drop in the mercury of the barometer is greater than the unconditional probability of
a storm. But suppose we partition events to take into account other factors, such as air
pressure (which we will assume contributes causally to the development of storms).
Because the level of mercury in a properly functioning barometer depends strictly on the air
pressure, but not all barometers function properly, the conditional probability of a storm
given a drop in air pressure is equal to the storm's probability conditional upon both a drop
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in air pressure and a drop in the level of mercury in a barometer: that is, air pressure screens
off a drop in the mercury of barometers from the advent of a storm. Screening-off therefore
allows us to distinguish, in this case, a genuine cause (changes in air pressure) from a
spurious one (changes in the mercury level of barometers).
(NSO) demands that one look at the relative statistical relevance of other factors
appearing in the populations under study. As a result, the satisfaction of (NSO) requires an
extraordinary amount of knowledge beyond that of the statistical relations between the
purported cause B and the effect A. In spite of its strong epistemological demands, (NSO) is
recommended by the fact that scientists use something like screening-off to make causal
inferences in actual science, though perhaps not so much to rule out spurious causes as to
measure the relative strengths of various causal factors in some particular population.
There are reasons to doubt, nonetheless, that (S) and (NSO) together form an
adequate probabilistic theory of causation. For one, proximate causes tend to screen off
distant causes from their effects; this tendency yields conclusions that are contrary to the
manner in which scientists normally identify causes. Suppose there is a type of fatal lung
infection in apes that can be caused by any of two factors — bacillus A or bacillus B. The
probability of death by lung disease given the presence of bacillus A is greater than the
unconditional probability of death. Yet the presence of bacillus A is screened off from
death by the occurrence of lung infection in every population in which death by lung
disease occurs. Despite its causal role, bacillus A is ruled out by (NSO) as a cause of death
by lung disease.
Salmon (1984) has offered a number of additional examples that show that a
proximate coincident effect, as well as a proximate cause, can screen off a true distant cause
from its effect. Suppose a beginning billiards player is attempting to sink the eight-ball in a
corner pocket, and, given his skill level, the probability that the eight-ball will drop is Vi.
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Unbeknownst to the player, however, if the eight-ball drops as planned, the chances of the
cue-ball falling into the adjacent corner pocket are close to 1 . In this situation, the event of
the cue-ball dropping in the corner pocket screens off the event of the beginner stroking the
cue ball from the effect-of- interest, the eight-ball dropping in the corner pocket. According
to (S) and (NSO), therefore, the dropping of the cue-ball in the corner pocket, not the
beginner striking the cue-ball, is the cause of the eight-ball falling.
These counterexamples can be handled by the addition of a temporal constraint to
(NSO):
(NSO T ) Event B is a genuine cause of event A only if there is no partition of
earlier events including an event C such that the conditional probability of
A, given B and C, is the same as the conditional probability of A, given C
alone. 125
(NSO 1 ) allows purported causes to be screened off only by factors that occur earlier than
they do. (NSO 1 ) thus handles both the proposed counterexamples, for they rely on later
factors to screen off genuine causes from their effects.
Nevertheless, the temporal constraint of (NSO 1 ) fails to rescue (NSO) from other
sources of criticism. (NSO T ), together with (S), can both fail to pick out true causal relations,
and fail to rule out spurious correlations. Brian Skyrms (1980) points out, for example, that
spurious correlations can show up in ways other than by screening off.
Positive correlations can change into negative correlations within the cells,
rather than to independence (Skyrms, 1980, 108).
(S) and (NSO 1 ) are therefore too weak. Skyrms provides the following example. Suppose
there is a strong correlation between living in the country (C) and smoking (S) (perhaps
there is so much air pollution in the city that city dwellers, already fearful of the effects of
pollution on their lungs, are much less likely to smoke). Imagine that country dwellers
smoke so much more than city dwellers that living in the country increases the chances of
acquiring lung cancer (L), i.e., ?(UC) > P (/.). The connection between living in the country
and lung cancer is spurious, but is it shown to be so by (NSO 1)? The answer is "no,"
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because the conditional probability of L given S and C is not equal to the conditional
probability of L given S alone: S does not make C statistically independent of L, but actually
reveals it to be negatively correlated with L
,
i.e., the correct relation is P(L/S&C) < P(L/S), for
S alone includes both country and city dwellers. Hence, (NSO 1 ) and (S) fail to catch the
spurious correlation between C and L
(S) and (NSO ) can also fail because statistical relationships often indicate only the
average influence of various factors, and may therefore reflect inaccurately the causal
relationships.'^’ Causal influence may be averaged out in at least two ways: first, coincident
causal factors can mix to generate a common effect; second, a causal factor may exhibit a
mixed capacity for — i.e., may both contribute to and inhibit — some effect. Consider our
example of fatal lung infections in apes, which we noted can be caused by both bacillus A
and bacillus B. Suppose that bacillus A rarely appears in healthy apes, but is present in
90% of the apes that die of lung infection, even in those apes in which the lung infection is
actually caused only by bacillus B (imagine, for example, that bacillus A appears in these
cases because the apes' immune systems have been overburdened by the infection by
bacillus B). Bacillus B, on the other hand, appears in only 60% of apes that die of lung
infection. The conditional probability of death by lung infection given the presence of
bacillus A is thus greater than the unconditional probability of death by lung infection. In
addition, the presence of bacillus B will not screen off the presence of bacillus A from death
by lung infection, even if a significant percentage of diseased apes die of lung infections
caused by bacillus B rather than by bacillus A. Here the causal efforts of bacillus A and
bacillus B are blended together in the statistics on the occurrence of fatal lung infection, and
thus (S) and (NSO) are unable to delineate correctly the causal structure of the disease in
most populations.
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Cartwright (1988, 1 989) argues that mixed causal capacities also cannot be captured
by statistical measures such as (S) and (NSOT). Suppose that a certain allele in a species of
moth - call it allele M - is responsible for two traits: first, allele M contributes to the
production of a hormone that makes the moths more viable than those with alternative
alleles; second, allele M produces melanic coloring in the moths' wings, which,
unfortunately for the moths, makes them highly visible to predators when resting on the
trunks of white birch trees, which are predominant in the moths' habitat. Now we ask the
question: what is the causal influence of allele M on the survival and reproduction of moths
that carry it? It seems correct to say that two causal claims about allele M are true: allele M
both causally contributes to moths' survival and reproduction and causally inhibits moths'
survival and reproduction. 127 Yet (S) and (NSO T ) cannot capture this complex causal
relationship. For any given population, the conditional probability of a moth's survival
through, for example, one cycle of reproduction, given that the moth has allele M will be c,
and c will be either greater than, equal to, or less than the unconditional probability of
survival and reproduction through one cycle of reproduction. In any case, the relationship
between c and the unconditional probability will reflect the average results of the mixed
causal influences of allele M. Information about the dual causal roles of allele M will be
lost in the statistical averages. As a result, we cannot conclude from the statistical relations
alone that allele M has a mixed causal role, nor can we legitimately conclude that the allele
has a single causal role in any population: because mixed causal roles would be averaged
out in the statistics, a given statistical relationship is always consistent with both a singular
causal role or any of a variety of mixed causal roles, even if we ignore the possibility that
the correlation may be spurious.
(S) and (NSO 1 ) are thus unable to perform the job of a theory of causation: they
often cannot distinguish spurious from genuine causal relations, and, because of the
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averaging effect of statistical measures, they fail to delineate causal structure where multiple
causes or mixed capacities are at work. Probabilistic theories of causation other than (S)
and (NSO 1 ) are possible, but none, so far as I know, can avoid the difficulties outlined
above
.
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In addition, there are reasons to think that no probabilistic theory can do the job of a
theory of causation. Take the case of allele AT. I have argued that (S) and (NSO1 ) alone
cannot mediate the correct conclusion about the dual causal role of allele AT. Nonetheless,
it must be conceded that there are populations in which the causal roles of allele AT will be
accurately reflected in the statistical relationships. The difficulty, of course, is knowing
which populations yield accurate data about the causal relationships. A common strategy is
to find a population in which all causes that might interfere with the causal operation of
allele AT are held fixed. Scientists have devised many ways of doing this. In the case of
allele AT, this is especially difficult, because allele AT itself has multiple and contrary causal
powers. Nevertheless, one could measure the positive causal influence of allele AT on
survival and reproduction (via improved viability) in a population that has no predators, for
example, and in which the influence of other factors influencing survival and reproduction
were also held fixed. To know that the statistical data for a subpopulation correctly reflect
the causal relationship between allele AT and survival and reproduction demands, however,
extensive knowledge of the causal factors that influence the moths' survival and
reproduction. At the minimum, one must be able to assume that all causal factors (other
than allele AT's effect on viability) affecting survival and reproduction are fixed in the
population under study, even if one cannot identify all these other factors (this is the point,
for example, of a randomized experiment). If one cannot make this assumption, then there
is always the possibility that the statistical relations revealed in a population will be reversed
upon further study, as they were in the examples of Simpson's paradox. Causal inferences
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can thus be read from statistical relations, but only under the assumption that all interfering
causal factors have been accounted for in the experimental setup.
Cartwright generalizes this assumption into a principle: C causes E if and only if the
presence of C increases the probability of E in every population of an exhaustive partition in
which all non-C causal factors for E have been held fixed. In Cartwright's words:
(SC) C causes E if and only if
P(£/C ± F, +...+ F
„) > P( —iC ± F 1 +...+ EX
where {F u ..., Fn> C} is a complete causal set for E (Cartwright, 1 989, 56). 129
(SC) suggests that causal inferences from statistics require a kind of bootstrapping from prior
causal knowledge. 1 * 0 The practical difficulties of acquiring knowledge sufficient to
bootstrap in the way suggested by (SC) are impressive. In addition, if something like (SC) is
correct, then probabilistic theories of causation face severe philosophical, as well as
practical, difficulties: if causal inferences from statistical relations require prior causal
knowledge, then statistical theories cannot illuminate the nature of causation. The question
is whether the knowledge from which new causal knowledge is bootstrapped can itself be
reduced to knowledge of statistical relations. In other words, can the set of causal factors
{F
;
,..., F
„} be specified in terms of statistical relations alone? If it cannot, then probabilistic
theories of causation cannot be successful.
Although my intuition tells me that Cartwright is correct about the futility of
probabilistic theories of causation, I have no strong argument in favor of this view, and thus
I will not claim that there never will be an adequate probabilistic theory of causation.
Nevertheless, we have seen that representative probabilistic theories of causation face
serious difficulties. Although statistical relations provide a certain kind of evidence in favor
of causal propositions, the probabilistic theories we have discussed (which are
representative of a large group of extant theories) cannot provide the basis of a theory of
causation.
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Having criticized regularity views as analyses of causation, it must be noted,
nevertheless, that although regularities probably cannot provide a satisfactory analysis of
causation, they do play an important role in causal inference, at least if one accepts a
broadened version of the principle of the common cause: this principle may be stated, in
rough terms, as the postulate that every true correlation has a causal explanation. With this
principle in hand, regularities, including statistical correlations and other laws of
association, can provide one important kind of evidence for the existence of causal
relationships.
4.1. 1.3 The Counterfactual View
David Lewis has proposed an analysis of causation extracted from a statement by
Hume, in which causal relations are clarified by reference to counterfactual conditionals:
An event c is a cause of event e if and only if it is the case that if c had not occurred, then e
would not have occurred (1973, 556f.). It should be noted that the counterfactual view is
not all that different from the regularity view: the counterfactual view distinguishes itself
only by focusing on regularities in counterfactual situations (or in possible but non-actual
worlds).' 3 ' Not surprisingly, the counterfactual view shares many of the problems of the
regularity view.
First, c may be a cause of e, and yet not satisfy the counterfactual criterion. This
happens, for example, when e is overdetermined by the presence of multiple redundant
causes. In addition, it is well known that specifying the truth conditions of counterfactual
conditionals is no easy task. Moreover, van Fraassen has argued that even if truth
conditions for a counterfactual can be given, the truth conditions will require a degree of
contextual dependence that make them unfit for the analysis of scientific claims (1980, 1 1 4-
118).
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Finally, satisfaction of the counterfactual criterion may provide evidence of the
existence of causal relations, but it does not settle the structure of the causes - like
regularity analyses, counterfactual analyses underdetermine causal structure. Assuming
Lewis's counterfactual criterion is satisfied by some c and e, many different causal structures
are possible: c may cause e, e may cause c, or they may have a common cause. The last
possibility - that c and e have a common cause - is perhaps the least intuitive, so perhaps
an example would be helpful. The following case, which was presented by Salmon in his
discussion of reference class homogeneity, provides a good example of this possibility:
Suppose, slightly simplifying the actual situation, that the neutral K-meson
K can decay in either of two ways: in mode N (neutral) it decays into a pair
of neutral pions; in mode C (charged) its decay products include a positive
pion and a negative pion. Among the class AC of all K° decay-events,
approximately 25% are of mode N and the remaining 75% are of mode C
(1984, 75).
Consider the set of trials in which a positive pion and a negative pion are among the decay
products. The appearances of the oppositely charged pions satisfy the counterfactual
condition (if anything in nature does), for we can see that if the positive pion had not
appeared, then the negative pion also would not have appeared. Yet neither of these two
events is the cause of the other: they are the result of a common cause, namely, the decay
of the neutral K-meson K°.
In general, there is not much difference between the counterfactual and regularity
views of causation, for they are both closely bound up with the notion of a lawlike
regularity. As a result, their inadequacies as accounts of causation are similar: they exclude
many perfectly good causal laws, while the laws they include, moreover, underdetermine
causal structure.
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4.1.2 Salmon's Theory of Causation (1984)
Salmon has proposed a fundamental change in the way we think about causal
relations. Causation is often thought of by philosophers as a relation between events; from
this perspective, events are the basic entities of interest and the object of analysis. A typical
example of an event-ontology is that of Bertrand Russell. On Russell's view, substantial
things (particulars) in the world, e.g., a dog or an electron, are to be analyzed as temporal
sequences of events. The events composing particular things are to be understood, in turn,
as instantaneous bundles of properties (or universals).”1 Once substantial things in the
world are analyzed in this way, a plausible approach to understanding causation is to view
it as a relation between events - as a relation, in other words, between instantaneous
bundles of properties. But what sort of relation can this be? The only available physical
relations between events seem to be the relations of space and time: causal events are often
contiguous in space and time to their consequent events. Another possible tactic is to
search the relations between the properties or bundles of properties that make up events in
hope of finding logical connections between them. Both of these approaches have, in
short, been pursued in many variations, but have failed to produce a widely acceptable
account of causation. Salmon suspects that this failure originates, in part, in the assumption
of an event-ontology, and suggests we turn our attention from relations between events to
causal processes.
The main difference between events and processes, he says,
is that events are relatively localized in space and time, while processes
have a much greater temporal duration, and in many cases, much greater
spatial extent. In space-time diagrams, events are represented by points,
while processes are represented by lines. A baseball colliding with a
window would count as an event; the baseball, traveling from the bat to the
window, would constitute a process. The activation of a photocell by a
pulse of light would be an event; the pulse of light, traveling, perhaps from a
distant star, would be a process (139-40).
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This simpie difference masks greater contrasts that come to light when one confronts the
philosophical problem of causation. Under the assumption of an event-ontology, the
problem of causation appears to concern the nature of the relation, or connection, between
causal and consequent events (or between their respective properties). If one assumes
processes to be the entities basic to causal relations, however, the problem is transformed:
the challenge becomes that of distinguishing causal from non-causal (or pseudo)
processes. 133
Salmon develops a criterion of causal processes that refers to the ability of causal
processes to transmit "marks":
The difference between a causal process and a pseudo-process.
..is that the
causal process transmits its own structure, while the pseudo-process does
not. The distinction between processes that do and those that do not
transmit their own structure is revealed by the mark criterion. If a process —
a causal process — is transmitting its own structure, then it will be capable
of transmitting certain modifications in that structure (144).
What is it to transmit a mark? Here Salmon introduces what he calls the at-at theory of
causal propagation. According to the at-at theory, the transmission of a mark from point A
in a causal process to point B in the same process is equivalent to the appearance of the
mark at each point between A and B without further interactions. In more formal terms:
MT: Let P be a process that, in the absence of interactions with other
processes, would remain uniform with respect to a characteristic Q, which it
would manifest consistently over an interval that includes both of the space-
time points A and B (A not equal to B). Then, a mark (consisting of a
modification of Q into Q'), which has been introduced into process P by
means of a single, local interaction at point A, is transmitted to point B if P
manifests the modification Q' at B and at all stages of the process between A
and B without additional interventions (148).
The criterion for mark transmission is employed to formulate an account of "structure
transmission" and the "propagation of causal influence":
ST: If a process is capable of transmitting changes in structure due to
marking interactions, then that process can be said to transmit its own
structure (1 54).
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PQ: A process that transmits its own structure is capable of propagating
causal influence from one space-time locale to another (155).
' g
Salmon's proposal is of great interest, especially as an epistemological criterion of
causal processes, but it seems unconvincing as a theory of causation. Two aspects of the
theory detract from its force. First, "mark introduction" and "interaction" in (MT) are
obviously causal processes, yet their nature is assumed in Salmon's criterion of mark
transmission, which is the foundation of his definition of a causal process. This would do
no harm if Salmon's account were considered only as an epistemological criterion, for one
could view the methodology offered as one of bootstrapping from knowledge of mark
introductions and other interactions to knowledge of previously unknown causal processes.
As a theory of causation, however, it will not do to refer to causal processes in the account
of the nature of causal processes.
The other area of concern is Salmon's counterfactual formulation in the criterion of
mark transmission (MT). Salmon believes that the counterfactual formulation is required to
ensure that the "mark" appearing in the process after mark introduction is actually the result
of the mark introduction and not of some other causal intervention.
Above we noted that many philosophers believe that the truth-conditions of
counterfactual conditionals require contextual knowledge. Salmon, like other philosophers,
fears that the use of counterfactuals brings with it the risk of introducing subjectivity into
scientific claims. FHe believes, nevertheless, that this risk need not worry us:
Science has a direct way of dealing with the kinds of counterfactual
assertions we require, namely, the experimental approach. In a well-
designed experiment, the experimenter determines which conditions are to
be fixed for purposes of the experiment and which allowed to vary. The
result of the experiment establishes some counterfactual statements as true
and others as false under well-specified conditions (1984, 149-50).
The results of the experiment are convincing, of course, only if the experimenter controls
for all the factors deemed by other scientists to be relevant to the particular experimental
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situation. Thus, Salmon has not shown that the testing of counterfactual claims in science is
not contextual. His comments suggest, however, that the context relevant to experimental
testing may be broader in science - broad enough, in fact, to be considered "ob|ective" -
than the subjective context offered by philosophical critics. Scientists can - though they do
not always - agree on which factors should be fixed and which should be allowed to vary
during an experimental test.
I do not believe that Salmon's strategy is necessary, however, for counterfactuals
play no role in the formulation or testing of causal claims. In favor of this belief I will argue
that background causal knowledge powerful enough to test the counterfactuals Salmon
believes he needs are also strong enough to test mark introductions directly, and thereby to
bypass any counterfactuals (i.e., the first clause of MT). Consider an example of testing
proposed by Salmon:
Suppose we want to see whether the beam traveling from the spotlight to
the wall is capable of transmitting a red mark. We set up the following
experiment. The light will be turned on and off one hundred times. At a
point midway between the spotlight and the wall, we station an
experimenter with a random number generator. Without communicating
with the experimenter who turns the light on and off, this second
experimenter uses his device to make a random selection of fifty trials in
which he will make a mark and fifty in which he will not. If all and only the
fifty instances in which the marking interaction occurs are those in which
the spot on the wall is red, as well as all the intervening stages in the
process, then we may conclude with reasonable certainty that the fifty cases
in which the beam was red subsequent to the marking interaction are cases
in which the beam would not have been red if the marking interaction had
not occurred (1984, 150).
Salmon submits that in order to find out whether the beam will transmit a red mark, we
must first test the counterfactual, "If the red mark had not been introduced, the beam would
not have been red." He then describes an experiment for testing this counterfactual claim.
One experimenter attempts to introduce (randomly) red marks into the beam. It turns out
that all the marking attempts coincide with the beam being red. On all the trials in which
no marking attempt is made, the beam remains white. This should convince us, says
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Salmon, that the counterfactual, "If the red mark had not been introduced, the beam would
no. have been red," is true. We are thus on the road to showtng that the beam is capable of
transmitting a mark.
Strong assumptions are required, however, to infer the truth of the required
counterfactual. In particular, one must assume that there are no sources of red marking
other than the experimenter. This assumption can be justified by checking around and
ruling out potential alternative sources of red marking. In Salmon's example, another
method is used: the randomized experiment. Here, the trial beams are distributed
randomly into treatment (i.e., those that will receive a marking attempt) and control groups,
which ensures that the groups will be homogeneous with respect to extraneous sources of
red marking (such as the person manning the light switch placing a red lens on the light). I
will not discuss the efficacy of the randomized experiment in ruling out extraneous causes;
it is enough to emphasize that ruling out (or averaging out the effect of) extraneous causes is
the goal of randomization, and that the experiment will not be successful unless this goal is
achieved.
Under such strong assumptions, however, it seems to me that we can directly infer
that the beam is capable of transmitting a red mark, without worrying about verifying the
intermediate counterfactual. To do so we reason thus: A number of red marking attempts
were made on a white beam, after each of which the beam appeared red at each stage of its
travel, including at the wall; when marking attempts were not made, the beam remained
white. We have ruled out (either by checking or randomizing) the existence of other
potential sources of red marking. Therefore, the beam has transmitted the red marks, and is
thus a causal process. The truth of the intermediate counterfactual ("If the red mark had not
been introduced, the beam would not have been red") is superfluous to this reasoning.
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Why does Salmon believe that the criterion of mark transmission (MT) requires the
counterfactual clause? The counterfactual formulation is required, he thinks, to overcome a
certain objection:
Suppose our rotating beacon is casting a white spot that moves around the
wall, and that we mark the spot by interposing a red filter at the wall.
uppose further, however, that a red lens has been installed in the beaconjust a tiny fraction of a second earlier, so that the spot on the wall becomes
red at the moment we mark it with our red filter, but it remains red from that
point on because of the red lens. Under these circumstances, were it not for
the counterfactual condition, it would appear that we had satisfied the
requirement formulated in MT (1984, 1 48).
Without the counterfactual formulation, Salmon fears, MT will validate pseudo-processes as
causal. Such cases present no problem, however, once we make explicit the causal
assumptions of good experiments. As we have shown above, the inference to the truth of
the counterfactual, "If the red mark had not been introduced with the red filter by the
experimenter, the beam would not have been red," requires one to rule out alternative
potential sources of red marking. Once these are ruled out, however, one need no longer
worry about the truth of the counterfactual, for one can infer directly (given otherwise
successful trials of marking) that the beam has been marked. Counterfactuals may be
needed elsewhere in philosophy of science, but a counterfactual formulation of MT is not
required to avoid the counterexamples that Salmon fears.
As a result, Salmon's criterion of mark transmission should be rewritten without the
counterfactual condition:
MT*: A mark (consisting of a modification of characteristic Q into Q’),
which has been introduced into process P by means of a single local
interaction at point A, is transmitted to point B if P manifests the
modification Q at B and at all stages of the process between A and B
without additional interventions.
The key phrase here (which was included in Salmon's original formulation) is "without
additional interventions." I take this clause to rule out interventions not only after, but
before, and simultaneous with, the marking attempt. This condition corresponds to the
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experimental requirement of ruling out extraneous causes, and precludes the need for the
counterfactual condition.
In any case, even if we accept that experimental methods offer an acceptable means
of testing instances of MT (with or without its counterfactuals) it is clear, nonetheless, that
Salmon's theory is inadequate as a theory of causation. For scientific tests of instances of
MT or MT* will be successful, it has been shown, only if the experimenter successfully
controls for all of the causal factors relevant to the given experimental situation. The truth
conditions of any instance of MT (or MT*) thus require a significant amount of background
knowledge about causal processes. The account cannot, therefore, be treated as a theory of
causal processes. 134
4.1.3 Dowe's (1992) and Salmon's (1994) Theory of Causation
Salmon s theory of causal processes has received heavy criticism for its reliance on
counterfactuals (e.g., Kitcher 1 989). Salmon (1994) has responded to this criticism by
proposing to replace the mark criterion (MT) with an entirely new theory of causality
advanced by P. Dowe (1992a, 1 992b, 1 992c). Although I have argued that Salmon’s
original theory needs no counterfactuals, and, hence, need not be replaced on their
account, the new theory is more interesting as a theory of causality. For the new theory
promises to describe and to explain causation, and not merely to provide an
epistemological criterion of causal knowledge.
Dowe and Salmon's new theory can be stated quite succinctly:
A causal interaction is an intersection of world-lines that involves the
exchange of a conserved (and invariant) quantity.
A conserved (and invariant) quantity is exchanged when at least one
incoming and at least one outgoing process manifest a change in the value
of the conserved quantity.
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A causal process is a world-line of an object that transmits a non-zero
amount of a conserved (and invariant) quantity at each moment of its
history.
A process transmits a conserved (and invariant) quantity from A to B (A not
equal to B) if it possesses this quantity at A and at B and at every stage of the
between A and B without any interactions in the half-open interval
A'BJ that involve an exchange of that particular conserved (or invariant)
quantity.
We look to currently accepted theories, says Salmon, to tell us what quantities are
conserved (and to provide us with the laws of conservation that govern exchanges).
In his original formulation, Dowe focuses on conserved, rather than invariant,
quantities, but Salmon criticizes him for using the terms "conserved" and "invariant"
univocally in some passages. Salmon argues that since causal relations are invariant across
frames of reference, the quantities exchanged in causal interactions should be restricted to
those that are invariant, and not merely conserved. I have thus referred to both
conservation and invariance in my formulation.
What does Dowe and Salmon's theory of causation suggest about the nature of
causal knowledge? One might expect to find science textbooks filled with the names of
causal processes and descriptions of the kinds and amounts of conserved and invariant
quantities they transmit and exchange, as well as descriptions of the typical kinds of causal
interactions in which they engage. Open any contemporary textbook of fundamental
physics or chemistry, and one will indeed find causal knowledge in this form, e.g.,
descriptions of the mass-energies and charges of subatomic particles, of the energy-states of
atoms, etc., and laws describing the exchanges of these quantities.
In most scientific textbooks, however, one finds no explanations that refer to the
transmission and exchange of mass-energy, charge, angular momentum, or other conserved
and invariant quantities. This is overwhelmingly the case in biological and social sciences,
but it is also true of many texts in the physical sciences. This is not because causality is
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unimportant elsewhere in science, but because causality is treated on different levels of
analysis in these areas. The question of how micro and macro-levels of causation are
related is important, but will not be addressed here.
As I stated above, the causal theory of explanation does not require a theory of
causation, so long as it can be shown that specific causal ascriptions are clear and testable.
For those who would demand a theory of causation, I present Dowe and Salmon's theory. I
would add, however, a closing caveat. Dowe and Salmon's theory of causation, though
interesting, is dependent upon recent physical theory. Consequently, as a tool for the
analysis of causal concepts used in past historical periods, or even in contemporary sciences
outside of fundamental physics and chemistry, Dowe and Salmon's theory is anachronistic,
at best; often, the theory is simply inapplicable.
It is unlikely, I think, that a universal theory of causation is forthcoming. What we
have is a universal, but loose, concept of causation that can be described only by reference
to synonyms, e.g., causation as the bringing about, production, etc., of an effect.
Connected to this loose concept of causation is a set of more specific causal concepts in
science, e.g., inertia, force, binding, reproduction, respiration, heredity, etc., which are
themselves connected in complicated ways. In contrast to "causation," clear, analytical
definitions and theories of specific causal concepts can often be given, usually in terms of
other (non-synonymous) causal concepts. Though specific causal concepts can thus be
analyzed (and defined) with success, one does not thereby remove causal terms from
scientific discourse (this point will be defended in the following chapter). Of these more
specific causal concepts, there is also a history of scientific understanding: their meaning in
science changes as causal knowledge advances. Although it would be interesting to
analyze historical changes in scientific understanding of causal concepts, this project cannot
be approached here.
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4.2 Causal Knowledge: Causal Capacities and Interactions
Two varieties of causal knowledge are essential to explanation: knowledge of
singular causal interactions and knowledge of causal laws. My view of causal knowledge,
which has been strongly influenced by Nancy Cartwright's work136
,
is Aristotelian and
doubly anti-Humean. First, I claim, contra Hume, that singular causal interactions are
observable, and that the observation of singular causal interactions is indispensable in
science. I must emphasize, nevertheless, that my view is not a kind of foundationalism:
I
maintain only that causal knowledge presents no epistemological problems not shared by
other kinds of empirical knowledge. Causes are as observable and as testable as are other
objects of empirical knowledge. But this fact does not provide causal knowledge with any
privileged or certain foundation.
Second, I believe, pace Aristotle, that knowledge of causal laws is best understood
as knowledge of causal capacities. We, like Aristotle, live in a world of things endowed
with a great variety of causal capacities. Accordingly, we explain the behavior of things by
reference to their capacities. We also believe, as did Aristotle, that there is a close
relationship between a thing's internal structure and its causal capacities (including
functions, which are the capacities in which Aristotle was most interested). But Aristotle, so
far as I can tell, never adequately clarified the relationship between structure, capacities,
and actual behavior. For instance, the Aristotelian essence, or form, of a thing contains a
jumble of structural properties and capacities. In addition, Aristotle believed that a thing's
essence (its essential structure and capacities) determines its actual behavior. This had
important consequences for his view of the body of scientific knowledge in general: he
supposed that once one acquires knowledge of the principles of a thing (its essential
structure and capacities), one can deduce the thing's actual behavior. From knowledge of
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what a thing is, in other words, one can infer what it does. Scientific understanding (and
explanation) is deductive in character.
Aristotle was correct about the explanatory importance of capacities and about the
close connection between structural properties and capacit.es. Modern scientific method,
however, forces three revisions in the Aristotelian account. First, modern science demands
that our knowledge of capacities be supported by observable evidence. Second, we must
separate structure from causal capacities: what a thing is is not the same as what it can do,
nor can the latter be deduced, a priori, from the former. Capacities are a function of
structure, but the connection between them is contingent 137
,
not logical. Nevertheless,
once we discover the connection between a structure and a set of capacities, we believe it
to be permanent.
Finally, we must recognize that capacities alone do not determine actual behavior,
for what happens in any particular case is a function of many variables independent of the
causal capacities of the things present at the scene of the phenomenon. Accordingly,
capacity ascriptions are an essential ingredient of explanations, but another ingredient is
also required, one must specify, out of all the causal capacities present, which ones are
operative in the case at hand, and support this claim with evidence. One must, in other
words, describe the causal interactions that actually take place, as well as list the capacities
that are present. The distinction between causal capacities and their operation (causal
interactions) has a number of important consequences. First, explanation is always
explanation of particular phenomena, because an explanation always refers to causal
capacities that were operative in some particular set of cases. Of course, general statements
about causal capacities are often made, e.g., "Smoking causes cancer," but such general
statements do not explain anything, for they do not imply that there are any actual cases in
which cancer was caused by smoking .' 38 Second, scientific explanation does not have the
1 1
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deductive structure envisioned by Aristotle (and by modern empiricists), because statements
describing causal capacities and those asserting the operation of causes are (usually) not
linked by deductive logic.
The capacity analysis of causal laws meshes well with Dowe and Salmon's theory of
causality, for the conserved and invariant quantities on which their theory rests are causal
capacities. The capacity analysis runs contrary, however, to the regularity view of causal
laws, which is the most popular current account. According to the regularity view, causal
laws describe regular observable behavior: they are about what things actually do. The
capacity account, in contrast, claims that causal laws describe not what things do, but what
they have the capacity to do, irrespective of what actually occurs in nature. Cartwright
portrays the contrast in this way:
[Mjodern empiricists in the Hume tradition remain just as eager as Hume
himself to reject powers. Laws of nature, they insist, are about what things
do. I want to maintain, by contrast, that fundamental laws are generally not
about what things do but what it is in their nature to do. Consider
Coulomb's law of electrostatic attraction and repulsion. Coulomb's law says
that the force between two objects of charge q, and q2 is equal to q,q 2/r2 .
Yet, this is not the force the bodies experience; they are also subject to the
law of gravity. We say that Coulomb's law gives the force due to their
charge. But this is no concept for an empiricist: Coulomb's is not the force
that actually occurs; rather, it is a hypothetical power hidden away in the
actual force (Cartwright, 1992, 48).
The regularity view is closely allied to the view that scientific knowledge (and
explanation) is deductive in structure, for if laws are about regularities, then only deductive
logic is required to move from laws to the phenomena. This is indeed a common
contemporary view of scientific method: when investigation is the goal, logic moves the
scientist smoothly from the observation of regularities to laws; when explanation, control, or
prediction is demanded, logic moves the scientist smoothly again from the laws back to the
phenomena at hand.
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The capacity account has a different view of scientific inquiry. On this view, the
connections between the structure of things, their causal capacities, and what actually
occurs in nature are contingent - not logical - and complex. There are some regularities
in the world, but these are found only where the phenomena are relatively simple. Causal
laws do not describe regularities, but link structural properties with causal capacities.
Because the relationships between structures, capacities, and behavior is contingent and
complex, the scientific community's path from empirical evidence to the discovery of new
laws is difficult, as is the correct application of these laws in explanation, prediction, and
control.
4.2.1 The Nature of Causal Capacities and Their Ascription
Causal capacities have the following characteristics, which they share with many
other dispositional properties: 139
(1) Causal capacities are actual properties, not merely possible or potential
ones.
For example, if a woman has worked out regularly to improve her cardiovascular efficiency,
she has increased cardiovascular capacity, whether or not she ever displays it.
(2) Causal capacities are properties of entities (individuals, systems) with a
particular structure, and are thus relatively localized in space and time.
Capacity ascriptions link capacities to entities with a certain structure. As a result, capacity
ascriptions embody an inductive assumption, namely, that all such structures have the
capacity named.
(3) A difference in causal capacity entails a difference in internal structure.
A causal capacity does not, however, entail any particular internal structure.
A single capacity may be carried by diverse internal structures. This is obviously true in the
biological world, where any given capacity (e.g., respiration) is performed by organisms
with vastly different (respiratory) structures. It is less common, but no less true in the world
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Of physics. For instance, an object may haye, in virtue of the energy i, carries, a certain
capacity to do work. But many kinds of things with various kinds of internal structures (and
bearing different kinds of energies, e.g„ gravitational potential, kinetic, or electrical) have
the capacity to do work. There is, in other words, a many-one relationship between internal
structures and capacities.
Identity of capacity thus does not imply identity of structure. Identity of structure,
on the other hand, entails identity of causal capacities, and thus a difference in capacity
implies difference in structure.
(4) Causal capacities are mutable as a result of causal interactions that
change structure. In the absence of intervening causal interactions,
however, causal capacities endure.
If an entity has a particular causal capacity, it will continue to have the capacity so long as it
is not changed through causal interaction. This is not to say that the causal capacities of
entities are necessarily stable, but only that if they are unstable, they are so in virtue of the
causal interactions they undergo. 14 This has important consequences for scientific inquiry:
once we have evidence that allows us to attribute a causal capacity to a thing, we expect it
to keep its capacity, so long as intervening causal interactions can be ruled out.
In practice, this judgment relies on causal background knowledge. If one knows
little about actual conditions or about which kinds of causal interactions can interfere with
the capacity in question, then one cannot be certain of the capacity’s persistence. But if one
knows a lot about possible interfering factors, the environment of the object, etc., then one
can be confident in the expectation that the capacity will or will not persist.
(5) Causal capacity ascriptions are independent of actual conditions, and
thus entail nothing about manifest properties or actual behavior, past or
future.
It may be true that all capacities have been manifested at one time or another. Furthermore,
it may be true that in order to have knowledge of a capacity, it must be manifest at some
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time. The truth of a capacity ascription does not require, however, that any property be
manifested. The manifestation of a capacity requires that the conditions be right, but a
capacity statement entails nothing about what the actual conditions will be. This is one
respect that distinguishes dispositional from non-dispositional properties. Compare the
dispositional property, "is fertile," with the non-dispositional property, "is pregnant." "The
lioness is pregnant" entails that she is carrying an offspring, and this must be true if she is
pregnant. On the other hand, "the lioness is fertile," implies, in itself, nothing about the
manifest properties of the lioness. It entails only that, if the conditions are right, the lioness
becomes pregnant. Of course, background knowledge may inform us that fertility is, in fact,
associated with manifest properties, e.g., an increase in body temperature. But such
properties are not entailed by the disposition alone.
Capacities must be distinguished from propensities. Propensities, as I understand
them here, are stronger than capacity ascriptions, for they assert not only the existence of a
capacity, but a probability that the capacity will be manifested. In order to do this, they
must take into account the probability that certain conditions enabling or disabling the
capacity will be actualized. Darwin's theory of natural selection, for example, says that
fitter organisms are more likely to achieve reproductive success than are the less fit. Here,
"fitness" is best understood as the (relative) propensity of an organism to reproduce
successfully. In declaring that an organism is relatively fit, one asserts that the organism not
only has the capacity to reproduce, but that conditions are such that it is likely to reproduce
with a certain relative probability.
Similar to propensities are tendencies, which take into account past behavior and,
like propensities, assert that the behavior is likely to continue in the future. An example of a
tendency-statement is, "John is a cigarette-smoker" or "lions are carnivores." Capacity
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ascriptions are weaker than both propensities and tendencies, for they entail nothing about
(including the likelihood of) actual manifest properties, whether of the past or the future.
(6) Ascriptions of causal capacity entail ceteris paribus factual conditionals.
This expresses correctly the relationship between causal laws and regularities. For example,
"sodium chloride is water-soluble" entails that if the conditions are right, sodium chloride
dissolves in water. Sometimes, the conditionals associated with capacities are written in the
subjunctive form, e.g., "if sodium chloride were placed in water (under otherwise correct
conditions), it would dissolve." The subjunctive form is acceptable, but it must not be
confused with counterfactual or hypothetical forms, which are not entailed by capacity
statements. In counterfactuals and hypotheticals, the antecedent condition is clearly false,
or at least unlikely. Capacity statements, on the other hand, entail nothing about the
likelihood of conditions or states of affairs. 141
The problems of counterfactuals, such as the formulation of truth-conditions for
them, are therefore irrelevant to causal capacity ascriptions. Causal capacity ascriptions are
easily tested, unlike counterfactual conditionals, which assume conditions that are false or
extremely unlikely.
(7) Causal capacity ascriptions are testable.
A common method of testing capacity claims is to observe the display (induced or
discovered) of a (suspected or unknown) capacity under conditions in which alternative
causal factors (capacities) can be ruled out. When a thing manifests a causal capacity in a
scenario that is well understood, often a single instance of display is sufficient to verify the
causal capacity.
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4.2.2 Causes As the Operation of Capacities v. Causes As Regularities
The capacity analysis of causal laws has many advantages over its leading
contender, the regularity view: 142
(1)
Laws of regularity, as we have seen, underdetermine causal structure: any given
true regularity is consistent with many contradictory causal structures. In general, any true
regularity of the form, "Whenever A, then B” is consistent with three possible causal
relationships:
(1 ) A causes B.
(2) B causes A.
(3) Neither A nor B is the cause of the other, i.e., a third factor C causes both
A and B.
The capacity account suffers from no such failings: once the operative capacities have been
specified (and sufficient evidence of their operation presented), the ambiguity of causal
structure is removed, and the causal relationship is settled.
(2) The capacity account can handle mixed capacities. As we have already noted, a
causal factor can have the capacities both to promote and to inhibit the occurrence of an
effect — and may even operate in both ways simultaneously. There may well be parallel
pathways by which certain birth control pills, for example, both contribute to and inhibit
breast cancer. But counteracting regularities cannot take place. The regularity account,
therefore, cannot describe the operation of mixed capacities.
(3) The capacity account handles cases in which causes are overdetermined; the
regularity account, in contrast, cannot. The capacity account handles the overdetermination
of causes in virtue of its distinction between causal capacities and the operation of
capacities. An effect is overdetermined when many factors having the capacity for that
effect are present at its occurrence. Yet under the capacity account we can correctly
attribute the effect to only one, or some other subset, of the capacities present: the
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responsible capacities, we say, were operative in this case. The capacity account thus
allows one to rule out present, but inoperative, causal factors.
(4) The capacity account allows for a distinction to be made between causal and
non-causal laws. Causal laws describe the causal capacities of things (with a specified
structure). Non-causal laws (laws of coexistence or succession) do not. The ability to
account for causal laws is important, for causal laws are required to design and execute
experiments, and to control processes, among other things. 143
(5) The capacity account can make sense of causal laws that contain unrealizable
conditions, e.g., Coulomb's Law, which tells us the force that acts on a two charged
particles, if their masses are zero. There are no charged particles with masses of zero 144
,
and hence the law describes no regularity. As a capacity ascription, in contrast, the law is
comprehensible, useful, and true: it describes a causal capacity that is operative throughout
nature, even though it describes the actual behavior of no natural objects.
(6) The regularity view also cannot account for important aspects of scientific
method, including analytic method and some kinds of experimental inference. 145 Analytic
method refers to a general strategy of inquiry: when we seek to understand a phenomenon
or thing, we pull it apart into pieces, and try to grasp the properties of each component in
isolation from the others, often under highly specialized conditions. Later, when we want
to explain, control, or predict the phenomenon in nature, we assemble what we know of
the relevant components to do so. When using analytical knowledge in these ways, we
assume that things will bring the properties (causal and structural) revealed under analysis
with them into new situations.
The key aspect of analytic method is the isolation of components to see how they
behave on their own. This often requires an experiment that creates very special (ideal)
circumstances under which the component can be observed, and this can be extremely
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d.fficult to achieve: the experimentalist must take into account all factors that will interfere
with or obscure the exhibition of the behavior of the component itself. To measure the
component of force clue to electrostatic forces, for example, the experimentalist will try to
construct conditions in which other forces, e.g., gravitational, are removed or can be
calculated away; indeed, the electrostatic force can be measured only under the ideal
conditions of a good experiment.
What does it mean to say that the conditions are ideal? They are ideal, on the
capacity view, if they are the right conditions for the capacity to exhibit itself. What makes
experimental conditions ideal, on the regularity view? The conditions under which the
electrostatic force can be measured successfully, for example, are only a small subset of
many possible conditions. Why should this subset of conditions rather than another be
preferred? It cannot be on grounds that only these conditions generate a regularity, for
alternative sets of conditions will generate regularities, too. The regularity theorist cannot
tell us what is so special about the conditions of a controlled experiment, nor can he
explain the great amount of work that scientists expend in getting experiments to perform in
just the right way.
Designing and executing a good experiment, i.e., one in which the target
phenomenon can be observed, is only half the job. For the scientist is not interested in
establishing only that the phenomenon occurs under the special conditions of the
experiment, e.g., that the electrostatic force is such and such a value under these special
conditions. If the experiment has been well designed and executed, the scientist will be
able to make a further inference to a more abstract finding: that the thing tested has a certain
capacity in general, independent of any specific conditions. Indeed, if adequate care has
been taken in the design of the experiment, a single-instance of the capacity's manifestation
suffices to warrant the inference to the abstract claim. Once the electrostatic force has been
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measured under well-controlled experimental conditions, for example, the scientist can
mfer that charged particles elsewhere, under a variety of conditions, also have the capacity
to act upon each other with the same force.
The regularity theorist cannot account for this inference. For on his view, the goal
of experiment is to establish a regularity - but the truth of a regularity law is always bound
to the specific conditions under which it occurs. Because of this, the results of a highly
controlled experiment usually cannot be generalized to other (e.g., natural) circumstances
- so long as we understand the results to be the establishment of a regularity.' 46
Consider how experimentalists pursued the study of cosmic radiation in the
1 930s. 147 One approach taken by Carl Anderson and others was to build cloud chambers
in which to take pictures of cosmic rays' ionization trails. But the experimentalists wanted
to observe the particles under very special conditions. Anderson, for example, placed his
cloud chamber in the middle of a powerful electromagnet, the field-strength of which he
could control precisely. FHe did this because he wanted to see what the particles would do
as they moved through a strong magnetic field. He also made the particles penetrate a lead
plate during their trajectory through the chamber. On what grounds could a regularity
theorist justify looking for regularities in the behavior of particles under these conditions?
These conditions are only one set among many possible circumstances — why are they so
special?
It is unclear what the regularity theorist can say. Perhaps the physicists sought to
connect the behavior of the particles with that of other particles moving in a magnetic field.
But this would be too narrow a description of the physicists' goal: describing the behavior
of particles in a magnetic field was not their main interest. Another possible explanation is
that the physicists wanted to see how the particles would behave when a force acted upon
them, and they knew that a magnetic field acts upon charged particles with a certain force.
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Although this explanation of Anderson et a/.'s method is more plausible, establishing laws
of regular behavior in the presence of forces was not the point of the experiments. Even if it
were, it is unclear why these regularities should be any more important than others.
The electromagnet and lead plate were added, of course, so that the effect of the
magnetic field on the paths of individual particles could be precisely measured. By
measuring the range and curvature of the particles' paths, physicists were able to judge the
momentum and mass of individual particles, among other things. The special conditions of
the cloud chambers allowed them to observe, in other words, the effects of an important
causal capacity (mass) of the individual particles traveling through the chambers.
There are therefore good reasons to prefer the capacity analysis over the regularity
view of causal laws. Some of these reasons will become more robust in our discussion
below of explanatory controversy.
4.3 The Causal Theory of Explanation
The main thesis of this dissertation is that scientific explanations describe the causal
origins of the phenomenon to be explained. Having established that causal laws are best
understood as capacity ascriptions, we are now in a position to delineate the structure of
scientific explanations. Scientific explanations contain the following kinds of information:
(1) Internal structures : the names of the relevant causal factors, and
descriptions of their internal structures;
(2) Causal capacities: descriptions of the causal capacities of the causal
factors;
(3) Background conditions: descriptions of special background conditions;
(4) Causal interactions: descriptions of the relevant causal interactions,
including evidence that they in fact occurred;
(5) Global laws; and
(6) Laws of coexistence.
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(1 ) Internal structures. Information about the internal structure of things is desirable
in explanations insofar as it helps to elucidate the causal capacities of the thing and the
causal interactions (the operations of causal capacities) that result in the phenomenon
explained. 148 The explanatory relevance of internal structure is a function of the causal
capacities with which it is associated. Aspects of the molecular structure of two chemical
compounds in reaction, for instance, may be part of the explanation of the reaction, but
only insofar as the features described are associated with relevant causal capacities.
What counts as internal structure reflects the chosen level of analysis. If the object
of analysis were human organ systems, for example, internal structure may lie at the cellular
level; the internal structure of cells would be (largely) irrelevant, however, as would be the
social behavior of the individuals.
A description of internal structure may include capacity ascriptions. For example, a
description of the structure of an atom may include mention of electrons, understood to be
sub-atomic particles with a certain mass and charge. "Mass" and "charge," however, are
causal capacities. 149
(2) Causal capacities. A causal capacity ascription describes the kinds of causal
interactions in which an entity is capable of participating. Some examples of causal
capacity ascriptions are:
(a) Melanie moths are able to avoid predatory birds by hiding on pollution-
darkened tree trunks.
(b) Some species of grass are heavy-metal tolerant.
(c) Light travels at a speed of 3 X 10 8 m/sec.
(d) Metals conduct electricity.
It has been thought by Quine and others that the explanatory role of capacities can
be (and is, in highly developed areas of science) ultimately superseded by descriptions of
internal structure. As examples, one could point to explanations that refer to the capacity of
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acids to neutralize bases or of the capacity of organisms to replicate themselves. Both kinds
of explanations can now be replaced by detailed molecular descriptions that do not refer to
capacities of neutralization or replication. Below I will argue that capacities cannot be
gotten rid of so easily: reducing macro-level capacity ascriptions to descriptions of micro-
level structure cannot be successful unless there are capacities at the micro-level. Micro-
reduction thus does not preclude the need for capacity ascriptions, but consists of replacing
macro-capacities with micro-capacities.
(3) Special background conditions. These are special circumstances (non-causal and
non-lawlike) that contribute to the causal outcome. Why is the incidence of lung cancer
high within a certain population? Because the members of this population all happen to be
cigarette smokers, and cigarette smoke causes cancer. The fact that the members of this
population are all cigarette smokers is a special background condition that is important to
the explanation, but is not of a causal nature. No causal connection between these
individuals and cigarette smoking is asserted.
(4) Causal interactions. A required component of scientific explanations is an
account of causal interactions. An account of causal interactions tells us which causal
capacities present were operative, and describes the causal interactions that took place.
These accounts tend to be narrative descriptions of generic or particular causal sequences of
events. Consider, as an example, the following description of crossing-over in DNA
recombination:
During meiosis, the DNA duplex molecules of homologous chromosomes
recognize each other by some unknown mechanism and become precisely
aligned in synapsis. Crossing over may then occur. In one model of
crossing over, nicks are made at corresponding points in a single strand of
each of the two aligned molecules and each free end is joined with the
broken strand of the other molecule. ..Base pairs then sequentially separate
and reunite with those of the other DNA molecule, forming a heteroduplex
sequence of greater or lesser length. According to this model,
recombination is observed when the heteroduplex region is terminated by a
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This is a generic description of crossing over. Explanations of particular events, e.g„ the
recent global warming, require descriptions of particular sequences of actual events.
(5) Global laws. Global laws refer to systemic properties, good examples of which
are the properties described by the great conservation laws. The law of conservation of
charge, for example, states that the total charge (e.g., number of positive unit charges minus
the number of negative unit charges) of any closed system remains constant. Conservation
of charge is a systemic, or global, property.
(6) Laws of coexistence. Finally, explanations may contain non-causal laws that link
the presence of some things or properties, or the values of some quantities, to the presence
or values of others. Such laws include statistical correlations and equations that specify
precise quantitative relations between properties of causal processes. Laws of coexistence
are especially valuable when precise quantitative values of properties are desired.
Examples of laws of coexistence are the Ideal Gas Law and the law of the simple pendulum.
Not every scientific explanation contains all of these kinds of information. Particular
forms of information may be absent for one of three reasons. First, some of these kinds of
information are simply irrelevant in particular cases of explanation. Laws of coexistence, for
example, play no role in the above explanation of crossing-over in DNA recombination.
Second, the phenomenon may not be completely understood, and, hence, some relevant
information may be unknown and therefore absent. Electrons, for example, appeared in
explanations long before anything was known of their internal structure. Third, the
information may be generally known, and thus need not be restated for the purposes of
explanation. Lack of novelty does not make information irrelevant to explanation, as some
theorists would have it: such information can remain a tacit but important component of the
explanation, so long as the information is causally relevant.
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Not every scientific explanation contains all of the six kinds of information
mentioned above. Yet causal information is always required, since explanation depends
upon information about the relevant causal capacities and causal interactions. 150
4.4 Theory, Explanation, and Causal Knowledge
Most philosophers of science have assumed that scientific explanation consists in
some special logical relation between scientific theory and fact. The relationship between
theory and causal knowledge is not simple, however, and the causal theory of explanation
forces a revision of this assumption.
Theories have many uses, only one of which is explanation: they can be used to
predict events, to calculate the values of quantities, to describe the internal structure of
natural things, to control processes, and to design experiments. Not surprisingly, therefore,
theories can contain many kinds of information, including global laws, laws of coexistence
(including mathematical equations), the values of important constants, descriptions of
generic causal interactions, descriptions of causal capacities, descriptions of internal
structures, or a mixture of any of these.
A theory need not provide any causal information. Some applications of the theory
of fluid mechanics, for instance, contain no causal information: the equations of fluid
mechanics are sometimes used, for example, to calculate rates of heat "flow" (transfer), even
though it is known that fluid mechanics describes incorrectly the causal process by which
heat is transferred.
Nancy Cartwright (1981) offers the interesting example of quantum damping to
distinguish causal accounts from theoretical treatments. She relates that there is a
universally agreed-upon causal description of quantum damping, according to which
quantum damping, and its associated line broadening, are brought about by the emission
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and absorption of photons. Supplementing the causal story, however, are six different
theoretical treatments, i.e., six different ways to set the phenomena into the general
mathematical framework of quantum mechanics. The choice of theoretical treatment is
determined by how the theory is to be used. For example, if one wishes to use it in
applications in which statistics are important, e.g., photon correlation experiments, one
must select theoretical equations that will provide statistical answers.
Theoretical treatments that provide little or no causal information exhibit
correspondingly little or no explanatory power. This is not to say that such theories cannot
participate in scientific explanations: they can, but only when supplemented with
appropriate causal accounts.
Naturally, some theories are causal theories. Darwin's theory of natural selection is
a good example of a causal theory: it provides a causal account of the evolution of
adaptations in organisms. Natural selection explanations contain a number of the
components mentioned above. Essential to natural selection explanations, for example, are
descriptions of the capacities of organisms to transmit traits to their offspring (heredity), and
the capacity to survive and reproduce, as well as descriptions of causal interactions between
organisms and their environment.
Some explanations contain few or no theoretical claims beyond the assertion (or
assumption) that some causal capacity exists and is operative in the particular case at hand.
An example of a non-theoretical explanation is: John F. Kennedy died of the trauma caused
by multiple gunshot wounds.
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4.5 A Summary of the Benefits of the Causal Theory of Scientific Explanation
The causal theory of scientific explanation offers an array of advantages unmatched
by any competitor theory of explanation. To summarize these benefits, it would be useful
to recall the set of philosophical problems of explanation canvassed in Chapter 1
:
(a) When does some information constitute a scientific explanation?
(b) Wherein lies the difference between description and explanation, or
between descriptive knowledge and explanatory knowledge?
(c) What is the precise relation between explanation and understanding?
(d) How can we account for explanation as an objective of scientific
inquiry?
(e) The ability to control processes and to explain phenomena both mark
scientific understanding: what is the connection between these two abilities?
(f) What is the distinction between theoretical prediction and explanation?
(g) What is the correct solution to the asymmetries of explanation, and other
problems of explanatory relevance?
(h) How can we account for differences in explanatory framework, style,
and practices among various subfields of science? Among different periods
in the history of science?
(i) Can we explain differences in the nature, progress, and resolution of
explanatory controversies?
(a) Information constitutes a scientific explanation, of course, when it describes the
causal capacities and interactions (mechanisms) responsible for the phenomena-to-be-
explained, in accordance with the pragmatic demands of the explanation context.
(b)
,
(c), and (e): The difference between descriptive knowledge and explanatory
knowledge (or understanding) lies in having knowledge of the causal capacities and
mechanisms responsible for the phenomenon. Again, causal knowledge is not the only
kind of understanding important in science. There are others (e.g., understanding a
derivation), but understanding why or how a phenomenon occurs requires causal
knowledge. Moreover, the ability to explain is only one kind of competence associated
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With causal understanding: designing effective strategies of action, controlling natural
processes, designing and executing experiments, and making predictions are others. The
reason for the intimacy between these kinds of abilities is now clear: they are all
manifestations of causal knowledge.
(d) This also clarifies why the goal of scientific inquiry is often said to be
explanation: "seeking understanding" and "seeking explanation" are sometimes used
interchangeably because both are a search for causal knowledge.
(f) The causal theory of explanation also reveals why epistemic or predictive
grounds and explanatory information have been conflated by philosophers .' 51 Laws of
regularity often serve as the basis of good predictive inferences. In addition, as we have
also noted, scientists believe implicitly that every true regularity has a causal explanation; a
regularity thus entails that a causal relationship exists between the correlated factors.
Philosophers have acknowledged these facts and mistakenly concluded that predictive or
epistemic grounds, and explanatory (causal) information are pretty much the same, and that
both require inferences from laws of regularity. These philosophers fail to note, however,
that causal structure is radically underdetermined by laws of regularity: though every true
regularity has a causal explanation, that explanation is not given with the regularity itself.
Therefore, laws of regularity can be useful for making predictions, but they cannot serve as
the basis of explanation.
(g) The causal theory shows explanatory asymmetries to result from causal
asymmetries between factors of interest. Explanatory relevance is a function of two aspects
of explanation: causal relevance and contextual (pragmatic) relevance.
(h) Explanatory practices differ in various sciences in part because of differences in
the complexity of phenomena, the depth of knowledge of causal mechanisms, and in the
kinds of evidence used to support capacity ascriptions and descriptions of causal
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interactions. For example, where phenomena are complex and causal mechanisms are
poorly understood, e.g., in psychology, statistical evidence is often used to support
explanatory claims. Statistical evidence is used because the weakness of our causal
knowledge, as well as the complexity of the phenomena themselves, obstruct efforts to
isolate factors in a way that allows them to be observed directly in individual cases. Where
phenomena are relatively simple, in contrast, more direct forms of evidence can be used to
verify the legitimacy of an explanation. Consider the cloud chamber experiments
performed by physicists in the 1 930s (some of which will be discussed in detail in Chapter
6). Statistical information certainly played a role, but so did the measurements of
trajectories (e.g., magnetic rigidity) of individual ion trails. These measurements provided
direct evidence of a causal capacity of individual particles, namely, their mass, but only
because of the relative simplicity of the phenomenon and the strong causal background
knowledge available.
To take another example, it is sometimes said that the role of laws in biological and
physical sciences is different. Ernst Mayr, for example, writes:
In classical physics, laws were considered universal, and Popper's
falsifiability principle was based on this conception...
[In contrast], the word law is used sparingly, if at all, in most
[contemporary] writings about evolution. Generalizations in modern
biology tend to be statistical and probabilistic and often have numerous
exceptions. Moreover, biological generalizations tend to apply to
geographical or otherwise restricted domains. One can generalize from the
study of birds, tropical forests, freshwater plankton, or the central nervous
system but most of these generalizations have so limited an application that
the use of the word law
,
in the sense of the laws of physics, is questionable
(1988, 18-19).
Mayr is certainly correct in noting that modern biology contains few laws of the generality
and precision of, say, Newtonian mechanics. The reason for this, I submit, is that the causal
structure of the biological world is vastly more complex than the world of large bodies
described by Newtonian mechanics. Causal capacities are as stable, and as plentiful, in
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biology as they are in physics. However, each organism carries a huge (usually unique)
system of capacities into a causally complex environment. As a result, though individual
capacities are stable across organisms or environments, behavior is not: the operation of a
capacity in any particular case depends upon a great variety of factors. In contrast, the
motion of large bodies such as planets or projectiles depends almost entirely on a single
capacity - the bodies' mass (inertia) - and a relatively small number of forces (e.g.,
gravity), the effects of which are calculable with comparative ease. As a result of this causal
simplicity, behavior of large bodies is relatively regular, and can be described accurately
with a few laws of great scope. The distinction pointed out by Mayr is thus a function of
differences in the causal structure of large body and biological systems.
(i) Explanatory controversies in the history of science will be discussed in the last
chapter. There it will be shown that explanatory controversies concern the causal origins of
the phenomena of interest, and that this partly explains the nature, progress, and resolution
of controversy. Explanatory controversies are tenacious, for example, so long as the causal
structure underlying a phenomenon is poorly understood. When relevant causal
knowledge is lacking, it is difficult to decide, with any finality, between competing
explanatory hypotheses. The experimental illumination of causal structure and mechanisms
can, on the other hand, decisively resolved long-standing explanatory controversies. But
the design and execution of decisive experiments requires a rich background of prior causal
knowledge, and thus cannot be pursued in every case.
We see that the benefits of the causal theory are impressive. But the causal theory
has been subjected to numerous attacks, most of which are based on Humean assumptions.
In the next chapter, we will see that the presumed disadvantages of the theory are not as
serious as critics suppose them to be.
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CHAPTER 5
OBJECTIONS TO THE CAUSAL THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
After Hume, causes and causal knowledge fell into disrepute in philosophy. And
while other objects of Hume's criticism, such as scientific theories and induction, have
regained their philosophical reputations, causes have remained in disgrace. This situation is
unfortunate and unjustifiable: it is high time, I will argue, to repudiate Hume's skepticism
about causes, too. This is not to say that Hume's arguments should be ignored, or can be
dismissed out of hand. They present legitimate hurdles to any account of causal
knowledge. But Hume's arguments are philosophical obstacles to be overcome, not
conclusive grounds for dismissing causal knowledge as unintelligible, unjustifiable, or
eliminable. I therefore urge a shifting of the burden of proof, similar to what has occurred
regarding induction and the status of scientific theories. In favor of this shift, I have already
shown that causal knowledge cannot be reduced to Humean laws of association
(regularities). In this chapter, I will demonstrate further that (i) causes and causal knowledge
are indispensable in science; (ii) that Hume's skeptical argument can be answered; and (iii)
that the epistemic credentials of causal knowledge are as good as those of any kind of
knowledge.
First, I should make clear some of my methodological assumptions. The search for
good theory — be it a theory of science or of some other activity — consists of a dialectic
between theory (or rules) and accepted practice. Goodman, in discussing how to justify
induction, describes this view succinctly:
Rules and particular inferences alike are justified by being brought into
agreement with each other. A rule is amended if it yields an inference we
are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are
unwilling to amend (1954, 64).
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As with inference rules, so it is with theories of science. This view yields two
methodological principles. First, theory should try to account for as much of accepted
scientific practice as possible. "Accepted practice" includes both scientific methodology
and the particular knowledge claims accepted by the scientific community. Second,
arguments whose conclusions require one to relinquish accepted scientific methodology or
knowledge thereby bring upon themselves an extra burden of proof: rare indeed is the case
in which accepted scientific methodology or knowledge should be jettisoned in favor of
philosophical theory.
These two rules will have consequences for our discussion of causal knowledge and
explanation. Epistemological arguments leading to skepticism about causal capacities often
fail the second principle: they apply equally well to more cherished kinds of knowledge.
Hence, the arguments, rather than our knowledge of causal capacities, should be doubted.
Ontological arguments against causal capacities, on the other hand, tend to flounder on the
first methodological principle: they yield an account of science on which much of what is
impressive and important in science, such as scientific explanation, experimental design
and inference, and process control, is incomprehensible (and even irrational).
Before we take up Hume's argument and concerns about the epistemic credentials
of causal knowledge, we will examine two preliminary issues: the importance of causal
knowledge in science; and the philosophical status of dispositions (including causal
capacities).
5.1 The Importance of Causes in Science
Some philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell, have argued that causal concepts are
no longer important in science, and that the appeal to causal concepts in philosophy is
therefore gratuitous. Philosophers who insist upon the importance of causal concepts, it is
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implied, have simply not yet caught up with the realities of modern quantitative science.
This objection is urged by those who have looked at science (though no further than
theoretical physics, most likely) and found nothing of importance beyond sets of
quantitative formulas expressing functional relationships between variables and constants.
Indeed, many eminent scientific laws, e.g., Newton's Second Law, say little or nothing
about the causal relations between the entities and properties represented by them. It is
also true that the word "cause" appears rarely in scientific reports.
Despite this evidence to the contrary, however, it is impossible to maintain that
causal concepts are not widely used in science. The following passage from a noted
physics text is a good example:
[Describing the operation of an ammonia maser...] In summary, the
molecule enters the cavity, the cavity field — oscillating at exactly the right
frequency induces transitions from the upper to the lower state, and the
energy released is fed into the oscillating field. In an operating maser the
molecules deliver enough energy to maintain the cavity oscillations — not
only providing enough power to make up for the cavity losses but even
providing small amounts of excess power that can be drawn from the cavity.
Thus, the molecular energy is converted into the energy of an external
electromagnetic field (Feynman, 1989, 1 1 1-9-1 2).
In case one believes that a textbook is the wrong place to look for real science, I opened a
recent issue of a respected journal to a random page and found the claim:
Asymmetric cleavage of the zygote results in the formation of an embryo
with a suspensor and embryo proper that have distinct developmental fates
(.Science 266 (1994): 606).
Both passages are filled with causal language.
One might maintain, of course, that although causal language appears in scientific
reports and textbooks, the heart and soul of science consists of the equations of theories and
their purely (or mostly) functional relationships. Causal concepts may be used by scientists,
e.g., for heuristic purposes, but the causal concepts themselves are not science proper, or, at
least, are relatively unimportant.
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Th.s attitude about what is important is science has the unfortunate consequence,
however, that most of what scientists do and write is not science, or, at least, is not
important to science. For most, if not all, scientific research is directed towards the
elucidation, description, and control of causal mechanisms. Look, for example, at the table
of contents of the same issue of Science mentioned above: Here one finds papers with titles
such as
"Causes of Decadal Climate Variability over the North Pacific and North
America,"
"An AIDS-Like Condition Induced in Baboons by HIV-2," and
"PHAS-I as a Link between Mitogen-Activated Protein Kinase and
Translation Initiation."
It is clear that one cannot dismiss philosophical appeals to causation merely on the ground
that causal concepts play no important role in science.
5.2 Dispositions
The causal theory of explanation appeals not only to causes, but to dispositions, as
well: a causal capacity is a disposition to interact causally. I have suggested that causal laws
are best understood as ascriptions of causal capacity, yet dispositions are distrusted by some
philosophers — typically by those who also despise causes. Before we turn to our
discussion of Hume, therefore, it would be best to deal first with potential objections arising
from the dispositional character of causal capacities.
We will begin with Carnap's analysis of disposition terms. 152 Carnap's goal is a
positivist one: he would like to show that disposition terms are verifiable by observation
and therefore cognitively significant. Let's take as an example the property of solubility. As
a starting point, Carnap considers the following account of solubility:
(1) a is water-soluble if and only if whenever a is placed in water, it
dissolves, or
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5(a) = (t)[W(a,t) 3 D(a,t)] (Carnap 1936/37, §7).
This account captures part of the meaning of solubility; however, the account presents
difficulties, as well. As Carnap points out, it follows from (l)that any a is water-soluble, so
long as a has not been placed in water.
Carnap attempts to improve on (1) by replacing it with the "reduction sentence":
(2) Whenever a is placed in water, a is water-soluble if and only if it
dissolves, or
(t)[W(a,t) 3 (5(a) h D(a,t))].
(2)
,
unlike (1), does not attribute solubility to all things not in water. It does, nonetheless,
have the opposite problem, namely, it attributes water solubility only to those things that
have been, at some time or other, in water (and have dissolved). This clearly does not
capture the accepted use of the term, as Carnap readily admits: such reduction sentences,
he concedes, can be viewed as no more than partial definitions.
(2) has a second disagreeable consequence that has been emphasized by Mellor
(1974, 160-1): it makes water solubility an immutable property of a so long as a, at some
time or other, dissolved in water. Most dispositions are not immutable, and so (2) is clearly
inadequate. This problem can be repaired in a manner suggested by Storer (1950-51) by
adding a temporal index to the predicate "is water-soluble":
(3) (t)[W(a,t) 3 (S(a,t) = D(a,t))].
(3) allows that solubility is mutable, and is thus an improvement on (2). (2)'s first problem,
however, remains: (3) can be satisfied only by those things that have been, at some time or
other, in water and dissolved. This may suffice as a (partial) epistemic criterion of water
solubility, but it will not do as an account of solubility, for we attribute solubility to things
even when they have not already been dissolved in water. This is a distinctive feature of
dispositional properties in general: we attribute them to things even when the dispositional
properties have not been manifest. 1 ”
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The situation, argues Hempel (1950), is even worse for dispositions of a
theoretical" character, e.g., gravitational potential or electric field:
if a system of reduction sentences for the concept of electric field were
available, then - to oversimplify the point a little - it would be possible to
describe, in terms of observable characteristics, some necessary and
sufficient conditions for the presence, in a given region, of an electric field
of any mathematical description, however complex. Actually, however,
such criteria can at best be given only for some sufficiently simple kinds of
fields (1950, 121).
Hempel's point is that constructing a system of reduction sentences for theoretically
complex dispositional predicates is extremely difficult, and practically impossible.
Some philosophers have concluded from the preceding sorts of deliberations that
dispositional properties are not real properties at all. Of special importance to this
viewpoint is the claim that a thing may have a dispositional property, although the property
is not being, and has never been, manifest. It therefore seems that one can attribute a
disposition to a thing, even if the disposition makes no empirical difference to the world.
Viewed in this way, dispositions assume a ghostly character that makes some philosophers
— especially those with positivist sensibilities — ill at ease.
Gilbert Ryle, for example, argues that:
Disposition statements are neither reports of observed or observable states
of affairs, nor yet reports of unobserved or unobservable states of affairs.
They narrate no incidents (1949, 125).
He concludes that dispositions are not actual or real properties. 154 Without getting into the
details of Ryle's argument, it is clear that it requires a further premise:
If a property is real, then its attribution must be a report of observed or
observable, or unobserved or unobservable, states of affairs.
A real property must make an observable difference to the events of the world. 155
Ryle's argument is plausible, especially when applied within the realm of
philosophy of science, for scientists are also wary of postulated entities and processes that
seem to make no empirical difference in the world. There are good reasons, nonetheless, to
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be suspicious of Ryle's argument
.
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For one, Ryle's argument applies equally well to
nondispositional properties. Consider the ultimate nondispositional property, the molecular
structure of table salt. That table salt has a certain molecular structure entails no particular
events, observable or unobservable. Of course, there are events, both incidental and
producible in experiment, that indicate the nature of salt's molecular structure. But there
are also events that can indicate the salt's dipositional properties, e.g., solub as well.
Here one must be careful to distinguish the direct display of a property and
observable events that constitute evidence of a property's existence. Only by conflating
display and evidence do dispositional and nondispositional properties seem different.
Once display and evidence are separated, however, there is no difference between
dispositional and nondispositional properties: there are nondispositional, as well as
dispositional, properties that are not directly displayed. Moreover, the existence of
dispositional, as well as nondispositional, properties may be affirmed by suitable observable
evidence. Assuming that we must accept nondispositional properties such as molecular
structure as real, then Ryle's argument provides no grounds on which to reject dispositional
properties as unreal, for dispositional and nondispositional properties are indistinguishable
by his argument
.
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One's suspicion of dispositions might not be so easily dislodged, however. Sure,
dropping and breaking a glass may indicate that the glass is fragile. But how do I know the
glass was fragile an hour ago, or that other glasses are fragile, if they have not been
dropped? I dropped this one, and it broke — but that does not provide me with a way to
distinguish other fragile glasses from nonfragile ones.
This problem is no more than the problem of induction, however, and it is by no
means restricted to attributions of dispositional properties. Induction presents a problem for
general laws describing non-dispositional properties, too.
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Hugh Mellor suggests that behind the suspicion of dispositions lurks the belief that
dispositions cannot carry out their presumed explanatory functions. When one considers
the explanatory use of dispositions, one thinks naturally of examples such as, "these pills, by
virtue of their dormative powers, will help you to sleep." Reference to the "dormative
powers" of the pills is surely no explanation of why the pills help one to fall asleep.
It would be wrong to conclude from such examples, however, that dispositions
cannot explain. Why did my headache go away? Because I took an aspirin, and aspirin
relieves headaches. Here the explanation - which the reader will find legitimate, I
presume - makes reference to the capacity (i.e., disposition) of aspirin to relieve
headaches, and is none the worse for it.
The difference between these two examples may be accounted for by the epistemic
context of explanation, not by any supposed distinction between dispositional and
nondispositional properties, or between certain dispositions (e.g., to relieve headaches) and
others (e.g., dormative powers). In a context in which the explainee knows about the
headache-relieving capacity of aspirin (and that I took an aspirin for my headache) the
answer given above will not explain the disappearance of the headache. In this case, the
explainee is probably looking for an explanation of how the aspirin works, which is not
explained by citing its capacity to relieve headache. On the other hand, if the explainee
does not know about the capacities of aspirin, citing the capacity of aspirin to relieve
headache is both informative and explanatory. Similar contextual considerations are active
when explanations are given in nondispositional terms. The failure of some dispositions to
explain is therefore independent of their dispositional character.
Other philosophers argue that, even if dispositions are not disreputable, still science
is better off when they are reduced to nondispositional terms (Goodman (1954), Quine
(1960, 1 969), Armstrong (1968, 1 973)). This kind of reduction often occurs in science, e.g.,
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the biological disposition term "heritab.lity" is now explained in terms of the molecular
structure of genes and their typical interactions in reproduction.
The approach advised by such philosophers is optimistic, to say the least. Although
the kinds of reductions suggested are common in science, the reductions usually do not
succeed in removing dispositions from discourse. What they accomplish, rather, is the
reduction of one set of dispositions to another. Thus, although heritability, solubility, and
other dispositions may be explained in molecular and atomic terms, these molecular and
atomic descriptions are themselves filled with dispositional properties. For example,
behavior at the atomic and molecular levels is characterized in part by reference to
electrostatic forces, which are described by Coulomb's law (and superposition, if there are
more than two charges). The electrostatic force described by Coulomb's law, however, is a
dispositional property of charges.
In addition, the reduction of nondispositional terms can be achieved in the same
way, though no philosopher thereby concludes that nondispositional terms are best
eliminated from science. For example, the property, "is dissolving" can be replaced by a
molecular description, but no one suggests that "is dissolving" is not a real property, or that
it must be replaced by its molecular description. "Is dissolving" is simply a more general or
abstract — though not less real — property than those properties detailed in its
corresponding molecular description. Disposition and nondisposition terms can both be
reduced to more precise, analytical terms, and reduction therefore provides no grounds for
avoiding dispositions.
I conclude that dispositions are respectable, and that there is no reason to believe
them to be less real than other properties. We have seen that all of the supposed difficulties
of dispositions are shared equally by nondispositional properties. The most important of
these difficulties is induction; ontological concerns about dispositions are often driven by
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epistemological worries about inductive inference. But induction is a problem no matter
what one accepts in his or her ontology. The progress of science, of course, may allow one
to remove some dispositions from discourse by reducing them to other properties. But
there is no reason to believe that these other properties must be nondispositional. In any
case, eliminative reduction is not restricted to dispositional properties alone, for
nondispositional properties may also be reduced to less abstract descriptions. Reduction
thus provides no grounds for avoiding dispositions in general. In cases where reduction is
possible, the only argument left is one of ontological economy, but this argument applies
only on a case-by-case basis, and applies equally as well to reducible nondispositional
properties.
5.3 Knowledge of Causal Capacities and Interactions
Dispositions are not as unintelligible as some philosophers imagine. Hence, the
dispositional nature of causal capacities need not trouble us. Neither should the appeal to
causes and causal knowledge. I have already provided evidence of the indispensability of
causes in science and of the irreducibility of causal claims to regularities or counterfactuals.
I will now argue that Hume's grounds for skepticism need not trouble us. Furthermore, a
look at some detailed scientific examples will yield evidence that causal beliefs can be
verified by empirical evidence.
5.4 The Grounds of Hume's Skepticism
The source of most twentieth-century skepticism regarding causal knowledge is the
work of David Hume. Any successful causal theory of explanation must therefore face up
to Hume's arguments. What I characterized in Chapter 2 as Humean positivism consists of
six doctrines:
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(1
)
Duality of knowledge: there are two distinct kinds of knowledge —
mathematical and empirical.
logical-
(2) Verifiability: significant propositions must be verifiable.
(3) Pro-observation: empirical propositions are best verified by observation.
(4) Anti-cause: there are no knowable causal connections in nature. There are only
the regular associations of objects in experience.
(5) Anti-induction: ampliative inference in empirical matters — that is the inference
from observed cases to those that have not been observed - has no epistemic
foundation.
(6)
Anti-metaphysics: metaphysical propositions are unverifiable and therefore
meaningless.
Most important to the causal theory of explanation is doctrine (4), though (4) relies in part
on doctrines (1 ), (2), (3), and (5). A defense of the causal theory of explanation requires one
to confront Hume's arguments in favor of (4), the conclusion that there are no causal
connections in nature (and no epistemological foundation for causal judgements). We will
now turn to the details of Hume's argument.
In support of (4), Hume argues that causal beliefs rest on principles that are founded
on neither experience nor inference. A causal belief, on Hume's view, consists of the belief
that there is a necessary connection between objects (e.g., between events). How can we
obtain knowledge of this connection? Hume argues first that the connection between cause
and effect cannot be a logical connection, and this argument is pursued in two ways. First,
he remarks that when one is presented with an unfamiliar object supposed to be a cause, it
is impossible to infer the nature of its effects:
Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and
abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the
most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its
causes or effects. ADAM, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the
very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity, and
transparency of water, that it would suffocate him, or from the light and
warmth of fire, that it would consume him. No object ever discovers, by
the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced
it, or the effects which will arise from it (1 977, 1 7)
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Second, argues Hume, it is always consistent to suppose a given cause to occur
without the appearance of its supposed effect:
When I see, for instance, a Billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards
another; even suppose the motion in the second ball should by accident be
suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not
conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from that
cause? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first
ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or
direction? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then
should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or
conceivable than the rest? All our reasonings a priori will never be able to
show us any foundation for this preference.
In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It
could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention or
conception of it, a priori
,
must be entirely arbitrary... In vain, therefore,
should we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or
effect, without the assistance of observation and experience (1977, 18-19).
A cause is always logically distinct from an effect, and hence a connection between the two
cannot be inferred, a priori. The knowledge of causal connections must therefore rest on
experience.
What, then, of the evidence provided by the senses? All will agree, declares Hume,
that causal connections cannot be directly observed:
It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from
all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial
qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles,
on which the influence of these objects entirely depends. Our senses
inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither sense
nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities, which fit it for nourishment
and support of a human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual
motion of bodies; but as to that wonderful force or power, which would
carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which
bodies never lose but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form
the most distant conception. ..It is allowed on all hands, that there is no
known connexion between the sensible qualities and their secret powers;
and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion
concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by any thing which it
knows of their nature (1 977, 21).
Causal connections cannot, according to Hume, be observed directly; in other words,
causation cannot be observed in the single instance. This portion of Hume's argument is
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often left unmentioned in commentary. One reason for this neglect, perhaps, is that
Hume s general skeptical conclusion follows even if one affirms that causal connections
may be observed in the single case. This will made evident below. Another reason for
neglect may be, as Hume suggests, that the point is so obvious that no philosopher could
object to it. But this hardly seems likely, upon reflection. Do the sensible qualities
mentioned by Hume, e.g., color, not already tell us something about the causal properties
of the objects that exhibit them, namely, that they have the power, in the case of colored
objects, to produce in us a perception of color? Similarly, I may not be able to infer from
the examination of a stationary billiard ball what it will do when I roll it; on the other hand,
if I see the ball roll into another, striking it and sending it into motion, have I not directly
observed the causal influence of the first rolling ball on the motion of the second?
Hume would perhaps answer that such claims rest on a misunderstanding of the
notion of causal connection. In particular, causation requires the existence of a necessary
or infallible connection between objects or events. I may observe a connection between
events in some cases, but I cannot observe, in the single case, a connection of necessity.
This reply is suggested by the following passage, among others:
When we look about us toward external objects, and consider the operation
of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or
necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and
renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We find only, that
the one does actually, in fact, follow the other (1 977, 41 ).
Leaving further discussion of this important point until later, we will continue with
Hume's general argument. Hume argues that the only empirical evidence of a causal
connection between two objects is the fact that they have always appeared together in past
experience. He continues:
But why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other
objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this
is the main question on which I would insist.. .These two propositions are far
from being the same, / have found that such an object has always been
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attended with such an effect, and / foresee
,
that other objects, which are, in
appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if
you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the
other.. .But if you insist, that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning I
desire you to produce that reasoning (1977, 21-22).
Thus, even if experience confirms that two objects have always been conjoined in the past,
an ampliative principle is required, something to the effect that nature will proceed in
unobserved cases as it has in observed, if one is to infer that similar objects will be so
conjoined in the future. The validity of this principle itself cannot be demonstrated,
however, for it can be confirmed neither by experience nor by inference.
The important aspects of Hume's argument may be summarized as follows:
(1) Causality is said to consist of an infallible, or necessary, connection between
objects or events.
(2) Empirical propositions are significant only insofar as they can be verified by
observation, or inference therefrom.
(3) The objects of experience are always logically distinct. Therefore, knowledge of
causal connections between any two cannot be inferred, a priori, but must observed
or inferred from experience.
(4) Causal connections cannot be observed in any single instance.
(5) Experience confirms, at most, that two objects have always appeared together in
the past.
(6) The demonstration of causal knowledge from past experience requires
an ampliative principle that is itself, however, undemonstrable.
Hume's conclusion, of course, is that causal knowledge is without empirical or inferential
foundation, and cannot be verified. It is thus meaningless, according to his doctrine of
verifiability (doctrine (2)) to talk about causes in nature, except in the restricted way allowed
by Hume's argument: to say that one thing causes another is merely to say that they have
appeared together regularly in past experience.
Further conclusions follow from Hume's argument. First, it is notable that Hume's
denial of ampliative inference applies to all empirical inferences beyond given experience,
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and not merely to causal inferences. All sorts of descriptive knowledge, so long as they
refer to unobserved as well as observed cases, are also cast into doubt by Hume’s rejection
of ampliative inference. In addition, our knowledge of external objects or of past
experience would seem to require causal theories of memory and perception. Thus, all
beliefs, besides those relying on the properties of immediate sensation, are left uncertain by
Hume s argument. Hume's skeptical conclusions therefore extend far beyond doubts about
causal knowledge. It is a curious fact that many, if not all, subsequent philosophers of
science have chosen to ignore Hume's broader skeptical conclusions, even as they
embraced his mistrust of causal knowledge.
The foci of my discussion will be Hume's rejection of inductive inference (6) and his
denial that causation can be observed in the single instance (4). I accept that Hume's
criticism of the foundations of inductive inference presents profound difficulties.
Nonetheless, this criticism provides no reason to disparage causal knowledge in particular.
For Hume's devastating argument applies equally to non-causal knowledge, as many
important theorists, e.g., Goodman (1954), recognize. Yet, while some philosophers view
the problem of induction to be fatal to theories of causal knowledge, few philosophers
(since Carnap) see it as grounds for general skepticism. The correct approach — the one
which is taken by most philosophers who write about knowledge in general — is to view
the problem of induction as an important philosophical problem that should be handled, if
possible, but not as a sufficient reason to repudiate all knowledge claims that go beyond
immediate experience, including causal claims. Consider an example of non-causal
knowledge, e.g., that DNA consists of two complementary polymeric chains twisted about
each other in the form of a right-handed double helix. No philosopher or scientist would
restrict this claim only to those pieces of DNA of which we have had experience. Equally,
no philosopher or scientist considers Hume's argument to be fatal to this claim. Although
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Hume's criticism of inductive inference has not been nullified by modern developments,
philosophers do not therefore doubt the truth of all generalized claims in science.
We are forced to the conclusion, therefore, that Hume's argument against inductive
inference, though it yields concerns about the foundations of knowledge in general,
provides no special reason to reject causal knowledge is particular. For the repudiation of
inductive inference finds no special application in the criticism of causal knowledge.
The main thrust of Hume's argument for skepticism about causal knowledge thus
lies in (4), the assertion that causation cannot be observed in the single case. Hume can
defend this premise in at least two ways, one of which focuses on the nature of causation,
the second of which concentrates on the content of immediate experience.
Suppose one were to deny (4), asserting that causation can, in fact, be observed in
single instances. As noted above, Hume might reply that to assert this is to misunderstand
the nature of causation, for causation is said to imply a necessary connection between cause
and effect, and necessity cannot be established in any single instance. One might pursue, at
this juncture, an investigation of the nature of the necessity that causal connections are said
to have. Hume conceived necessary connections, of course, to be logical relations between
events (or statements), much like tautologies or analytic truths. Other views are possible.
Kant, for example, believed that some non-analytic truths could be known, a priori
,
and
could therefore be considered necessarily true.
But what reason could there be for insisting that causal knowledge is knowledge of
something necessary? Historically, the most important impetus, I take it, has been a desire
to establish the certainty of causal knowledge in the face of skepticism. To do this,
however, nothing stronger than induction is needed. The whole investigation into necessity
is thus avoided if we accept that the only epistemic pedigree required for causal knowledge
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is that provided by induction or some similar principle of inference. As we have already
seen, however, the problem of induction is not endemic to causal beliefs.
Hume could, and in fact does, take another approach in defending (4): he argues
that the content of immediate (singular) experience contains no information about causal
relations. There is, in his words, no "impression" of causation in experience. Hume
thought this point to be obvious, and subsequent philosophers have generally agreed. I
intend to provide strong evidence, however, that Hume was wrong: causation can indeed
be observed in the single instance.
5.5 The Perception of Causation
Since most philosophers of the past two hundred years have followed Hume in
dismissing the idea that causation can be observed in a single instance, an attempt to prove
otherwise may seem quixotic, at best. Yet recent experimental work in the psychology of
perception has forced psychologists to revise long-held assumptions about the nature of
perception, some of which are essential to Hume's critical position. My own study of the
literature in the psychology of perception has only recently begun, and my discussion will
thus be somewhat lean. Indeed, I rely heavily on the remarkable results of a single
psychologist, Albert Michotte (1 881-1 965) 158
,
although much complementary work has
been performed by Gestalt psychologists, as well as by more recent experimental
psychologists (e.g., Kolers, 1972). Nonetheless, I believe this experimental work provides
grounds on which to reconsider Hume's criticism of the observation of causation.
First, let's rehearse Hume's claim about the "impression" of causation. As we saw
above in our discussion of Humean positivism, Hume argued forcefully that the content of
experience contains no impression of causation. If I pick up any object, e.g., a billiard ball,
and examine it, I see that it has certain properties such as shape, color, and weight. No
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amount of scrutinizing, however, will yield knowledge of the ball's causal powers — the
ball’s causal powers are not evident to the senses. Even if I roll the ball across the table so
that it strikes another, sending it flying, I still have no impression of causation, says Hume. I
see only the first ball advance on the second until it touches it, after which I see the second
ball withdraw from the first. There is simply no particular sensory impression, according to
Hume, that corresponds to a causal concept.
Hume's view seems confirmed by reflection on the fact that any given perceived
event is consistent with many inconsistent, underlying causal scenarios. For instance,
suppose a metal disk, which was at rest on a low-friction surface, begins to move and slides
five feet before coming to a stop. I can say that I saw the disk begin to move, but as to what
caused the acceleration, there are many possibilities (e.g., a magnet moving beneath the
surface, a silent gust of wind from the side, a subtle tilting of the surface, etc.), none of
which I observed.
Hume was certainly correct, at least with respect to the following point: when a
causal event is observed, there is no distinct sensory stimulus in the sensory field that
corresponds to any particular sensation of causation in the way, for example, that the white
phosphorous pixels arranged on my computer screen correspond to the white letters and
words I perceive. But the conclusion that there is no perception of causation rests on a
significant assumption, namely, that there is a strict point-to-point correspondence between
sensory stimuli and the content of resulting perceptions . 159
This important assumption, however, has been shown by Gestalt psychologists to be
incorrect: there is no point-to-point correspondence between perceptions and local sensory
stimuli. Rather, perceptual structures are the result of a process of extraction and
organization that endows them with specific global properties that do not correspond to any
particular part of the sensory stimulus.
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Everyone is familiar with Gestalt phenomena such as Rubin's picture that can be
perceived alternately as two black faces on a white background or as a white vase on a
black background. Such examples demonstrate that identical sensory stimuli can yield
perceptions of radically different contents. Recent experimental work reveals that the brain
not only organizes given sets of sensory stimuli into perceptions of coherent objects: it also
adds information to the content provided by the stimulus. This has been demonstrated, for
example, by Kolers’ (1972) experimental work on the perception of moving and changing
objects.' 60 The simplest example is that of a colored spot that appears briefly on a
contrasting background, followed by the appearance of a similar spot a short distance away.
The interval of time between the two appearances can be varied. If the time-interval is
quite short, then the spots seem to appear simultaneously. If the time-interval is longer, the
two spots appear to flash in succession. If the spots are flashed successively within a time-
period of 10 to 45 milliseconds, however, observers perceive a single spot moving
smoothly from the first location to the second. In order for this perception to occur, the
brain provides a suitable spot during the time-interval between flashes. 161
One need not pursue controlled laboratory experiments to become convinced that
processes of extraction, supplementation, and organization underlie perception, for
examples are common in everyday life. When text is scrolled through on a computer
screen, one perceives the text to move up or down, though in fact there is no such
continuous movement. Here the mind supplements the given stimulus information to
generate a perception of motion where there is none. The knowledge that the text is not
really moving does nothing, moreover, to disrupt the perception of movement. As a final
common experience, consider that the mind often constructs three-dimensional objects in
perception out of essentially two-dimensional cues. This occurs when the objects actually
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do have three dimensions, but also when we know they do not, e.g., when the objects are
representations painted on a flat surface.
It is now widely accepted among cognitive psychologists that no one-to-one
correspondence between sensory stimuli and perceptions exists, and that perception is the
result of complex processes of extraction, supplementation, and organization. 162 The old
assumption of correspondence between stimulus and perception has been repudiated.
The revision of this long-held assumption enabled Michotte and his colleagues to
reapproach the problem of perceived causation, and his experimental results have
important consequences for Hume's view of causation (Michotte and Thines 1963/1991,
67). Hume analyzed the contents of perceptual experience, sifting through the pieces, and
found no element that could be said to correspond to causation. Michotte's experimental
results demonstrate, however, that Hume was simply looking for causation in the wrong
place. Hume was correct to hold that the perception of causation does not correspond to
any localized sensory stimulus. But causation is perceived, nonetheless, and it is perceived
in the same way as is motion, three-dimensionality, and Gestalt properties: causation is part
of the global content of perceptions, the result of mental processes of extraction and
organization.
5.6 Michotte's Experiments
Michotte's experimental methods are both simple and forceful. In a typical
experiment (hereafter, "the basic experiment"), observers view two elementary colored
squares (5 mm sides) at rest, 40 mm from each other, on a white background. At a given
moment, the left square (A) sets off towards the right square (B) at a speed of 300 mm/sec.
A stops the moment it comes into contact with B
,
at which time B begins to move away
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from * at a speed of 1 00 mm/sec. Then 8 stops after covering a distance of about 20
mm.' 63
The result of this experiment, which Michotte and his colleagues performed with
hundreds of observers, was unequivocal:
the observers see object A bump into object B
,
and send it off (or
"
launch
"
it, shove it forward
,
set it in motion, give it a push). The impression is clear
it is the blow given by A which makes B go, which produces B's movement'
(Michotte 1947/1963, 20).
The italicized expressions are taken from the reports of observers. The subjects consistently
reported, in other words, that they perceived object A causing object B to move. Observers
emphasized, moreover, that the perception of causation was distinctly different from the
perception of successive movements by the two objects. In addition, Michotte varied the
experimental setup to show that this perception of causation is independent of the size,
shape, or color of the objects used.
One could argue, of course, that observers were supplying Michotte with some sort
of reflective interpretation of events, or an inference (albeit subconscious inference) based
on past experience. Yet Michotte supplied experimental evidence to confirm that the
perception of causation is direct, and cannot be the result of reflective interpretation or
inference from past experience. Michotte did this by carefully manipulating the stimulus
conditions of the experiment and recording changes in the response patterns of observers.
Michotte found that when the conditions of the experiment were manipulated
slightly, the perception of causation disappeared. In the simplest case, Michotte varied the
time interval between the moment of contact between A and B and the moment at which B
began to move. He found that if this interval were increased beyond 200 milliseconds, the
perception of causation disappeared completely, replaced by a perception of two
independent movements. In this case, the objective stimulus conditions are almost
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identical to those of the experiment that produced a perception of "launching," yet the
resulting perception is distinctly non-causal.
In another example, the causal impression could be made to disappear by
increasing the speed of A and B. When speeds are very high, e.g., 1100 mm/sec., observers
no longer see the impact of /\ launching B into motion, but only a single object A moving
across the screen. Interesting effects can be added here. For example, if A and B are
different colors, one sees a single object A move across the screen, but changing its color
halfway across (at the point of impact with B).
In other interesting cases, the perception of launching was made to disappear by
manipulating the contextual stimuli of the experiment. Michotte borrowed the term
camouflaging to describe the conditions. In one such experiment, a third colored square,
C, is introduced to the basic experiment cited above. C sits equidistant with A from B, but
on B's opposite side. Both A and C begin to move simultaneously towards B, which is
stationary. A and C meet B simultaneously, and, as in the basic experiment, A comes to a
stop at impact, at which point B moves away from A for a short distance. C, on the other
hand, continues its original motion, disappearing under A and B, then reappearing on the
other side from which it started and continuing its motion. Thus, the movements of A and B
are identical to those of the basic experiment (which produced a distinct perception of
launching), except that the cross-motion of the third object, C, is added. Contrary to
expectations, the perception of causation disappears under these conditions.
In all these cases, when the stimulus conditions were modified slightly, the
perception of causation (launching) disappeared. 164 This constitutes important evidence in
favor of Michotte's claim that the perception of launching is not significantly influenced by
past experience or reflection: for it is unlikely that the stimulus modifications correspond to
differences that would be weighty enough in past experience to influence the perceptual
152
habits of observers. This conclusion is strengthened by consideration of the abstract nature
of the objects used in the experiments: the objects used by Michotte (e.g., colored two-
dimensional shapes) appear rarely in everyday experience, and even more rarely do they
participate in the kinds of causal interactions represented by Michotte's testing apparatuses.
It is thus unlikely that the experimental observers' perception of causation could have been
influenced in any specific way by past experience.
Michotte's claim that causation is perceived directly is fortified further by
experiments in which he succeeded in generating perceptions of causation under
conditions that clearly contradicted any relevant past causal experience of observers; he
called these cases "paradoxical" cases. For example, Michotte did tests in conditions similar
to the basic experiment described above, but using objects of kinds so different, e.g., a
wooden ball and a dark two-dimensional (shadow-like) shape, that experience could not
possibly suggest any causal relation between the two. Yet under the correct temporal and
other conditions, the perception of causal launching persisted. Another "paradoxical" case
arose under conditions similar to those of the basic experiment above, except that both A
and B begin to move at the same time, though A at a faster rate than B. When A makes
contact with B, A stops and B continues, but more slowly, eventually slowing to a stop.
Observers reported a perception of launching similar to that of the basic experiment above
(Michotte called it "launching-in-flight"). These reports seem contrary to common
experience of mechanical causation, however, for B's speed decreases, rather than
increases, after being struck by A. Nonetheless, the impression of causation remained clear.
These "paradoxical" cases strengthen Michotte's conclusion that the perception of causation
is direct, and is not in any way an artifact of the past experience of the observers.
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5.7 Hume's Argument Again
Michotte's experiments demonstrate that, under the correct conditions, causation is
perceived in the same manner as is motion, three-dimensionality, and other common
properties. Hume's assertion that causation cannot be observed in single instances is simply
wrong.
A few caveats must be added, however, to our anti-Humean conclusion. First, the
range of causal perceptions confirmed by Michotte is restricted to that of the mechanical
interactions of simple objects. There is no reason to believe that other sorts of causation are
perceived in the same way. Indeed, Michotte did extensive tests of the perception of
qualitative interactions, i.e., of interactions between changes in color, sound, and other
non-mechanical qualities, but found that in most cases observers reported no perception of
causation. He recounted that, at most, observers reported a "triggering" relationship
between qualitative changes, and this in only some cases. "Triggering" is a causal
relationship, but one that is less direct than "launching." In any case, the results of the
experiments concerning qualitative causation were much more inconsistent that those
concerning mechanical causation, and no positive conclusions concerning the perception
of "qualitative" causation could be drawn, in Michotte's opinion
.
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In addition, we must be careful not to draw epistemological conclusions from
Michotte's experiments that are unwarranted. In particular, Michotte experimental results
correct Hume's belief that causation cannot be observed in single instances, but they do not
answer Hume's problem concerning the justification of causal knowledge. Michotte has
not, in other words, provided philosophy with a new foundation for causal knowledge, but
only with some interesting evidence of the causal content of human perception. This is
apparent if one only considers Michotte's experimental apparatus: in every case in which
the perception of causation is generated by the stimulus conditions provided by the
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apparatus, there is in fact no causal interaction between the events presented. Michotte
does not prove that knowledge of singular causation can be founded on observation. He
has demonstrated, nonetheless, an important point: that there is no significant difference in
character between the perception of causation and the perception of motion, form, space-
dimensionality, and other "global" properties.
Even if Michotte's experiments do not provide an epistemological foundation for
causal knowledge, however, they do suggest that there is no important epistemological
difference between our beliefs about causation and those about motion, space-
dimensionality, and form. For if the mechanisms of perception are similar in each case,
then knowledge in each case probably rests on a similar foundation.
To sum up, where do we stand with respect to Hume's skeptical argument? We
have seen that Hume's argument relies on two major assertions: the claim that causation
cannot be observed in the single instance, and the denial of ampliative inference. We have
shown, with Michotte's help, that Hume is wrong about the observation of causation:
causation can indeed be observed. In addition, I have argued that Hume's skepticism about
ampliative inference should not concern us greatly, for the justification of ampliative
inference is a problem not just for causal knowledge, but for all empirical knowledge that
presumes to go beyond immediate experience. We thus arrive at the conclusion that if our
theory of scientific explanation requires causal knowledge, Hume's criticism places no
insuperable obstacle in our course. For it is no criticism of causal theories that they cannot
answer charges of general skepticism, and, we have seen, there are no charges specific to
causal claims that cannot be justly dismissed.
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5.8 More Epistemological Worries
Some readers will feel uneasy at this point. Should Hume's criticism be dispensed
with so lightly, and in the face of such narrow experimental evidence? More important,
even if we accept Michotte's conclusions, what relevance do they have to the domain of
our inquiry, namely, the domain of science? Michotte's experiments yield evidence that
causation can, contra Hume, be perceived, but the connection between such perception
and the causal claims of science remains obscure. Indeed, the perception of mechanical
causation investigated by Michotte can, on the face of it, play no more than a small role in
scientific inquiry. Furthermore, it has already been conceded that the direct perception of
mechanical causation, even where it is relevant, cannot by itself provide a foundation for
causal knowledge.
In short, I have offered reasons not to be troubled by Hume's skeptical conclusions,
but have made little advance toward the solution to Hume's original problem of the
foundation of causal knowledge, especially within the realm of science. In fact, our
epistemic situation seems worse than it did from Hume's viewpoint. Hume and his
positivist successors envisioned the foundation of scientific knowledge to consist of
observation and deductive inference: all valid empirical claims were to be justified by direct
observation or deductive inference therefrom. The same experimental evidence that affirms
our view that causation can be observed, however, also destroys the main pillar of the
positivist epistemic foundation. The modern psychological evidence tells us that perception
depends upon complex mental processes of extraction, supplementation, and organization;
the perception of space, form, time, and causation all rely on these processes. But this same
evidence entails that there is no simple correspondence between perception and sensory
stimulus. As a result, the contents of perception cannot be assumed to provide accurate
information about the world. Observation — that bedrock of positivism — can no longer be
156
accepted as epistemically self-evident™ Hume's skeptical conclusions can be repudiated
(or their acceptance discouraged, at least), but we leave Hume's argument with less
assurance than with which we began.
5.9 Epistemology and Science
This presents no difficulties for those who have given up the foundational program
of the positivists. The foundational program was abandoned, in part, because all attempts
to adhere to positivist criteria of epistemic justification led, ultimately and inevitably, to a
repudiation of much of accepted scientific knowledge. As a result, the demand that
philosophy provide an epistemological foundation for science has been replaced, in some
philosophical quarters, by the desire to explain how theoretical and causal knowledge is
acquired in science. The shift in emphasis is subtle, perhaps, but nonetheless real: a
normative enterprise (founded on Humean norms) has been replaced by a descriptive one.
Yet this shift has not been made by all. A group of neo-positivist philosophers still
worries about the epistemological foundations of theoretical and causal claims. Witness the
comments of Philip Kitcher, a critic of causal theories of explanation, from a recent section
entitled "Hume's Ghost":
The desire to analyze causation stems from the apparent difficulty of
justifying causal judgments. Some of the causal claims that we make are
justified. But how does the justification work? Once we have been
educated in the causal lore of an ongoing field of science, then it is easy to
claim that we simply observe causal relations. But there is very little
plausibility to the idea of observing causation, when the observer is a
neophyte, say a child. Thus there arises the conviction that we come to
make justified causal judgments by observing that certain conditions obtain,
and (initially, at least) inferring causal claims from the premises that record
our observations. Hence we arrive at the project of giving necessary and
sufficient conditions for the obtaining of causal relations, formulating those
conditions in ways that will dissolve the epistemological mysteries
surrounding causation by deploying only concepts whose satisfaction is
observationally ascertainable...
If causal knowledge is observational knowledge, then the apparently
implausible implications of that position should be addressed. But, if causal
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knowledge is inferential knowledge, then we are owed an account of the
mTTeO)
131 C°nditionS ° n which ca usal justifications depend (Kitcher,
It is fair to say, I think, that Kitcher and other critics of causal knowledge make no such
demands of non-causal scientific knowledge, or, if they do, they have no answers that
would both satisfy the epistemological criteria they propose and account for actual scientific
practice. u’ 7 Nonetheless, "Hume's ghost," as Kitcher calls it, cannot be dispelled so easily.
The critics of causal knowledge deserve a more complete answer to their concerns about
how causal knowledge is justified. We have provided grounds for resisting Hume's
skeptical conclusions, but we must also say more about how causal knowledge is acquired
in science.
5.10 Testing (Bootstrapping) Causal Claims
So how is causal knowledge acquired and justified in science? The key to
understanding how science acquires causal knowledge is the following: scientists are never
in the predicament described by Hume. The predicament, as Hume sees it, is how to justify
the judgment that A causes 8, assuming as evidence only non-causal observational
knowledge and the rules of deductive logic. But scientists approach every investigation in
possession of much more than rules of logic and observations of the objects of inquiry —
there is also a rich background of causal knowledge that scientists can bring to bear on the
investigation at hand. This rich background of causal knowledge makes all the difference,
for it enables scientists to construct lists of plausible alternative causal explanations and to
assemble further information, e.g., by doing statistics, experiments, etc., that will allow them
to decide between alternative prospective hypotheses. Scientists successfully test causal
claims by applying causal knowledge previously won.
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At least four general sorts of causal claim are tested in science:
(1) Causal laws. Causal laws ascribe causal capacities to causal factors (entities with
a certain structure).' 68
(2) Descriptions of causal interactions. These descriptions inform us which factors,
in virtue of their causal capacities, were operative in a particular case (or typical
kind of case), and how they interacted causally to bring about the phenomenon in
question.
(3) Causal measurements. Scientists test the strength with which causes operate.
(4) Descriptions of causal mechanisms. In addition to finding out which causes
there are, which are operative, and at what strength they operate, scientists also seek
to describe the specific mechanisms by which causes operate.
There are many different ways of testing each kind of claim. The manner of testing depends
upon various factors, including the nature of the phenomenon and the strength of relevant
background knowledge. In areas where the causal structure of a phenomenon is relatively
simple, well-understood, and controllable, controlled experiments may be done to test
causal hypotheses. On the other hand, in areas in which causal mechanisms are poorly
understood, phenomena are extremely complex, and causal factors cannot be controlled or
isolated, scientists rely often on statistical analyses rather than controlled experiments.
I will provide only one example of causal inference in science. The example is
necessarily simplified, for the number and variety of causal assumptions that participate in
most scientific inferences is astounding, and hence a complete description of an actual case
would be long and tedious. For a detailed discussion at an abstract level, I refer readers to
Nancy Cartwright's valuable book, Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement (especially
Chapters 1 and 2), which is, in part, an extensive study of how scientists make inferences to
causal conclusions from empirical evidence, including the evidence of statistical analyses,
structural models, randomized experiments, and single-instance controlled experiments.
For further examples of causal inferences in science, see Cartwright's discussion of the
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gravity-probe experiment (1989), and my discussion of Anderson et a/.'s cloud chamber
experiments in the last chapter.
Our example is one in which the relevant causal mechanisms were fairly well
understood, and in which the operative cause was suspected but untested. I take as my
case Kettlewell's (1955, 1 956) famous study of industrial melanism in moths. According to
Kettlewell, melanic forms of at least fifty species of Lepidoptera first appeared in Britain in
the mid-nineteenth century, and succeeded subsequently in spreading throughout
Lepidoptera populations. Their evolutionary success coincided with the industrialization of
England, and was restricted, moreover, to areas in close proximity to major industrialized
areas. At the time of Kettlewell's work, melanic forms dominated populations in some
industrial areas; in the woods near Birmingham, for example, it was estimated that 90% of
the species Bistort betularia consisted of melanic forms.
Ford (1937) proposed that the melanic forms had evolved as a result of natural
selection. It follows that melanism is either adaptive or linked to adaptive traits. In most
cases, the contributions of an adaptive trait to overall fitness are complex, and are made via
many different mechanisms. To establish that melanism is an adaptation, it must shown
that:
(i) There was, during the evolution of melanism, variation in coloring among species
of Lepidoptera
;
(ii) Melanic and other colorings are heritable;
(iii) Melanism is adaptive in the environment in which it evolved; 169
(iv) The proportion of melanic forms of Lepidoptera increased, in part, because of
the adaptive character of melanism, i.e., the individuals were selected in virtue, in
part, of their melanic coloring.
Ford advanced two hypotheses concerning the adaptive value of melanism: that melanism
is linked to superior viability; and that melanism allows moths to avoid predation by birds
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by hiding on tree trunks darkened by industrial pollution. Later, Ford (1940) demonstrated
the superior viability of some melanic forms.
Kettlewell (1955, 1956) set out to test the second part of Ford's explanation: that
melanism contributes to moths' ability to avoid predation by hiding on darkened tree
trunks. Kettlewell's concern was not to establish that melanism is an adaptation; he simply
assumed that it is. 170 Rather, his goal was to establish, in part, the mechanism by which
natural selection for melanism took place. In particular, he tested the claim that melanism
was selected because it permitted individuals to avoid predation more effectively than did
non-melanic coloring.
Kettlewell performed experiments using three species of Lepidoptera : B. betularia
(the typical form, which is whitish grey with a sprinkling of black dots), B. betularia
carboneria (the industrial form, which is almost completely black), and B. betularia insularia
(another melanic form, which is dark but with a sprinkling of white scales). Kettlewell’s
investigation consisted of four parts:
(1) a test of the relative conspicuousness of melanic and non-melanic forms when
sitting on trees in an industrial area of England;
(2) observations of the behavior of birds feeding on insects in an aviary;
(3) observations of the relative survival rates of the three species in a forest
environment in industrial England; and
(4) a repetition of (1) and (3) in a wooded area relatively untouched by industrial
pollution.
For our purposes, we will discuss only (3) in detail. The conclusions of the other parts will
be summarized, however, as they are important to Kettlewell's reasoning.
Human observers judged the conspicuousness of each of the three species as they
perched on oak and birch trees in a forest near industrial Birmingham. Here it is important
to note that air pollution has two significant effects on the coloration of tree surfaces: first, it
darkens the tree bark; second, it removes lichen, which is generally light in color (Jones,
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1 952). Kettlewell's observations showed that all three species were suitably camouflaged
on birch trees (black on white bark), though the typical and insularia individuals were
especially well concealed. On the darkened oak trees, however, the typicals appeared very
conspicuous, while the melanics (especially the darker carboneria ) were well concealed. In
an unpolluted area of England (Devon), where all the trees and rocks are covered with
lichen, the results were opposite: carboneria were highly conspicuous no matter where they
settled, while typicals were well concealed (insularia were not released in this case).
In the second set of experiments, individuals of the three species were set loose
inside an aviary cage that contained a variety of tree surfaces; some surfaces were dark,
while others were either light birch or lightened by the presence of lichen. The moths were
allowed to find resting places, and then the relative conspicuousness of each individual on
its resting place was judged. Finally, birds (Great Tits) were allowed into the cage, and their
preferences for the moths were judged by observing their feeding behavior. The
observations supported two conclusions. First, the birds readily ate all three types of moths,
including the melanics. Second, the birds took the moths roughly in the order of
conspicuousness as judged by the human observers.
Kettlewell's third set of experiments will be the focus of our discussion. The goal of
these investigations was to assess the claim that melanism contributes to the chances of
survival, and thus of reproductive success, of melanic moths by improving their ability to
avoid predation. To do this, Kettlewell marked hundreds of male individuals of the three
species tested, released them over a period of ten days in an industrial-area forest heavily
populated by birds, and then recaptured as many of the moths as he could, using Mercury
Vapor lights and virgin females to attract the males to traps. The male moths were released
in proportions equal, roughly, to that in which they were found naturally in this forest, i.e.,
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85% carboneria, 10% typical, and 5% insularia. The recapture rates of the three species
were 27.5% for carboneria
,
13% for typical, and 1 7.4% for insularia.
Any of a number of factors could have caused the differential recapture rates
observed by Kettlewell. Accordingly, Kettlewell's field experiment was carefully designed
so that alternative possible causes of differential survival rates (as evidenced by differential
recapture rates), both intrinsic and extrinsic to the experimental setup itself, could be ruled
out. Thus, one specific factor in the melanics' evolutionary success — the avoidance of
predation by means of cryptic coloration - could be isolated and tested convincingly.
The factors Kettlewell considered, and the grounds on which they could be ruled
out as the causes of the differential recapture rates, are:
(1) Differences in migratory behavior. For example, if carboneria moths typically fly
greater distances during their nocturnal migrations, this would account for a greater
percentage of them appearing in the traps.
Kettlewell placed the traps at a variety of distances from the release points.
The recapture rates were independent of the distance of the trap from the release
points. Differences in migratory behavior could thus be ruled out.
(2) Differences in the scents of females baiting the traps. The males of one species
are perhaps not so strongly attracted to the scent of females of other species.
To eliminate this possibility, the traps baited with females included one
female from each of the three species.
(3) Differences in attraction to Mercury Vapor lights, or to virgin females.
Kettlewell used both Mercury Vapor light traps and traps baited with
females. The recapture rates at both were similar, which indicates that differences in
attractions to either kind of trap were insignificant.
(4) Differences in the life-spans of the species.
Kettlewell cites two kinds of evidence to rule out this possibility. First, he
says, the life-spans of these species are not different in the laboratory. Second, he
released only males that appeared to be strong and healthy.
Having ruled out other possible causes of the differential recapture rates, Kettlewell
concluded that the differential recapture rates were due to differences in survival rates of the
three species.
163
A similar strategy is applied to the problem of deciding among possible causes of
the differential survival rates of melanic and non-melanic forms. The general explanandum,
remember, is the evolutionary success of melanic forms in industrial areas. Numerous
factors could have contributed to this success. Ford cites differences in viability. Another
obvious possibility is differences in resistance to the toxic effects of industrial air pollution,
especially among larval forms. Kettlewell is not interested in ruling out all other factors, in
general. Indeed, he believes that factors other than predator avoidance are certainly
important. But if he is to test the causal hypothesis that the cryptic coloration of melanics
helps them to avoid predators, he must, for the purposes of his study, rule out, or reduce the
influence of, these other factors, so that the effect of predation avoidance can be measured.
The following features of Kettlewell's test ensured that the differential survival rates
could be attributed to the effects of predation:
(1) The survival rates were for healthy males released for a period of only 24-48
hours. Many potential causes of differential survival, e.g., the toxic effects of air
pollution on larvae, could thus be assumed to have no influence on the survival
rates of the moths.
(2) The moths were released in a forested bird sanctuary, where aviary predation
was sure to be heavy.
(3) Kettlewell had the opportunity of observing two birds (a robin and a hedge
sparrow) hunting moths by inspecting tree trunks and boughs, and eating moths that
had previously been released by him. This further confirmed that predation was a
factor in the survival rates.
Kettlewell thus concluded that only differential predation could explain the differential
survival rates of the three species observed in the industrial forest.
To sum up Kettlewell's results, having
(1) observed that melanic moths are, to the human eye, better camouflaged on the
soot-darkened and lichen-free tree surfaces of industrial forests than are non-
melanics,
(2) observed that birds discover and eat moths roughly in the order of
conspicuousness as judged by human observers, and
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(3) demonstrated that the differential survival rates of three species of Bfston
birds
'a m a" mdUS,rial f°reS' are the result of differential rates of predation by
Kettlewell concludes that the cryptic coloration of melanics in general evolved as a result, in
part, of selective predation by birds in forests contaminated by industrial air pollution.
Kettlewell later confirmed his conclusions by repeating his experiments in an area relatively
uncontaminated by industrial pollution (Kettlewell, 1956).
Kettlewell's conclusions are convincing because through careful experimental
design he was able to rule out alternative possible causes of differential survival among the
three species of moths. He was also able to provide strong evidence that predation is a
factor in the differential survival of the species, and that the camouflage-effect of melanism
improves moths ability to avoid predation. Kettlewell was able to achieve these things only
by applying a vast background of causal knowledge to design and to perform a set of a
decisive experiments. Indeed, we have only scratched the surface, so to speak, of the great
body of causal assumptions made by Kettlewell in his investigations.
Kettlewell's experiments show that scientists are able to test successfully the causal
claims they make, although the design and execution of decisive tests always requires a rich
background of prior causal knowledge. It is clear that I have not provided any theory of
how causal claims are to be tested experimentally, although Kettlewell's example suggests
some possibilities.
171 As a result, my discussion of these examples of causal inference does
not constitute a complete answer to Hume, for this would require a theory of epistemic
justification, which I have not provided. Yet while I do not have a theory of causal
inference, I believe I have provided convincing evidence that philosophers need not be
discouraged from appealing to causal concepts in the philosophy of science. We have
shown that:
(1) Causal knowledge is indispensable in science.
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(2) Causal claims are irreducible to laws about regularities, counterfactuals, etc.
(3) Hume's argument provides no
that does not also cast into doubt
knowledge.
special reason to doubt our knowledge of causes
more cherished (by philosophers, at least) forms of
(4) Causal claims are tested in science, and that the tests sometimes yield
evidence in support of causal conclusions.
convincing
I conclude that historical and epistemological worries present no obstacle to the causal
theory of scientific explanation.
5.11 Non-Causal Explanations
A number of authors contend that even if causal explanation is important in science,
it is almost certainly true that some explanations are non-causal. 172 At the core of this
contention is often the belief that causation is only one of many determinative or
constitutive relations that make up the structure of the world. Because explanation respects
this diversity of constitutive relations, it is argued, an adequate theory of explanation cannot
refer to causal connections alone.
Below we will examine a representative sampling of alleged non-causal
explanations. In most cases, I will show that the examples pose little threat to the causal
theory. The explanatory value of some examples is simply dubious. In other cases, the
proposed examples are irrelevant to our domain of interest — science; non-causal
explanations outside of science do not threaten the claim that scientific explanation is
causal. Finally, most alleged counterexamples are based on the recognition that
explanations often contain — or even emphasize — information that is non-causal. But
upon close inspection, it is clear that these explanations require, either implicitly or
explicitly, causal information to fulfill their functions as explanations.
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5.11.1 Laws of Coexistence
A large number of counterexamples to the causal theory of explanation arise from a
mistaken belief about the nature of causation: that causes cannot exist simultaneously with
their effects. 173 In accord with this belief, some authors argue that explanations employing
so-called laws of coexistence cannot be causal, for these laws describe relations between
properties such that a change in one property entails an instantaneous change in another.
Hempel's (1965) example is the law of the pendulum, which describes the functional
relation between a pendulum s length and the period of its movement. A change in the
length of the pendulum will change, as well as explain, a change in the pendulum's period.
But since these changes can occur simultaneously, the connection cannot, it is claimed, be
causal.
However, the belief that causes and effects cannot occur simultaneously is dubious:
many causal interactions occur simultaneously. Consider the simple example of a billiard
ball knocking a second (stationary) ball into motion. In this case, the cause (the striking of
the second ball by the first) occurs simultaneously with the effect (the launching of the
second ball into motion). There is nothing curious about the cause and effect occurring
simultaneously. In general, I submit, there is no good reason to maintain that cause and
effect cannot occur simultaneously. 174
5.11.2 Brody's Essential-Property Explanations
Baruch Brody (1972) begins with a proposed explanation of the fact that sodium
normally combines with chlorine in a ratio of one-to-one:
(I) (1 ) Sodium normally combines with bromine in a ratio of one-to-one.
(2) Everything that normally combines with bromine in a ratio of one-to-one
normally combines with chlorine in a ratio of one-to-one.
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(3) Therefore, sodium normally combines with chlorine in a ratio of one-to-one
Brody's starting point is the fact that this explanation (intuitively) provides no explanation of
the one-to-one ratio in which sodium and chlorine normally combine (although it satisfies
the requirements of the Covering-Law Model).
The correct explanation of the ratio of combination, says Brody, refers to the atomic
structures of the two substances. This explanation, moreover, is non-causal, for the atomic
structures of the substances are not the cause of their combining in a one-to-one ratio:
a given case of sodium combining with chlorine is the same event as that
sodium combining with that chlorine in a one-to-one ratio, and, like all
other events, that event has only one cause. It is, perhaps, that event which
brings it about that the sodium and chlorine are in proximity to each other
under the right conditions. That is the cause of the event in question, and
not the atomic structure of the sodium and chlorine in question (which, after
all, were present long before they combined). To be sure, these atomic
structures help explain one aspect of the event in question, the ratio in
which they combine, but that does not make them the cause of the event.
(Note 6: It might, at least, be maintained that they are still the cause of the
aspect of that event. But this is just a confusion — it is events, and not their
aspects, that have causes.)
To say that the atomic structure of the atoms in question is not the
cause of their combining in a one-to-one ratio is not to say that a description
of that structure is not an essential part of any causal explanation of their
combining.. .It is only to say that the atomic structure is not the cause (193).
The gist of Brody's argument is that sometimes the (essential) properties of things
can explain the properties of other things, but they cannot cause them: "It is events, and not
their aspects [properties], that have causes."
Brody concludes that not all explanations are causal. Now, it will to do no good for
the causal theorist to dispute the existence of essential properties, for, despite Brody's
assertions to the contrary, his criticism of the causal theory does not rest on the acceptance
of essential properties. Consider the following example, which is similar to Brody's in some
respects but not in others: Why was the car totaled (damaged beyond repair) in the
accident? About the explanation of this incident, we would expect Brody to say the
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following: The collision is to be explained by descriptions of the travel paths of the two
vehicles up to the point of collision (which is a description of two or more events). The
severity of the collision (and subsequent damage to the car), on the other hand, is no event,
but an aspect of an event, and is thus to be explained not by reference to other events
(causes), but by reference to the weight and velocity (the momentum) of the truck with
which the car collided, as well as by the structural frailty of the car itself. The truck's
momentum and the car’s frailty, however, are not essential properties. Brody's claims that
there are non-causal explanations thus need not rely on the existence or importance of
essential properties.
How, then, is one to respond to Brody's claim that some explanations are non-
causal? It should be noted that few causal theories of explanation, including the one
presented here, demand that explanations contain only causal information. Other kinds of
information (e.g., structural properties, global laws, mathematical formulae, etc.) can also
play important roles in explanation. Brody's argument hurts the causal theory, therefore,
only if it shows that some explanations contain no essential causal information. I doubt,
however, that Brody's examples can satisfy this requirement. Atomic structure helps to
explain the ratio of combination of sodium and chlorine, for example, only if the causal
interaction resulting in combination has taken place. To put it another way: atomic
structure explains only in virtue of the structural properties being associated with certain
causal capacities that operate in some particular instance of combination. The causal
capacities of sodium and chlorine, as well as the operation of these capacities when they
combine, are thus necessary to the explanation of the one-to-one ratio of combination, even
if one chooses not to emphasize this information.
One way to see this point is to consider the following type of explanation:
(II) (1) Sodium normally has atomic structure X.
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(2) Anything with atomic structure X normally combines with bromine in a one-to-
one ratio.
(3) Anything that combines with bromine in a one-to-one ratio also normally
combines with chlorine in a one-to-one ratio.
(3) Therefore, sodium normally combines with chlorine in a one-to one ratio.
(II) offers a Covering-Law explanation of the one-to-one combination of sodium and
chlorine that includes a premise describing the atomic structure of sodium. Yet the
explanation is no better than the one initially criticized by Brody. Why? Because no causal
connection between the atomic structures of sodium and chlorine and their one-to-one
combination is established. This suggests that the appeal to essential properties is
unsuccessful as an explanation unless is it associated with appropriate causal claims.
5.11.3 Kim's Non-Causal Connections
Jaegwon Kim (1974) argues that the world is constituted by a number of
dependency relations that are not of a causal nature. One such relation is "Cambridge"
dependency, in which a change in one thing's properties depends upon a change in
another's, though the two properties are not causally connected. Kim's example is:
Xantippes became a widow when Socrates died in prison; Xantippes’ becoming a widow
was determined by Socrates' dying; the determination is not, however, causal. 175
About Kim's argument I will make only one point: even if Cambridge dependency is
accepted as a non-causal relation, it has no relevance for scientific explanation. Xantippes'
widowhood may not be caused by Socrates' death, but neither would it be explained by it.
The connection between widowhood and the husband's dying, unlike causal connections,
is not contingent: it is a dependency relation that is "built-in" to the language, in the sense
that if any competent speaker of English learns that Xantippes has been widowed, then he
or she knows immediately that her husband has died. An explanation of Xantippes'
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widowhood would thus be required only in two cases: if someone fails to understand the
meaning of the word "widow"; or if someone would like to know how Xantippes' became a
widow, i.e., how her husband died. In the latter case, the explanation would be a causal
explanation of Socrates' death; in the former case, the explanation would be of the meaning
of the word "widow." In neither case would the explanation be of Xantippes' widowhood.
Cambridge dependency thus poses no counterexample to the causal theory of scientific
explanation.
Kim discusses a second non-causal dependency relation as well: the relation
between "action-pairs." An example of an action-pair is my signaling a left turn by
extending my left arm. Here two actions, "signaling a left turn" and "extending my arm" are
related, the first depending upon the second. Kim argues, moreover, that the dependence is
not causal: My extending my left arm brings about (causes) the arm being extended. But
the arm being extended is connected to signaling only by rules of social convention, not
causality. Hence, extending my arm and signaling are not causally connected, argues Kim.
Kim's example plays on a very difficult and general problem area in the philosophy
of social sciences: the relationship between the physical world and the worlds of the
psychological and social. With this in mind, Kim's problem can be understood in the
following terms. Some "actions" are events of physical behavior that have social
significance or meaning. Many meanings at the social level (e.g., signaling a turn, pointing
at something) can be associated with a single physical event (e.g., extending my arm).
Furthermore, these meanings are connected to the physical event only by social
convention, not by relations of causality. The connection between the physical event (e.g.,
extending my arm) and the "socially significant event" (e.g., signaling a left turn) is therefore
non-causal.
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I have no intention of initiating a discussion about the relation between the physical,
psychological, and social worlds. We will simply accept that these worlds contain relations
that are non-causal, and ask what this means for the causal theory of explanation.
The causal theory here presented does not claim that all explanations are 100%
causal, but only that all scientific explanations contain some information about the causal
capacities and interactions of things. This would seem to be confirmed even in the case of
Kim's action-pairs. What would suffice to explain, for example, my signaling for a left-turn?
There are a number of possibilities, each specific to an explanation context. One possibility
is an explanation in terms of my intentions (what led me to signal left, or what did I hope to
achieve by signaling?). Another possibility is an explanation of how I signaled (did I extend
my arm, switch on the car's turn signal, etc.). In both possibilities, there are clearly causal
aspects to the explanation: to explain why I signaled would be to describe the intentional
causes of my behavior; to explain how I signaled would be to describe the sequence of
causal interactions that led up to the signaling.
Another kind of explanation is possible in this case: the explanation of what
signaling for a left turn is (e.g., to answer the question of one who is not familiar with this
custom). This kind of explanation would contain descriptions of social goals and rules, e.g.,
what is the social purpose of signaling, when is it beneficial or required to signal, etc. But it
would also contain descriptions of the conventional causal mechanisms by which one
signals. Indeed, the conventional causal mechanisms are an important aspect of the socially
informed concept of signaling.
Kim's examples thus fail to show that non-causal explanations must be recognized.
They demonstrate only that explanations sometimes contain non-causal information, a fact
that the causal theory already appreciates.
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5.11.4 Other Non-Causal Laws
Some commentators argue that scientists occasionally use non-causal laws to
explain phenomena. Examples of such laws are the law of inertia, conservation laws, and
equilibrium laws. Typically, such laws (e.g., the law of inertia) tell us what happens to a
system in the absence of external causal intervention. Others, such as R.A. Fisher's
equilibrium explanation of observed sex ratios, tell us what happens to a system regardless
of the initial properties or actual causal forces acting in a system .' 76
Some of these laws, I submit, are mistakenly held to be non-causal laws
.
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Consider the law of inertia, which tells us that a moving body will continue, so long as no
forces act upon it, to move at a constant velocity in straight line. According to the theory of
causation sketched above, this law looks like the description of a causal capacity: inertia is
the causal capacity of objects with mass to maintain a constant velocity and direction in the
absence of forces acting upon them . 178
Fisher's equilibrium explanation of the 1 : 1 sex ratio of reproductive age organisms
in a population would appear to be different. The main idea of the explanation is
characterized by Elliot Sober as follows:
if a population ever departs from equal numbers of males and females, there
will be reproductive advantage favoring parental pairs that overreproduce
the minority sex. A 1:1 ratio will be the resulting equilibrium point. The
ratio of male to female progeny has an impact on a parent's fitness in virtue
of the number of grandchildren that are produced. If males are now in the
majority, an individual who produces all female offspring will on average
have more grandchildren than one that produces all males or a mixture of
sons and daughters (Sober, 1983, 20 1-2). 179
Fisher's account, says Sober, demonstrates that the sex ratio will be 1 : 1 no matter what
actual initial conditions or selective pressures occur in a given population. Fisher's account
thus cannot be considered causal:
whatever the actual initial sex ratio had been
,
the selection pressures that
would have resulted would have moved the population to its equilibrium
state. Where causal explanation shows how the event to be explained was
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in fact produced, equilibrium explanation shows how the event would have
occurred regardless of which of a variety of causal scenarios actually
transpired (202).
Even if Fisher's explanation of sex ratios does not pick out a single historical cause
of any given 1:1 sex ratio, it does provide an exhaustive disjunction of three causal
scenarios, in which the initial population has either (1) a sex ratio of 1:1, (2) more males
than females, or (3) more females than males, and a description of the causal path of the
population in each case. Isn't this to provide a causal explanation of the 1:1 sex ratio, even
if no single causal path is picked out? To explain by reference to a disjunction of causal
possibilities is a causal explanation. To this, Sober replies:
A disjunction of causal scenarios clearly provides ' information about the
cause
1 (namely, that the actual cause was one of the several mentioned); but
disjunctions of causal scenarios will sometimes fail to say what the cause is.
An ice cube melts in a warm room. We might say that the cube's being
made of water caused it to melt. Suppose that there were another
substance, call it X, that has the same melting point; if the cube had been
made of X, it would have melted just the same. In what sense is it true that
the cube's being made of water or of X caused it to melt? Only in the sense
that its being made of water caused it to melt, or its being made of X caused
it to melt. The disjunction of possible causes fails to say what the cause it
(205).
Sober concedes that the disjunction provides information about the causes of the one-to-
one sex ratio. His further point is not easy to discern, but it seems to be that, there being
nothing in common between being made of water and being made of X, the disjunction of
the two possible causes says nothing about the cause of the substance melting. But there is
something in common that is causally relevant: both water and X have the same melting
point; melting point is a causal capacity. Fisher's argument is similar: no matter what the
initial population structure, he argues, natural selection will force the population to move
to, or to remain steady at, a one-to-one sex ratio. Hence, a common causal factor — natural
selection — plays a role no matter which causal path is taken in concrete cases. Fisher's
argument is a causal one, but at an abstract level: natural selection is an abstract cause, the
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actual operation of which may take a number of concrete forms. But abstract causes are no
less causal than are concrete causes.
5.11.5 Identity Explanations
A number of authors have argued that information about identity relations can be
explanatory, though causes obviously play no role in such explanation (for a thing cannot
cause itself). Identity explanations can take many forms. Two general forms cited by
David-H i I lei Ruben (1990, 218-219) are:
(i) explaining why some particular a has property P by identifying P with a property
Q, which a also has;
(ii) explaining why a is a P by identifying a with the sum of its parts, b & c & d, etc.,
and identifying P with some property of the sum, Q, or with a property Q had
individually by each member of the sum.
Most interesting identity explanations in science, says Ruben, rely on identities that reduce
macro-properties to micro-properties (1990, 220).
The nature of identity explanations is often obscured, I think, by the form in which
examples are stated. Two examples noted by Ruben are typical: that a gas sample has
temperature t can be explained by the fact that it has mean kinetic energy k; and that ice is
water can be explained by the fact that it is H 20.
180 The emphasis, in each case, is
explaining what something is, e.g., what temperature is, or what ice is. This is obscured by
the mention of a particular gas sample at temperature t, and by the comparison between ice
and water. As a result, the explananda are easily confused with similar explananda that
receive a causal explanation: for example, why is this gas at temperature t'?; because heat
was applied to the gas, causing the kinetic energy of the gas molecules to increase until the
gas reached a temperature of t\ This explanation makes use of the equivalence between
mean kinetic energy and temperature, but it also provides causal information. Examples
such as these provide no counterexample to the causal theory of explanation.
175
Once the explananda are stripped of features that demand causal explanation, we
are left with an explanandum of the form, "what is X?", e.g., "what is temperature?", and
"what is ice?" Commonly, the explanation to this sort of question is a description of the
structural properties of X.
Structural explanation (explaining what something is) is certainly a part of scientific
inquiry, and it would be obtuse not to distinguish structural explanations from causal ones.
The two kinds of explanation are complementary, however, and closely related. First,
many, if not all, structural explanations provide causal information. Here are two examples:
First, the structure of an atom may be described as consisting of a nucleus, which contains
neutrons and positively charged protons, and a cloud of negatively charged electrons,
which are bound to the nucleus by electrostatic forces. "Being bound by electrostatic
forces" is a causal description. To take another example, no explanation of the heart would
be complete without a citation of its pumping function. Anatomical descriptions of
biological organisms often contain information about the functions of described structures,
but functions are operative causal capacities.
So structural explanations often contain causal information. In addition, the search
for structural explanations is closely bound to the search for causal explanations. For one
aim in trying to understand the structural properties of things is to better understand their
causal capacities. One goal of the dissection and careful description of the structure of
organs, for example, is to improve understanding of their biological functions. Structural
properties are of interest partly because they are associated with causal capacities: there is a
permanent, though brute-fact, connection between structural properties and causal
capacities, and a major goal of science is to discover these connections. I conclude that
while room in the causal theory of explanation must be made for structural explanations,
the addition of structural explanation to the theory complements causal explanation nicely.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPLANATORY CONTROVERSIES AND THEIR RESOLUTION
6.1 Explanatory Controversy in Science
Positivist philosophy of science has traditionally viewed historical science through a
narrow scope: only the theories in science were examined with care, and these were
appraised in static form, stripped of historical context. Recent work has begun to correct
this traditional preference for theory and static, ahistorical contexts. Thomas Kuhn's The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) initiated vigorous discussions of theoretical
change in dynamic historical contexts. More recently, the work of Ian Hacking (1983) and
others has forced philosophers to reexamine the intricacies of experimental science, as well
as the complex relationship between experiment and theory.
With respect to explanation, however, attention to dynamic historical contexts is
unusual, and the role of experimentation and other actual methods of resolving explanatory
puzzles is still ignored. These weaknesses come to the forefront when one examines
particular episodes from the great history of explanatory controversies in science, and tries
to understand how these controversies arise, are pursued, and finally settled or left
unresolved. 18 ' It is no surprise, given philosophy's traditional focus on static theories, that
discussions of explanatory controversy are also rare. 182
This is unfortunate, for controversies in science are rich sources of information about
scientists' thinking. Controversy compels scientists to defend their views forcefully and
completely in public forums. Sharp disagreements thus bring more of scientists' reasoning
to the surface, where it may be observed by philosophers and historians of science. During
a period of controversy, moreover, the statuses of competing theories are in flux, and the
champions of all sides of the conflict are visible, which helps the philosopher or historian to
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resist the natural tendency to discount or overappreciate the value of hypotheses in accord
with the ultimate outcome of the controversy.
Below we will consider what recent neo and paleo-positivist theories of explanation
have to say about explanatory controversy. With respect to each theory of explanation, we
ask: (1) what reasons does it provide to expect explanatory controversy to exist, and to exist
in the forms that it does? (2) Can it provide an account of the ways that explanatory
controversies are pursued and resolved? Historical examples will be presented which
demonstrate that positivist theories of explanation provide inadequate guidance in
understanding the genesis of controversies, the methods by which resolution is pursued,
and the speed and decisiveness by which they are resolved.' 83 In each case, the failures can
be shown to result from a false conception of explanation. We will preface this discussion
by introducing detailed descriptions of two historical controversies: the dispute between
Jensen and Lewontin over the genetic determination of IQ (which occurred in a series of
articles published during 1 969-1 970), and the controversy concerning the nature of cosmic
radiation, which ran from the mid-1 920s to its partial resolution in 1 937.
The argument in this chapter requires an important assumption: that the history of
science can help to settle disputes between philosophical theories of explanation. Fifty
years ago, this assumption would have received immediate rebukes from a majority of
philosophers of science, for philosophy was viewed as a normative project best pursued at
an objective distance from the details of actual scientific practice. Times have changed, and
contemporary philosophers of science have acquired serious interests in the history of
science. Nonetheless, questions about the proper relation between history and philosophy
of science remain unsettled. As a result, although the appeal to history should generate less
heat now than it would have in the 1 940s, it must still be defended.
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We will approach the topic by considering two common arguments against using
the history of science to settle disputes between philosophical theories of science (including
scientific explanation). When considering these arguments, one must keep in mind that
one is evaluating the use of history of science not in isolation, but vis-a-vis normative
philosophy of science, as a basis for adjudicating philosophical questions. The complaints
come in two general forms:
(1) Historical cases can be cited in which the methods used by scientists are
no longer accepted as good scientific practice, though they were approved,
and even championed, by the methods' practitioners and their
contemporaries. It would seem, therefore, that history provides unreliable
grounds on which to decide between philosophical theories of science. In
addition, scientific methods and knowledge have clearly made progress
throughout history. Yet any appeal to history to settle philosophical
disputes seems to deny that the methods, inferences, and conclusions of the
chosen historical episode can be improved upon by subsequent science, or
by philosophy. Noretta Koertge, who makes this argument in a discussion
of Lakatos' work on historical reconstruction, asks rhetorically, "[w]here
would logicians be if they had rejected any theory of inference which did
not reconstruct all of the arguments of the great Euclid as valid? Or what if
medical theory had restricted itself to the articulation of the methods used
by the best surgeons alive in 1850?"' 84
(2) How is the history of scientific practice to be filtered and assessed for the
purpose of gathering examples for philosophical argumentation? On what
grounds is one to judge which historical episodes contain examples of good
explanatory practice? An initial evaluation is required, and it would seem
that there are three possible sources on which the evaluation can rely: (a)
intuition; (b) the consensus of scientists; (c) a normative philosophical
framework. Any reliance on intuition or consensus, however, is
unacceptable to many philosophers of science. Prior philosophical
frameworks are therefore required. This conclusion is summed up by
Lakatos' paraphrase of Kant: "history of science without philosophy of
science is blind" (Lakatos, 1971/1978, 102). Historical analysis therefore
presupposes normative philosophy of science, and cannot be used to
adjudicate between competing philosophical theories of science.
While (1 ) raises some important questions about the use of the history of science, it
is unconvincing as an argument against the use of history (and in favor of normative
philosophy of science). The doubts it raises about the reliability of history as a basis to
adjudicate philosophical disputes can be raised with respect to normative philosophy of
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science as well. Models of good scientific practice reconstructed from history are certainly
fallible, but so are models constructed from any philosophical basis. Moreover, scientific
practice can be improved, as is demonstrated by the progress of scientific practices
throughout history, and any evaluative use of history must respect this fact. But there is also
a history of normative philosophy of science, and many examples can be given of earlier
philosophies of science (e.g., Aristotle's final causes) that are no longer accepted by modern
philosophers. That historical reconstructions are fallible, and that scientific practices have
progressed throughout history, therefore provide no good reason to prefer normative
philosophy to history as a basis for adjudicating disputes.
In the case of (2), I wish to mention two points. First, the value of scientific
consensus is underrated by many philosophers of science. Consensus regarding the
importance of theoretical or experimental developments is achieved only at the end of an
institutional process of dissemination, critical review, and selection. It is much more than
the "mob psychology" that some philosophers make it out to be. Having said that, I wish to
focus discussion on a second point: even if we accept that the assessment of history requires
a normative philosophical framework, the construction, interpretation, and evaluation of
philosophical theories of science generally require, in turn, the application of the
philosophy in actual scientific practice. On this view, philosophical progress demands a
dialectic between actual practice (including historical study) and philosophical
interpretation, analysis, and assessment.' 85
Philosophical theories of science do not appear out of thin air, but through
examination of the history of science. Theories can be interpreted, moreover, only in light
of actual cases of scientific practice: the philosophy of science without the history of science
is, again in Lakatos' words, empty. Most important, philosophical theories of science can
be evaluated only in terms of the fruitfulness of their application in actual scientific practice,
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either historically or in the present. Until a theory has been put into practice, it remains a
mere intellectual curiosity; at best, it is of interest because it is seen as having potential
application in some area.
Since Hempel (1 965) first made the argument, it has become common for
philosophers of science to portray their theories as "ideal" models of scientific practice.' 86
They suggest that because their theories are only ideal models, criticism founded on conflict
between the theories and actual scientific practice can be dismissed. In Chapter 3, I argued
that ideal models of explanation must satisfy the following criterion: wherever the criteria of
the ideal model are satisfied by some proposed explanation, the proposal in question must
be explanatory. Here I would add another criterion: the model must aspire to satisfy some
cases of good explanatory practice in science, either historic or future. If a model of
explanation is not satisfied by any historical examples of good explanatory practice, then
the model acquires a burden of proof: it must be shown that if the model were satisfied (i.e.,
applied in scientific practice), then the resulting scientific practice would be successful.
Naturally, it is easier to show that a theory of explanation can account for successful
scientific practices in the past than it is to show that the theory would be successful if
applied to future cases.
This, combined with what has already been said, is sufficient, I hope, to indicate
that philosophy of science not only benefits from, but requires, the study of actual scientific
practice. We now turn to our two historical examples.
6.2 First Case Study: Controversies over the Explanation of Differential IQ-Test
Performance
The genetic basis of human intelligence is a huge subject with an extensive history
of controversy.
187 Our immediate topic is a single dispute within this history: the exchange
between Arthur Jensen and Richard Lewontin concerning the heritability of IQ as evidence
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for a genetic explanation of the racial differential in IQ test performance. Jensen reopened
debate on the genetic basis of intelligence with his article, "How Much Can We Boost IQ
and Scholastic Achievement?", published in Harvard Educational Review in 1969. Jensen's
article set off a dramatic controversy that extended beyond his exchange with Lewontin. 188
The general controversy over the genetic basis of intelligence has not subsided 189
,
and
scientists participating in this controversy remain polarized. The smaller dispute between
Lewontin and Jensen remains equally unresolved: neither Lewontin nor Jensen has budged
from his original point of view.
The dispute is of interest to our discussion of scientific explanation for two reasons.
First, the dispute clearly concerns the causal role of a factor in a phenomenon (namely, the
role of genetic factors in IQ-test performance). In addition, knowledge of plenty of laws of
regularity (statistical data) about both genetic relationships and IQ relationships has failed to
resolve the dispute: knowledge of these laws has been insufficient to clarify the respective
roles of hypothesized causal factors.
Jensen's argument starts from two facts, neither of which is disputed by Lewontin:
First, compensatory education has failed to eliminate the differences in scholastic
performance between certain groups of students, especially between black and white
students. 190 Second, black students score 15 points lower on IQ tests, on average, than do
white students; this differential is reduced to 1
1
points, claims Jensen, if one controls for
"gross socioeconomic" factors. 19 ' The purpose of Jensen's original article is twofold: to put
forth and defend a causal explanation for these facts; and to suggest education policy
measures that he believes are in accord with the proposed causal explanation. The main
outlines of Jensen's argument can be sketched as follows:
(1) IQ is highly heritable (in white American and northern European populations).
(2) IQ has a strong genetic basis, as (1) and other evidence show.
1
'’ 2
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(3) The IQ differential between black and white students therefore has a strong
genetic basis. 6
(4) Compensatory education rests on two assumptions: the "average children
concept and the "social deprivation hypothesis." 194
(5) (1 )-(3) challenge the assumptions of compensatory education. They suggest
further that the IQ (and, hence, the scholastic performance, as well as socio-
economic achievement) differential between blacks and whites cannot be
eliminated by compensatory educational programs. Finally, these groups may have
different educational needs that require different educational methods.
Although Lewontin believes available studies overestimate the heritability of IQ, he accepts
(1 ) for the sake of argument. His criticism centers on Jensen's claim that (2)-(5) can be
reasonably inferred from (1) (and any additional evidence). Lewontin and Jensen thus
disagree on two major questions: does the high heritability of IQ and other evidence show
that IQ (or intelligence) has a strong genetic basis?; and what can one reasonably infer about
education policy on the assumption that IQ is highly heritable or, further, that intelligence
has a strong genetic basis? Our case study focuses on the first question.
6.2.1 Jensen's Argument
Jensen is very careful in the development of his argument. He disavows any claim
to know what intelligence really is, or whether it is a single capability or a family of related
capabilities: he is satisfied to study whatever is measured by IQ tests, so long as these
measurements are positively correlated with other factors of interest such as scholastic
achievement and occupational success.' 95 He is also quick to agree that arguments about
whether or not intelligence is "fixed" are irrelevant:
[WJhatever we observe or measure of the organism is a phenotype, and this,
by definition, is not "fixed." The phenotype is the result of the organism's
internal genetic mechanisms established at conception and all the physical
and social influences that impinge on the organism throughout the course of
its development. Intelligence is a phenotype, not a genotype'
96
,
so the
argument about whether or not intelligence is "fixed" is seen to be spurious
( 17 ).
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It is misleading to describe intelligence as "fixed," says Jensen, because intelligence is a
phenotypic characteristic that develops through the interaction between the person's
genetic constitution and his or her environment. While Jensen discards the question of the
"fixedness" of intelligence, however, he intends to show that human intelligence has a
strong genetic basis, and that relative intelligence (such as is measured by IQ tests) is very
stable throughout the lifetime of individuals. Moreover, he criticizes the claim that relative
intelligence is much affected by environmental manipulation (e.g., educational
intervention).
In support of the conclusion that human intelligence has a strong genetic basis,
Jensen cites the following evidence:
(1) Mental abilities, e.g., maze-running skills in rats, can be selectively bred.
(2) Known genetic defects have recognized consequences on human mental
abilities, e.g., Turner's syndrome.
(3) The heritability of IQ (i.e., the proportion of variance in IQ attributable to
variance in genotype) has been measured to be .81.
(4) The measured correlation between socioeconomic factors and IQ is weak, e.g.,
some measures of the portion of variance in IQ due to variance in environmental
factors show it to be about .20.
(5) Large upward shifts in IQ seem to occur only in cases in which severe
environmental deprivation is remedied.
In his discussion of the IQ differential between black and white students, he mentions these
additional factors:
(6) No amount of environmental manipulation (educational intervention, for
example) has been shown to eradicate the IQ differential; cited programs for
disadvantaged children show only 5-10 points gain in IQ, and these results have
been difficult to replicate on a broad scale.
(7) Various evidence shows that the IQ differential is steady across socioeconomic
classes.
Since (1) and (2) show, at most, that genetic factors play a role in intelligence — a claim that
almost no one disputes — they can be ignored. The remaining evidence falls into two
184
categories: (i) positive evidence for the strong role of genetic factors in determining IQ
(primarily the high heritability of IQ); and (ii) negative evidence for the role of
environmental factors (e.g., socioeconomic conditions, or educational intervention) in
determining IQ. Although the negative evidence for the role of environmental factors is
important to Jensen's argument 197
,
the focal point of Lewontin's criticism is Jensen's appeal
to the high heritability of IQ.
6.2.2 Heritability
As we have noted, Jensen says he is concerned not with the "fixity" of intelligence,
but the genetic basis of intelligence:
When we look behind the rather misleading term, "fixed intelligence," what
we find are principally two real and separate issues. ..The first issue concerns
the genetic basis of individual differences in intelligence; the second
concerns the stability or constancy of the IQ throughout the individual's
lifetime ... 198
Geneticists have avoided confusion and polemics about the issue of
whether or not a given trait is "fixed" by asking the right question in the first
place: how much of the variation (i.e., individual differences) in a particular
trait or characteristic that we observe or measure (i.e., the phenotype) in a
given population can we account for in terms of variation in the genetic
factors (i.e., the genotype ) affecting the development of the characteristic?
( 16 - 17).
In this way, Jensen raises the question of the heritability of IQ, for "heritability" is a measure
of the proportion of phenotypic variance that is assignable to genotypic variance.
Heritability is only one of the "lines of evidence" cited by Jensen, but it is of utmost
importance to his argument because it is the primary positive evidence he offers in favor of
the genetic hypothesis.
The estimation of heritability is a special application of the analysis of variance,
which is a general statistical technique for measuring the relative influence of possible
contributing causes . 191 Heritability (h 2 ) is defined as the ratio of genotypic variance {Vc ) to
total phenotypic variance (VQ:
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h 2 - Vc/Vp.
The total phenotypic variance (Vp) is itself a function of genotypic variance and other
sources of variance:
vP = vc + VE + V, + covCE + ve .
Here "non-genetic" sources of variance are represented by V
E (environmental variance), V,
(variance resulting from genetic-environmental interactions), COVCf (variance due to
covariance between genotype and environment), and V
e
(error in measurement). 200
Obviously, genetic factors are operative in V, and COVCEl as well as in Vc . Genotypic
variance (Vc) also has a number of components that can be distinguished, including additive
genetic variance, variance due to dominance deviations, and variance due to genetic
interactions (epistasis).
There are a number of techniques for estimating heritability. Using subjects whose
genetic relationship is known (e.g., parent-offspring, monozygotic twins, siblings, etc.), for
example, one can calculate the genetic variance in these groups, and then use
measurements of the phenotypic variance of traits within the group to make estimates of the
heritability of the trait. However, because of the complexity of gene-interactions
(dominance and epistasis), and the existence of background correlations between genetic
relationships and environmental properties (e.g., siblings tend to develop in similar
environments), it is difficult to arrive at a good estimate of the heritability of IQ and other
human traits . 201 Lewontin notes some of the difficulties of estimating heritability, and
concludes that the heritability of IQ is overestimated in most studies. Nevertheless,
Lewontin accepts Jensen's estimate of the heritability of IQ for the sake of argument, and we
will thus ignore the general issue of estimating heritability, restricting ourselves to related
points as they arise in our discussion.
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Citing a number of studies of IQ in white north European and American
populations, Jensen estimates the heritability of IQ to be .81
. He infers from this that about
80% of the variation in IQ can be explained by genetic variation. This figure, combined
with the perceived failure of social scientists to find any strong correlation between
environmental factors and IQ, leads Jensen to conclude that genetic factors are most
important in explaining the IQ differential between white and black students.
6.2.3 Lewontin's Criticism
Lewontin's criticism of Jensen's genetic hypothesis focuses on two points:
(1) Jensen's argument confuses the heritability of a trait within a population
with the heritability of the difference between two populations: the "genetic
basis of the difference between two populations," argues Lewontin, "bears
no logical or empirical relation to the heritability within populations," and
the high heritability of IQ within some studied populations thus provides no
evidence of the genetic basis of the difference between populations (89).
(2) Jensen's argument assumes that the major environmental variables have been
identified by social scientists, and that the genetic variables have thus been
successfully isolated in their analyses. This assumption, suggests Lewontin, is
biologically naive.
To bring home his arguments, Lewontin presents two simple examples. First, suppose we
take two handfuls of seed from a bag of open-pollinated corn (which contains a lot of
genetic variation):
we will grow the seed in vermiculite watered with a carefully made up
nutrient, Knop's solution, used by plant physiologists for controlled growth
experiments. One batch of seed will be grown on complete Knop's
solution, but the other will have the concentration of nitrates cut in half and,
in addition, we will leave out the minute trace of zinc salt that is part of the
necessary trace elements (30 parts per billion). After several weeks we will
measure the plants. ..[W]e will find variation within seed lots which is
entirely genetical since no environmental variation within lots was allowed.
Thus [within-group] heritability will be 1 .0. However, there will be a radical
difference between seed lots which is ascribable entirely to the difference in
nutrient levels. Thus, we have a case where heritability within populations
is complete, yet the difference between populations is entirely
environmental!
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But let us carry our experiment to the end. Suppose we do notknow about the difference in the nutrient solutions because it was really the
carelessness of our assistant that was involved. We call in a friend who is a
very careful chemist and ask him to look into the matter for us. He analyzes
the nutrient solutions and discovers the obvious — only half as much
nitrates in the case of the stunted plants. So we add the missing nitrates anddo the experiment again. This time, our second batch of plants will grow a
little larger but not much, and we will conclude that the difference between
the lots is genetic since equalizing the large difference in nitrate level had so
little effect. But, of course, we would be wrong, for it is the missing trace of
zinc that is the real culprit. Finally, it should be pointed out that it took
many years before the importance of minute trace elements in plant
physiology was worked out because ordinary laboratory glassware will
leach out enough of many trace elements to let plants grow normally (90-
This example shows that even where the within-group heritability is 1
.0, environmental
factors can be decisive in producing between-group differences. Lewontin presents a
second example in which the relationship is reversed: he describes a plausible scenario in
which two groups of corn plants exhibit within-group heritabilities of 0.0, yet have
between-group average differences in height that are entirely due to genetic differences
between the two groups.
It is important to understand that Lewontin's claim is not just that Jensen's inference
from within-group heritability to explain between-group differences is epistemologically
risky. Lewontin's point is stronger:
Is it not then likely that the [IQ] difference is genetic? No. It is neither likely
nor unlikely. There is no evidence. ..Indeed, between two populations, the
concept of heritability of their differences is meaningless. This is because a
variance based upon two measurements has only one degree of freedom
and so cannot be partitioned into genetic and environmental components
(89).
Lewontin's argument contains two primary lines of reasoning, though my interpretation is
based in part on a later article by Lewontin on the analysis of variance (Lewontin, 1 974).
The two lines of Lewontin's argument are: (1) where the operation of causal factors is not
independent, the analysis of variance (including heritability) is misleading when interpreted,
as it is by Jensen, as an analysis of relative causal contributions; and (2) the analysis of
188
heritability is always local to a population and a particular environment - it does not, in
other words, reveal the general functional relationship between genotype and environment,
except under very special conditions (which, it should be added, there is no reason to
believe are met in the case of IQ).
(1) One must keep in mind that "heritability" has a definite technical meaning: it
refers to the ratio of genetic variance to phenotypic variance in a population. Above we
represented heritability by this formula:
b 2 = Vc/Vp .
The degree of heritability of a trait is thus a function of the genotypic and phenotypic
variation in the population. So described, heritability appears to isolate the respective
contribution (i.e., causal contribution) that genetic variance makes to phenotypic variance.
This appearance is mistaken. Remember that VP is itself a function of genotype and
environment, as well as of their interactions and covariance:
vp = vc + vE + vl + covCE + ve .
The problem for the causal analysis is that the factors listed on the right side of the linear
equation are not independent of one another: environmental variance is function of
genotype and genotypic variance is a function of environment — this is the relationship
indicated by V,. The phenotypic expression of a genotype varies with environment (the
range of this variation is called the genotype's "norm of reaction"), and different genotypes
have different norms of reaction; it is common for the phenotypic expression of two
genotypes to vary not only in degree, but in direction across environments. Because
phenotypic variance (and thus heritability) depends on both environmental and genetic
factors, heritability does not truly isolate the causal contributions of either environmental or
genetic factors. For instance, if environmental variance is small (and h 2 is large), it is
impossible to tell whether this is because there is little actual variation in environment or
189
because the particular genotype is insensitive to environmental differences. Being "highly
heritable" is therefore not the same as being "strongly genetic," if this is meant in a causal
sense. Lewontin's corn examples show this: the causal role of the genotype may be strong
in determining a plant's height, even if the heritability of height is 0.0 (e.g., because there is
no genetic variation in the population). Even if we assume therefore that the between-group
heritability is similar to that within the group, we have no way of knowing whether the
between-group differences are due to differences in genotype (including norms of reaction)
or to differences in environment.
(2) A measure of heritability is always relative to a particular population in a
particular environment. Because the phenotypic expression of a genotype varies across
environments, and because different genotypes have different norms of reaction, a measure
of heritability does not, under most conditions, describe a general functional relationship
between environment and genotype that can be applied outside of the measured
population. The only case in which such generalizations can be made is when genotypic
and environmental effects are additive so that differences in genotype or environment yield
perfectly proportional differences in phenotype. In his 1974 article, Lewontin discusses a
number of reasons that might be introduced to support the assumption of additivity when
analyzing variance, and argues that none of them is justified (1974, 189-191).
6.2.4 Jensen's Reply
In his reply to Lewontin's article, Jensen responds as follows:
The main thrust of Lewontin's argument, as he sees it, actually attacks only a
straw man set up by himself: the notion that heritability of a trait within a
population does not prove that genetic factors are involved in the mean
difference between two populations on the same trait. I agree. But
nowhere in my Harvard Educational Review discussion of race differences
do I propose this line of reasoning, nor have I done so in any other writings.
I do, however, discuss many other lines of evidence which I believe are
more consistent with the hypothesis that genetic factors are involved in the
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average Negro-white IQ differences than with purely environmental theories
(1970, 103).
Given that Jensen devotes over 25 pages of his original article to a discussion of the
heritability of IQ, and, as we noted above, that the heritability of IQ constitutes the only
positive evidence in favor of Jensen's hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly implicated
in the IQ differential between races, this rejoinder seems disingenuous. Not surprisingly,
Jensen continues in a manner that reveals he does indeed believe that the inference from
the high heritability of IQ to the genetic hypothesis is valid. We will quote his argument at
length:
But let us further consider Lewontin's statement that heritability. ..within
populations is irrelevant to the question of genetic differences between
populations. Theoretically, this is true: It is possible to have genetic
differences within populations and no genetic differences between
populations which differ phenotypical ly; conversely, it is possible to have
zero heritability within populations and complete genetic determination of
the mean difference between populations. Therefore, heritability
coefficients obtained within populations, no matter how high, cannot prove
the existence of a genetic difference between populations. ..But it is
necessary to distinguish between the possible and the probable, and
between proof in the sense of mathematical tautology and the probabilistic
statements that result from hypothesis testing in empirical science. The real
question is not whether a heritability estimate, by its mathematical logic,
can prove the existence of a genetic difference between two groups, but
whether there is any probabilistic connection between the magnitude of the
heritability and the magnitude of group differences. Given two populations
(A and B) whose means on a particular characteristic differ by x amount, and
given the heritability (hA
2 and h B 2 ) of the characteristic in each of the two
populations, the probability that the two populations differ from one another
genotypically as well as phenotypically is some monotonically increasing
function of the magnitudes of hA 2 and h B 2 (1 970, 1 03-1 04).
Jensen then offers an example:
Would Lewontin maintain, for example, that there would be no difference
in the probability that two groups differ genetically where h 2 for the trait in
question is 0.9 in each group as against the case where h 2 is 0. 1 ? Pygmies
average under five feet in height; the Watusis average over six feet. The fact
that the heritability of physical stature is close to 0.9 does not prove that all
the difference is not caused by environmental factors, but it is more
probable that genetic factors may be involved in the difference than would
be the probability in the case of a group difference in the amount of
scarification (body markings) which very likely has a heritability close to
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zero. Since pygmies and Watusis live in very different environments, why
should we not bet on the proposition that their difference in mean height is
attributable to environment? In short, the high heritability of height suggests
a reasonable hypothesis. We would then look for other lines of evidence to
test the hypothesis. ..We can proceed similarly in studying group differences
in behavioral characteristics. Within-group heritability estimates thus can
give us probabilistic clues as to which characteristics are most likely to show
genetic differences between groups when investigated through all the other
available lines of evidence (1970, 104-105).
Jensen believes that the heritability of a trait provides prims, fscie evidence of the degree to
which between-group differences in the trait are genetically based. Lewontin, he suggests,
either fails to recognize the probabilistic nature of this evidence or demands, in the case of
explaining IQ differences, a degree of proof required nowhere else in natural science.
6.2.5 Lewontin Again
In his response to Jensen's reply, Lewontin reemphasizes the point that heritability is
irrelevant (both deterministically and probabilistically) to Jensen's genetic hypothesis. In
addition, he expands his original argument to consider other grounds relevant to the
probability of the genetic hypothesis:
If two populations have high heritabilities for a character and there is an
average difference between them, is that difference mostly genetical? One
possibility is that the populations differ genetically because of a previous
history of differential selection of a type that causes genetic variation to be
stabilized. Another possibility is that the populations may differ genetically
because of historical accidents of genetic sampling (genetic drift) without
differential selection. A third possibility is that the populations are
genetically much alike but live in environments that differ from each other
in some critical limiting factor. All of these occur in nature, and again no a
priori likelihoods can be fairly assigned to them.
For the race problem, however, we can say something because of
other information. The first possibility is quite unlikely because the result of
selection would be the elimination of additive genetic variance, leaving
only dominance and interaction variance. But Burt's data, quoted by
Jensen, show that 48 percent of the variance in IQ is additive genetic
variance. This is a high figure for a quantitative trait in general, and
absurdly high for any trait that has long been under selection.
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It appears
that IQ has been selectively neutral, at least over much of our species
history. The second and third possibilities are more or less equally likely
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explanations of the situation in man, and I would not care to bet the
educational future of any children on one or the other (1 970b, 1 10).
Does the high heritability of IQ support Jensen's genetic explanation of IQ
differences or not? Jensen and Lewontin do not come to agreement, although they do agree
on the statistical relations regarding genetic variance and variance in IQ (i.e., on the
heritability measures), at least for the sake of argument. This knowledge of statistical
relations, however, fails to settle their explanatory disagreement.
6.3 Second Case Study: Controversies over the Nature of Cosmic Radiation
The story of the study of cosmic rays begins in 1912, when Victor Hess performed
experiments to try to understand a phenomenon — the spontaneous discharge of
electroscopes — that had puzzled scientists for more than a century. 203 Hess and other
scientists understood enough about the physical world to know that the discharge was due
to charge-neutralizing ions present in the gas surrounding the leaves of electroscopes, but
they were unsure of the source of these ions. What was causing the continuous ionization
of the gas? Scientists knew of various radioactive substances that were capable of ionizing
gases, such as X-rays and radium. They also knew that whatever was causing the ionization
in electroscopes, some of it came from outside the electroscopes, and was able to penetrate
thick layers of shielding lead or water. Most scientists presumed, as a result, that the source
of ionizing radiation must be the earth's crust.
To test this opinion, Hess ascended to 1 6,000 ft. in a balloon, measuring the altitude
and rate of discharge of a set of electroscopes he had on board. He discovered that the rate
of discharge decreased at first (up to about 2,000 ft.), but then, surprisingly, steadily
increased thereafter. Indeed, at 1 6,000 ft., the rate of discharge was four times that at the
earth's surface. Hess concluded that while the earth's crust does contain sources of ionizing
radiation, a significant amount of radiation has its source in the heavens above earth.
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Hess's discovery launched forty years of inquiry into the nature of cosmic rays, and
this inquiry played a major role in the history of particle physics. 204 The study of cosmic
rays was driven by an evolving set of explanatory problems. At least one of these problems
- the spontaneous discharge of electroscopes - had already dogged physicists for over one
hundred years. Most of the puzzles, however, developed with the introduction of two new
instruments, the Rutherford (and especially the later Geiger-Muller) electric counting
devices, and the Wilson cloud chamber. These instruments made it possible, for the first
time, to study the behavior of individual micro-particles, and the data from them generated
explanatory problems that received intense attention from physicists beginning in the mid-
1 920s. The explanatory problems included: How is one to explain the spontaneous
discharge of shielded electroscopes and the simultaneous discharges of electric counters
separated by heavy barriers? How is one to explain the showers and long single ionization
tracks that appear in cloud chamber photographs? More general questions also engendered
debate: What is the nature of cosmic radiation? Is cosmic radiation photonic or particulate?
Are there primary and secondary components of cosmic radiation? If so, what are their
respective natures, and what is the process by which secondary radiation is produced from
primary?
These questions generated vigorous, at times acrimonious, controversy among
physicists between 1929 and 1 9 3 7. 205 This controversy was nonetheless resolved rapidly
during 1 936-1 937. 206 Although this story includes many explanatory ups and downs, we
will look in detail at only a small part of it: the discovery in 1937 of the mu-meson, which is
the main component of sea-level cosmic radiation. 207
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6.3.1 Cosmic Radiation: Photons or Particles?
It will be useful to summarize first the main events preceding 1 936. 208 By the mid-
1920 s, two sources of ionization had been recognized: corpuscular radiation and the
Compton Effect, which was discovered by Compton in the early 1 920s. Cosmic rays were
known to ionize gases. After Compton's discovery, most cosmic ray researchers assumed
that cosmic rays were made up of high-energy photons.
Robert Millikan emerged as the major defender of the photon view. Beginning in
the mid-1 920s, he and G.H. Cameron sought to shed light on the nature of cosmic rays by
constructing an absorption curve for rays by measuring their ionization rate as a function of
depth in the atmosphere and in lake water. They chose to resolve their data into three
curves, and then calculated the energies of photons that would yield each absorption curve.
They argued that the calculated energies are exactly what one should expect them to be, if
one assumed the cosmic rays to be photons released as a result of the fusion of hydrogen
into helium, nitrogen, oxygen, and silicon. This quantitative agreement convinced Millikan
that cosmic rays are photons, the "birth cries" of atoms being formed in outer space. 209
Millikan's photon-hypothesis was soon challenged by experimental work performed
by W. Bothe and W. Kolhorster (1929). In their experiments, Bothe and Kolhorster
arranged two Geiger-Muller tubes in parallel, separating them by a thick gold block. 210
They discovered that the two tubes discharged simultaneously with a significant frequency.
In principle, photons could produce a double discharge by colliding with an atom and
kicking out a high-energy recoil electron (the Compton Effect). But Bothe and Kolhorster
argued that a calculation of the energies of recoil electrons (using a reasonable absorption
curve and the best available theory of the Compton Effect — the Klein-Nishina theory)
reveals that very few, if any, recoil electrons at sea-level would have energy sufficient to
penetrate the gold barrier. Bothe and Kolhorster concluded that the penetrating particles
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were not recoil electrons, and speculated that the cosmic rays themselves must consist of
high-energy charged particles rather than photons.
Between 1 929 and 1 934, two groups of scientists pursued experiments to try to
better understand cosmic radiation. One group suspected that Bothe and Kolhorster were
correct. Bruno Rossi, for example, continued experiments in Bothe and Kolhorster's lab
using an improved Geiger-Muller counter (Rossi, 1930a, 1930b, 1933). Others, like Arthur
Compton, sought new kinds of evidence for the charged-particle hypothesis, such as the
existence of geomagnetic effects on cosmic rays (the famous Millikan-Compton dispute
concerned the existence of geomagnetic effects). Millikan's group, on the other hand,
pursued confirmation of his photon hypothesis. Hoping to gain better measurements of the
energies of cosmic rays, Millikan encouraged his student, Carl Anderson, to build a cloud
chamber with which to observe the behavior of the secondary particles he presumed were
produced by photons, with the goal of acquiring more precise measurements of the
photons' energy. 211
Millikan chose Anderson because he already had significant expertise with cloud
chambers, which he had used since his undergraduate days. Anderson built his cloud
chamber inside of a powerful electromagnet, which helped him to judge the charge and
energy of the particles captured in his photographs. He published his first results jointly
with Millikan in 1 932 (Millikan and Anderson, 1 932). They found significant numbers of
both negatively and positively charged particles, and he and Millikan interpreted the
particles to be the electrons and protons of disintegrated nuclei. Nine-tenths of the
photographed particles had energies, they argued, consistent with the photon hypothesis.
Their interpretation of the data postulated a new process of absorption and ionization, in
which photons collide with atoms, thereby ejecting protons and electrons (which were
captured by Anderson in his cloud chamber photographs).
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Later, Anderson enhanced the quality of his photographs by reducing turbulence
and improving illumination in the chamber. As a result, he could better assess the particles'
energies by measuring their curvature and ionization densities. He began to suspect that
the ionization of the positive particles was less than he had believed, suggesting that the
particles had a mass comparable to that of electrons, and certainly lighter than protons. He
also considered the possibility that his photographs were not of positive particles traveling
downwards, but of negative electrons traveling upwards. To resolve this difficulty, he
installed a lead plate in the cloud chamber, hoping to catch a particle losing energy through
the plate. Having lost energy going through the plate, the curvature of the particles would
be greater on their exit sides than on their entrance sides, thus settling the question of their
direction and charge. Anderson's subsequent tests, the results of which were published at
the end of 1 932, revealed that the small-mass particles — dubbed positrons — were indeed
positive in charge.
P.M.S. Blackett and G.P.S. Occhialini soon confirmed Anderson's results, though
they explained positrons to be the result not of nuclear disintegrations, but of Dirac pair-
production processes, in which high-energy photons create an electron and positron out of
the vacuum (Blackett and Occhialini, 1 933). Anderson accepted their explanation soon
after it appeared, though he continued to believe in Millikan's photon hypothesis. Millikan,
on the other hand, rejected Dirac pair-production, though its use by Blackett and Occhialini
was not inconsistent with his photon theory of cosmic rays. Nevertheless, he willingly
accepted Anderson's results as further confirmation of the photon theory.
Meanwhile, Rossi published results of his counter experiments, which suggested
that some particles were able to penetrate over one meter of lead (Rossi, 1 933). Anderson,
Millikan and their colleagues responded in an article written at the end of 1 933, and
appearing in 1934 (Anderson, Millikan, et al., 1934). Rossi had noticed secondary showers
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of particles appearing with the passage of single, penetrating particles. Anderson and
Millikan had also noticed these showers, and their observations had revealed that the
number of shower particles increased up to one and one-half centimeters of lead. In their
article, they argued that the release of showers by a passing photon better explained the
simultaneous discharges of Rossi's counters than did his proposal of a single particle passing
through both counters and a meter of lead. They returned to the claim, therefore, that any
secondary radiation was due to the interactions of photons and atomic nuclei. To bolster
this conclusion, they declared that their latest data were inconsistent with the Dirac pair-
production theory, for they revealed more negative particles than positives among the
secondary particles — not equal numbers as one would expect if the secondary particles
were being produced in pairs by photons.
Despite Millikan's efforts, however, the penetrating particles emphasized by Rossi,
Bothe, and Kolhorster would not go away. For one, new evidence on the geomagnetic
effect on cosmic radiation (the latitude and east-west effects) favored the conclusion that
cosmic radiation consists of charged particles. 212 More importantly, perhaps, Anderson and
S.H. Neddermeyer had begun to suspect that the radiative losses of many of the high-energy
particles observed in their cloud chambers were lower than was to be expected, which is to
say that these particles had great penetrating power. At the London and Cambridge
conference on nuclear physics in late 1934, they presented their data, and argued that it
was inconsistent with the best current theory of radiation. Their presentation, which
precipitated a theoretical crisis, raised difficult problems:
213
the then-current theory (Bethe-
Heitler) described only two sub-atomic particles, the electron and the proton, each of which
was understood in terms of two properties, namely, mass and charge. Neither particle, so
described, could account for the absorption data presented by Anderson and Neddermeyer.
On the one hand, the radiative losses of the observed particles were much lower than those
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predicted for electrons by the Bethe-Heitler theory, the best quantum electrodynamic theory
of radiative losses. On the other hand, the hypothesis that the penetrating particles were
protons confronted its own problems: First, the measured energy distribution of secondary
electrons (the result of ionization) was incompatible with the hypothesis that the primary
rays were protons. Second, if the primary rays were protons, one would expect to find at
sea-level some protons with relatively low energy, the ionization tracks of which are easily
distinguishable from those of high-energy electrons. Yet no such low-energy protons had
been found.
6.3.2 Cosmic Radiation: Crisis and Resolution of the Explanatory Controversy
By the end of 1 934, the study of cosmic radiation had no doubt advanced. Most
physicists (besides Millikan) were now sure that cosmic rays were charged particles and not
photons. But in explaining the particles that apparently make up cosmic radiation —
especially the light-ionizing, penetrating tracks observed in Anderson's and Neddermeyer's
cloud chamber — scientists were faced with an unpalatable explanatory dilemma. Either
quantum theory was correct and the particles were protons, or quantum theory was
incorrect and the particles were high-energy electrons. But there was good evidence that
the particles were not protons, and to accept that they were electrons would be to concede
that quantum electrodynamics was false. Not surprisingly, theorists such as Bethe tended to
believe that the penetrating particles were protons, which would salvage quantum theory,
while the experimentalists such as Anderson believed it was more likely that the particles
were electrons that did not behave in accord with quantum theory.’
14
This explanatory crisis did not last long, however, for it was resolved rapidly during
1 936-1 937. The resolution took place in two steps: First, the phenomenon of particle
showers was successfully modeled by Carlson and Oppenheimer using the Bethe-Heitler
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quantum theory: particle showers were shown to be cascades initiated by high-energy
electrons and photons (Carlson and Oppenheimer, 1936). Their model employed the
important distinction between the particle showers and the penetrating particles. Its success
boosted physicists confidence in quantum electrodynamics.
Second, two groups of scientists — Anderson and Neddermeyer, and Street and
Stevenson — gathered decisive cloud chamber evidence for the conclusion that the
penetrating particles were neither protons nor electrons, but an entirely new particle: the
mu-meson (Street and Stevenson, 1937a and 1937b, and Neddermeyer and Anderson,
1 937). Mu-mesons turn out to make up the bulk of sea-level cosmic radiation, and to be the
penetrating particles that explain not only the cloud chamber phenomena, but also the
simultaneous discharges of shielded Geiger-Muller counters, and the spontaneous discharge
of shielded electroscopes, the last of which had been an explanatory puzzle for over a
hundred years. We will be concerned only with the second step of the resolution of the
explanatory crisis.
By the time Carlson and Oppenheimer's paper appeared at the end of 1936,
Anderson was already persuaded of the likely existence of a new particle. To clinch the
conclusion, however, as well as to acquire better data on the nature of the new particle, he
and Neddermeyer performed a comparative study of the energy losses of shower particles
and penetrating particles at the same energy. By considering particles from the two groups
at the same energy, they would be able to rule out the possibility that the penetrating
particles were simply high-energy electrons that radiated less than did electrons at low-
energy levels.
Neddermeyer and Anderson calculated the energy levels of particles from
measurements of their path-curvatures in the electromagnetic field in which their cloud
chamber was located. Having obtained groups of particles at comparable energies, they
200
then measured the energy-losses of these particles as they penetrated a 1 cm plate of
platinum. The absorbing plate was thick enough that the likelihood that an electron could
pass through it without great radiative losses was negligible. Upon analysis, Nedermeyer
and Anderson reached these conclusions (Rossi, 1964, 103ff.):
(1 ) The particles fell into two sharply distinguished groups: the particles of one
group suffered large energy-losses, while those of the second group lost very little
energy penetrating the barrier.
(2) The absorbable particles often appeared in clusters, and they frequently
produced showers, confirming the view that they are electrons (as analyzed by
Carlson and Oppenheimer). The penetrating particles, however, usually generated
single tracks in the cloud chamber photographs.
(3) The energy-losses of the absorbable group, moreover, were consistent with those
of electrons according to quantum theory. Because the particles of the two groups
had comparable initial energies, there was no reason to believe that the two groups
were simply electrons behaving differently at different energy-levels. The
penetrating particles, in other words, were not electrons.
(4) Some of the penetrating particles had an energy-level at which they would have
had, had they been protons, an ionization density three times that which was
recorded (the ionization density recorded for these particles was roughly that of an
electron). As a result, it could be inferred that the mass of the penetrating particles
must be smaller than that of a proton. In addition, because the penetrating particles
did not radiate as much as do electrons, their mass must be greater than that of an
electron.
Neddermeyer and Anderson's precise measurements of the energy-loss and ionization
density of the penetrating particles in their cloud chamber forced the conclusion, therefore,
that the particles were neither electrons nor protons, but were charged particles with a mass
intermediate between the two.
Street and Stevenson's research took a slightly different track (Galison, 1 987, 1 1 9ff.).
First, experiments performed by a student of theirs, L. Fussell, confirmed for them that the
Carlson-Oppenheimer analysis of particle showers was correct. 215 Confident that the
shower particles were electrons as modeled successfully by the Carlson-Oppenheimer
analysis, Street and Stevenson could focus on the penetrating particles. They built a double
cloud chamber, the upper chamber of which was fitted with an electromagnet, allowing
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Street and Stevenson to measure the momentum of particles. The lower chamber was fitted
with a series of lead plates, which allowed the two physicists to determine which particles
produced showers and which did not.
Street and Stevenson's photographs yielded two groups of particles, one of which
produced showers, and one of which did not. Moreover, the non-shower particles were ten
thousand times more likely to penetrate over 6 cm of lead. Street and Stevenson concluded
that the penetrating particles were not electrons. They, like Neddermeyer and Anderson,
also measured the ionization density of the penetrating particles, and concluded from their
measurements that the penetrating particles could not be protons, for their ionization rate
was much lower than that of protons.
Street and Stevenson had other reasons to believe the penetrating particles could not
be protons. First, their low and medium-energy penetrating particles had much greater
penetrating power than that of protons of comparable energies, as calculated by Bethe in his
Handbuch. In addition, Street and Stevenson found particles whose energies and ionization
densities indicated clearly that they were protons, but which penetrated no further than
Bethe said they should. It was evident that Street and Stevenson's penetrating particles were
neither protons nor electrons.
Street and Stevenson soon acquired an additional, powerful piece of evidence for
the existence of the new particle. Hoping to catch a penetrating particle coming to a stop in
their cloud chamber, they fitted one with counters that triggered expansion only when a
particle entering the chamber through one counter failed to exit the chamber through the
second. In the fall of 1937, their apparatus produced a picture of a dense, slightly curved
track of a penetrating particle coming to rest in the chamber. By measuring the ionization
density of the thick track, as well as its magnetic rigidity (a function of the force of the
electromagnetic field and the particle's momentum) Street and Stevenson were able to
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estimate the mass of the particle to be about 200 times the mass of an electron. This
picture, more than anything else, convinced most physicists of the existence of the charged
particle with intermediate mass (Galison, 1987, 122).
6.4 A Comparison of the Two Case Studies
Our two case studies differ in a number of important respects. First, the controversy
over IQ and race is a dispute about explanatory scope: Are genetic, developmental, social,
or other factors — all of which are recognized to be operative in determining intelligence —
most important in determining IQ test performance? The controversy over the nature of
cosmic radiation could also have been understood, at times, as a controversy of scope: Is
cosmic radiation photonic or particulate? If particulate, is it composed primarily of
electrons or protons? In the end, however, the controversy was resolved by a novel
addition to theory — the postulation of a new charged particle of intermediate mass — and
thus ultimately cannot be viewed as a controversy of explanatory scope. Second, the
controversy over IQ and race remains unresolved, though it has raged for over seventy
years. The dispute concerning the nature of penetrating cosmic radiation, on the other
hand, was resolved quickly and decisively by the cloud chamber experiments of Anderson
et al.
We now turn to theories of explanation, and ask: how useful are they in elucidating
explanatory controversies, and, in particular, the features of the controversies named above?
6.5 The Covering-Law Model and Explanatory Controversy in the History of Science
What can the Covering-Law model tell us about explanatory controversies? A
phenomenon is explained, on the Covering-Law model, if a statement describing the
phenomenon can be deduced from a set of true laws (some of which are empirical) in
203
conjunction with auxiliary statements of fact. This model suggests the following as potential
foci of explanatory controversy:
(1 ) the truth of the general laws and singular statements appearing in a proposed
explanatory deduction;
(2) the empirical content of some laws used in the deduction;
(3) the lawlikeness of the proposed laws;
(4) the validity of the rules of deductive logic used; and
(5) the appropriateness of the explanandum chosen.
Disagreements about the empirical content of laws or the validity of rules of logic are rare in
the history of science. On the other hand, the truth and lawlikeness of general laws 2 ' 6
,
and
the suitability of the explanandum 217
,
sometimes serve as objects of dispute in explanatory
controversies. But for other types of explanatory controversies and their resolution,
including the controversies over IQ and cosmic radiation, the Covering-Law model offers no
plausible explanation:
(1 ) From the standpoint of the Covering-Law model, once an explanandum, laws
(regularities), and auxiliary facts sufficient to construct a Covering-Law derivation of the
explanandum are settled, explanatory controversy should end; further explanatory pursuits
should be pointless. Yet the history of science is filled with controversies that have
flourished long after a covering-law derivation has been obtained. The acrimonious
controversy over the relation between race and IQ-test performance is a good example.
(Lawlike) correlations between average test scores and race, social class, and other features
are accepted by most parties to the debate. These laws suffice, moreover, to construct
covering-law explanations of differential test scores.
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Yet in spite of this, the controversy
about the explanation of IQ-test performance has continued unabated. It seems obvious
that the controversy rests on deep disagreements about the nature of the causal mechanisms
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connecting race and IQ-test performance, but the nature of these disagreements cannot be
captured by the Covering-Law Model.
(2) Under the Covering-Law model, one would expect scientists to resolve
explanatory controversy in the following way: Look for relevant regularities that can be
formulated into true laws. Then confirm the necessary auxiliary hypotheses, and construct
covering-law derivations of the phenomena in question.
In actual science, however, the search for regularities sometimes plays no role at all:
scientists try to understand the factors responsible for a phenomenon by observing single
cases of them in isolation under the artificial conditions of the experimental setup. The
cloud chamber experiments performed by Anderson et a/, present examples of this strategy.
Two aspects of their experiments are important for our argument. First, they sometimes
drew inferences from no more than a handful, or even single, photographs of particle trails.
If confirming a regularity was the goal, the inductive basis was weak, to say the least.
Second, the behavior they observed was obtained under unnatural conditions: the particles
were made to go through chambers of gas, powerful magnetic fields, and a variety of metal
plates as their behavior was photographed. If regularities were established in these
experiments, they are bound to such highly specialized conditions that the laws would be
inapplicable outside of the lab. Both of these features indicate that establishing regularities
was not the goal of the experiments.
This is not to deny, of course, that the experiments of Anderson et a/, were
repeatable, or that repeatability was a goal of the experiments. This fact might mislead
some into believing that the goal of the experiments was to establish regularities, for
repeatability seems to entail regularities. The experimental data were acquired under such
highly specialized conditions, however, that if we assume scientists understood them to be
indicative of a regularity, it would be a regularity useless outside of the investigators'
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specially designed cloud chambers .' 1
1
What would such a law of regularity look like? In
the case of Anderson et a/., one law might have this form: Whenever a particle of energy p
and charge z is able to penetrate more than y cm of lead, and if it is subjected to a
perpendicular magnetic field of strength g, then it will move along a path of curvature r.
Obviously, this law, which is perhaps true for particles inside of the experimentalists'
specialized cloud chambers, is of little use when conditions are other than energy p, charge
z, depth y, and force g. Yet lawlike regularities of this type are all that could be inferred
from the experimentalists' specialized setup.
Anderson et a/, did infer, nevertheless, that the properties of the mu-mesons in their
cloud chamber were like those of mu-mesons outside of their experimental setup. But this
inference is not an inference from one regularity (under experimental conditions) to another
(under natural conditions). Rather, they inferred from the experimental observations that a
particle with great penetrating power and light-ionization capacity exists, and that it has a
mass intermediate between that of an electron and that of a proton. Furthermore, they
assumed that other mu-mesons also have these capacities, no matter what the circumstances
in which they are found. Finally, the physicists also inferred that the penetrating and
ionizing behavior of cosmic radiation outside the lab was due to the mu-meson. This
inference was grounded on the experimentally confirmed knowledge that mu-mesons have
this capacity, as well as the belief that no other particle has capacities that could explain this
behavior.
The goal (and subsequent method) of Anderson et a/.'s experiments was not the
establishment of any regularity, nor were the important conclusions drawn by them about
lawlike regularities. The Covering-Law model thus cannot account for Anderson et a/.'s
approach to solving the explanatory difficulties of cosmic radiation, nor why their
experimental results resolved the explanatory controversy so decisively. The Covering-Law
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model's inability to do so, moreover, is clearly a result of its reliance on description of
lawlike regularities as the central component of explanation.
6.6 Pragmatic Theories of Explanation and Explanatory Controversy in the History of
Science
Van Fraassen's pragmatic theory of explanation rests on a theory of why-questions,
according to which explanatory answers must respect the why-question's topic, contrast
class, and relevance relation, all of which are a function of the questioner's intentions. This
theory would seem to sanction disagreements regarding only the intentions of questioners
(everything else is taken for granted), which has nothing to do with actual explanatory
controversy in the history of science. Van Fraassen's theory thus adds nothing to the
understanding of explanatory controversy and its resolution
.
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What about Sintonen's structuralist extension of the pragmatic approach? What
suggestions might it make concerning explanatory controversy? Sintonen argues that
explanatory relevance is fixed by sets of explanatory exemplars shared by a scientific
community. The search for explanation is motivated by unrealized theoretical
commitments to treat a domain of phenomena. Within the boundaries of a scientific
community, therefore, there would seem to be little room for explanatory controversy, for
the theoretical commitments that delineate explanatory relevance are given in advance and
shared by all members. Thus, it would seem that no more than minor skirmishes over the
explanatory scopes of theories could occur . 221
Between scientific communities, on the other hand, Sintonen's theory suggests that
deep explanatory disputes may occur, for different communities may be bound to
conflicting sets of theoretical commitments. Scientific controversies between groups with
different theoretical commitments certainly occur. In early nineteenth-century Europe, for
example, there arose an extended explanatory dispute in biological morphology, the most
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celebrated event of which was the famous series of debates between Geoffroy and Cuvier in
Paris (1830-1 832). 22 ' As is true of most great disputes, the significance of the Cuvier-
Geoffroy debate was multifaceted, and subsequent students have interpreted it in various
ways. But perhaps the most important point of controversy was a disagreement about the
correct approach to explaining biological form: Cuvier argued that biological form must be
explained by reference to the organism's functional requirements and, hence, to its
"conditions of existence" (environment). Geoffroy asserted, in turn, that biological form
could be explained by reference to sets of fundamental structural plans (Bauplane) and laws
of morphological change.
Though Sintonen's theory recognizes grounds on which explanatory controversy
between scientific groups can arise, it remains a mystery how such disputes can be settled.
Explanatory relevance is settled, on Sintonen's view, by the theoretical commitments
(paradigms) accepted by a given community. Hence, where there is a conflict between
paradigms, there is no basis on which to settle explanatory disputes. That is to say, there is
no scientific basis for conflict resolution, though there may be social or political bases.
In truth, there is one way to settle such disputes: by the victory of one paradigm
over another. But this requires broad changes in the theoretical outlook of the capitulating
scientists, and such changes can occur only slowly, given the power attributed to theoretical
commitments by Sintonen (and by the progenitor of his theory, Kuhn). There are episodes
in the history of science, however, in which explanatory conflict is settled decisively within
a short period of time. The explanation of the penetrating component of cosmic radiation
provides a good example: disputes about the nature of cosmic radiation that had persisted
for decades were resolved quickly by the experimental work of Anderson et at. in 1937.
The dispute was settled, moreover, on the basis of a relatively small amount of experimental
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evidence concerning the nature of the penetrating radiation. 223 Sintonen's theory cannot
account for the quickness and decisiveness with which this controversy was resolved.
Sintonen s theory has other difficulties, as well. Sometimes explanatory controversy
can be resolved by the introduction of a new theory, or the theoretical expansion of existing
theory. But explanation by the introduction of new entities and their properties cannot be
understood as fulfilling pre-existing theoretical commitments, as conceived by Sintonen.
Again, the discovery and acceptance of the mu-meson as the explanation of the penetrating
component of cosmic radiation presents an illustration. On Sintonen's account, the
acceptance of the mu-meson as an explanation of cosmic radiation phenomena is
unintelligible, for there was no theory of the mu-meson prior to 1937.
This is not to say that when a new theory is introduced and immediately recognized
as having explanatory force, that it does not in some way meet pre-existing expectations. It
was no doubt comforting to physicists to learn that the main component of cosmic
radiation, for example, was indeed a charged particle, as many had suspected. But if pre-
existing commitments or criteria are satisfied in this and similar cases, they are much more
general and diffuse that the commitments associated with any well-defined theory.
6.7 Kitcher's Unification Theory and Explanatory Controversy in the History of
Science
If Kitcher's theory of scientific explanation were correct, what would be the nature
of explanatory controversy, and how would scientists proceed to settle their disagreements?
The answers to these questions depend upon whether or not the controversy involves the
potential for theoretical change.
Controversy can occur without the threat of significant theoretical change: a variety
of factors may be known to produce the phenomenon in question, though scientists remain
unsure which factor is responsible in a set of particular cases. Debates about the nature of a
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poorly understood disease, for example, might focus on a number of well-known factors —
genes, viruses, bacteria, inorganic toxins, etc. — with each potential factor having its own
champion in the debate. Such controversies may be said to concern the explanatory scope
of accepted theories.
The historical episodes detailed above include examples of this type. In 1 930, the
explanatory problem of cosmic radiation might have been posed this way: Is cosmic
radiation due to photonic or particulate rays? If particulate, do the rays consist primarily of
electrons or protons? All sides were vigorously defended, and lively controversies resulted,
the best known of which was perhaps the Millikan-Compton dispute. 224 The controversy
engendered by Gould and Lewontin's (1984) critique of the adaptationist programme is also
one of explanatory scope: the debate concerns the extent to which evolutionary
phenomena are to be explained by natural selection, genetic drift, pleiotropy, allometry, or
other mechanisms of evolutionary change, all of are already recognized as occurring in
nature.
In controversies concerning explanatory scope, significant theoretical change is not
at issue: the opposing explanations all instantiate explanatory patterns that are already
accepted members of the explanatory store, to put the point in the terms of Kitcher's theory.
As a result, the unifying power of the explanatory store remains the same no matter which
hypothesis turns out to be the correct explanation. Controversies concerning explanatory
scope therefore cannot be said to be founded on disagreements about the unifying power of
alternative hypotheses, nor can they be resolved by considerations of unifying power.
22 ’
What about the other class of cases, where one or more of the competing
explanatory hypotheses is of a novel type, and thereby threatens theoretical change?
226
Kitcher's theory seems more at home here than in controversies of explanatory scope, and it
brings a ready answer to the question: explanatory controversy arises over the respective
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unifying powers of the alternative explanatory stores associated with each explanatory
hypothesis. Controversy is settled, moreover, when a (global) comparison of the stores of
patterns associated with each competitor hypothesis reveals a decisive difference in paucity
and stringency of patterns or wealth of consequences. Thus, we might expect scientists to
pursue controversy by streamlining their theories into structures with fewer basic
assumptions, and by seeking out new sources of data that may be shown to be a
consequence of one theory (explanatory pattern) but not of the other.
This proposal, though plausible in some cases, accounts for neither the way in
which many controversies are pursued, nor the manner in which they are resolved:
(a) A major problem for Kitcher's theory, already touched on above, is that it cannot
account for the swift resolution of explanatory controversies via the introduction of novel
explanatory hypotheses. Novel theories are sometimes unifying, but more often they are
diversifying. They introduce new entities and/or new properties, and with these come new
patterns of explanation. So long as there is no previously accepted pattern that is
completely replaced by the new one, the number of patterns in the explanatory store will
inevitably increase with the acceptance of the new theory. Thus, even if the new pattern
increases the total number of phenomenon covered by the explanatory store, the total
unifying power of the store is not improved.
If Kitcher's theory were correct, scientists should be ambivalent about resolving
explanatory controversies through the acceptance of novel (diversifying) explanatory
hypotheses. Yet many cases in the history of science exhibit the decisive resolution of
controversy through the acceptance of a novel theory — even though the unifying power
associated with the theory was ambiguous, at best. The early history of particle physics is a
case in point. Of this period, Brown and Hoddeson write:
Although the positron discovery of August 1932 was a validation of Dirac's
theory, that particle (and the neutron, neutrino, and meson) totally
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destroyed the synthesis that appeared to be at hand in 1 930. As Millikan
said: "Prior to the night of 2 August, 1 932, the fundamental building-stones
of the physical world had been universally supposed to be simply protons
and negative-electrons." Progress in the 1930s, and the next few decades,
would lie not in unification of forces and a reduction in the number of
elements but rather in diversification — in the discovery of new particles, in
the enlargement of the particle concept, and in the recognition of new
nuclear forces, both strong and weak. 227
The discovery of the mu-meson is an exemplary case in which explanatory
controversy was resolved via the (non-unifying) diversification of theory, namely, the
expansion of quantum electrodynamics to include a charged particle of mass intermediate
between that of a proton and of an electron. The acceptance of the mu-meson as the
penetrating component of cosmic radiation was, moreover, quick and decisive.
Kitcher s theory cannot sanction the acceptance of the mu-meson as an explanation.
It was a new particle with a previously unknown constellation of properties. Moreover,
while its competitor explanatory hypotheses (the electron and proton hypotheses) promised
to unify the phenomena of cosmic radiation with hosts of other well-known phenomena,
the mu-meson hypothesis explained only the penetrating component of cosmic radiation.
The acceptance of the mu-meson is thus inconsistent with Kitcher's view that explanatory
decisions are made on grounds of unifying power.
One could argue that the introduction of the mu-meson did not really diversify
theory, in the sense that new basic explanatory patterns were added to the explanatory
store. In many places, Kitcher suggests that the basic explanatory patterns of the
explanatory store are extremely general, e.g., a "mechanical corpuscular" pattern, or an
"origin-and-development" pattern. 228 Kitcher's frequent move to extremely generic patterns
suggests a means of handling the case of the mu-meson. Kitcher could argue that the mu-
meson brought with it no patterns of explanation that could not be fit into a pre-existing
general pattern, one which we might call the "physical particulate" pattern of explanation,
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according to which phenomena are explained in terms of the properties (e.g., mass and
charge) of micro-particles.
In 1 937, the mu-meson explanation of penetrating cosmic radiation no doubt fit a
general pattern in which physical phenomena were explained in terms of the mass and
charge of micro-particles — but this "general pattern" is not the kind of pattern described by
Kitcher s theory of explanation. A pattern," in Kitcher's theory, is much more specific: it
contains a set of schematic premises, a set of explicit filling instructions for those premises,
and a logical ordering of premises. To cover the mu-meson explanations, the kind of
schematic pattern envisaged by Kitcher's theory would have to contain the claim that there
is a charged particle of intermediate mass — but there could be no such claim before
Anderson et a/.'s discoveries. 229
Putting this criticism aside, a further problem presents itself. If Kitcher were to argue
that the mu-meson explanation of the penetrating component of cosmic radiation
instantiated a "particulate pattern" of explanation, and thus that the discovery of the mu-
meson brought with it no explanatory novelty, then the controversy resolved by the
discovery of the mu-meson is transformed into a controversy of explanatory scope, i.e., as a
controversy between proponents of accepted photonic and particulate patterns. We have
already seen, however, that Kitcher's theory has nothing to say about controversies of
explanatory scope: the theory provides no reason to expect controversies of explanatory
scope to occur, and no grounds on which they can be resolved. Even if Kitcher can show
us the schematic pattern that the mu-meson explanation could be said to instantiate,
therefore, this move does nothing to explain both the existence of controversy and the
nature of its resolution.
(b) If the preceding conclusion is correct, then there must be grounds for accepting
explanatory hypotheses that are not among Kitcher's criteria of unifying power. This is
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evident, I suggest, in the weighing of evidence in favor of explanatory hypotheses: evidence
is often weighed locally, not globally, and not all evidence is accorded equal weight.
If Kitcher's theory were correct, all experimental evidence (i.e., all the consequences
of explanatory patterns) should be weighted equally, for unifying power is a function only
of the numbers (and not type) of confirmed experimental consequences. Yet sometimes a
minuscule amount of evidence of the right kind (minuscule, at least, when measured against
the general wealth of empirical data) suffices for a swift and decisive resolution of
controversy.
Consider the case of the mu-meson. Prior to 1 937, there was a great deal of
empirical evidence that was consistent with both the electron and proton explanations of
the penetrating particles. 2J0 Yet a small series of experiments performed in 1937 by
Neddermeyer and Anderson, and Street and Stevenson — especially a single photograph of
a stopping particle in Street and Stevenson's cloud chamber — convinced the scientific
community that a new particle, the mu-meson, was the penetrating component of cosmic
radiation. Decisive for this conviction was not the wealth of undifferentiated, confirmed,
empirical consequences, but the special nature of the experimental evidence. In particular,
the experiments' ability to distinguish electrons, protons, and a new particle as explanatory
possibilities was decisive. To take one example of the scientists' reasoning, Anderson,
Neddermeyer, and others had long argued that the radiative losses of the penetrating
particles observed were inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory for electrons.
But the penetrating particles also had energies much higher than anything previously seen.
Thus, there remained the possibility that the penetrating particles were high-energy
electrons, and that high-energy electrons simply radiate differently than do those with low-
energy. Neddermeyer and Anderson's experiments in 1937 were designed explicitly to rule
out this possibility. They measured the energy losses of two groups of particles, shower
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particles and penetrating particles, at the same energy. The energy losses of the first group
were consistent with those described by theory for electrons, while those of the second
group were not. Hence, they concluded — as did the majority of physicists' — that the
penetrating particles could not be electrons. This is only one example of the many ways in
which Neddermeyer and Anderson, and Street and Stevenson, carefully designed their
experiments to yield decisive data. The resulting evidence showed that only one plausible
hypothesis could explain their data — that postulating the existence of a charged particle of
intermediate mass.
If Kitcher's theory were correct, the small amounts of empirical data — no more than
a few sets of photographs taken under highly specialized conditions in cloud chambers —
would not have weighed heavily against the wealth of prior experimental data. The weight
of the new evidence of 1937 diminishes further when one considers that the hypothesis it
favors — the existence of a new particle — competed with hypotheses that promised to
unify the penetrating particle phenomenon with hosts of other phenomenon caused by
electrons or protons. If Kitcher's theory were true, therefore, the evidence of 1 937 could
not have resolved decisively the dispute concerning the nature of the penetrating
component of cosmic radiation — and certainly not in favor of a new particle. But a
decisive resolution was indeed the outcome.
Kitcher's theory also misreads the path taken from experimental evidence to the
conclusion that the mu-meson is the penetrating component of cosmic radiation, and that its
existence explains a variety of phenomena both inside and outside the lab. Good
experimental data tell scientists what is happening in the specialized experimental
apparatus employed. This is the primary significance of experimental evidence. Any
inferences made to the global level, e.g., about the unifying power of general explanatory
hypotheses, are secondary. For example, Street and Stevenson's photographs provide
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evidence, first and foremost, of what happened in their cloud chamber - not of whether
electrons, protons, or other particles explain cosmic radiation in general. Only after they
were certain that the ion trail in their chamber was caused by a new particle of intermediate
mass, could they consider the broader implications of the evidence for the explanation of
cosmic radiation. Local explanation — and the experimental evidence thereof — is often
prior to global considerations.
If Kitcher's theory were correct, the line of reasoning would be exactly the reverse:
to accept the explanatory force of the mu-meson hypothesis, it would have to be judged
that the complete explanatory store of science would be better unified if the mu-meson
hypothesis were accepted. Only then could we know that the existence of a new particle
explains what happened in the cloud chambers of Anderson, Neddermeyer, Street, and
Stevenson. This description fails to fit the facts.
(c) There are cases in which a new and promising theory has had great unifying
power, yet has been considered by scientists to be unexplanatory. I will cite only theories
that have impressive unifying power on an intuitive level, and which have been accepted
by Kitcher as examples of powerfully unifying theories. 231 The two cases I have in mind are
Newton's theory of universal gravitation, and Darwin's theory of natural selection.
Finocchiaro (1980) and Mischel (1966) argue convincingly that Newton's
hypothesis of gravitation was widely viewed to be unintelligible because action-at-a-
distance could not be understood in then-current mechanical terms. 232 As a result, many
scientists of Newton's time — and perhaps even Newton himself — considered the theory to
provide an accurate, precise statement of a multitude of empirical regularities, but to fail as
an explanation of the phenomena (Mischel, 40-1). Newton apparently wavered between
two alternative views of his theory: sometimes he viewed his theory as an incomplete
explanation; other times he denied that the theory was an explanation at all (239ff.).
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Finocchiaro argues further that gravity was accepted as intelligible only much later, and that
intelligibility was won as a result of a long historical process in which abstract,
mathematical theory was gradually embraced as intelligible in itself, without the
requirement that it be articulated or explained in mechanical terms. 233 Yet no one - even
critics of Newton's theory such as Huygens - denied the great unifying power of Newton's
laws. These scientific judgments are inconsistent with Kitcher's account of explanation.
Kitcher has also cited Darwin's theory of natural selection as an example of a theory
whose potential unifying power was widely recognized (Kitcher, 1981). Indeed, scientists
worried, remarks Kitcher, that its explanatory scope was too great: some scientists
complained that any conclusion could be adapted to its premises. But recent historical
studies have emphasized the great reluctance of scientists to accept Darwin's theory of
natural selection as an explanation of adaptations or of other phenomena: it is now
generally agreed that natural selection was not widely accepted until the so-called
evolutionary synthesis of the 1 920s and 1 930s. 234 Indeed, some commentators around the
turn of the century declared natural selection to be dead as a theory. Darwin's theory thus
initially failed as an explanation, despite its great unifying power.
6.8 Explanatory Controversy and the Causal Theory of Explanation
Positivist theories of explanation thus fail to account for a variety of aspects of
explanatory controversy. Once the laws, explanatory paradigms or patterns, or intentions of
questioners are settled, positivist theories cannot say why explanatory controversy should
continue, though it often does. From the other side, positivist theories cannot say why
explanatory controversies should be resolved through the introduction of small amounts of
empirical evidence acquired under the highly specialized conditions of an experimental
setup, especially when the evidence supports belief in the existence of novel entities,
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properties, or processes. These problems, and others, came out clearly in our discussion of
the controversies over IQ and cosmic radiation.
In comparison to positivist theories, the causal theory of explanation illuminates the
historical cases with ease. In the controversy over race and IQ, both Jensen and Lewontin
accept the validity of the statistical correlations between race and IQ test performance.
They strongly disagree, however, about the nature of the causal process that determines IQ
test performance, as well as the connection between IQ and race. Is the mechanism
genetic, social, or environmental? The parties agree that genetic, social, and environmental
factors are all operative in the intellectual development and resulting IQ-test performance of
individuals. They disagree about the relative causal importance of these factors, however,
as well as on the programmatic conclusions that should be drawn from our limited
knowledge of the causal mechanisms. The causal theory thus explains why the controversy
should have continued, although the statistical correlations are assumed to be
incontrovertible.
The causal theory can also account for the quick and decisive resolution of the
controversy about penetrating cosmic radiation. The controversy was resolved, remember,
by the postulation of a new particle, the mu-meson, which was supported by a series of
cloud chamber experiments performed by Anderson et a/. From the perspective of the
causal theory, Anderson et a/.'s experiments were successful because they were carefully
designed so that specific causal capacities of the new particles could be observed in
operation in the cloud chamber.
The fact that the controversy was resolved neither through the establishment of a
regularity, nor a discovery that fit pre-established explanatory patterns or paradigms, does
not trouble the causal theory. Scientists go looking for causal explanations by analyzing
causal processes into components, isolating these components in the controlled conditions
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of an experiment, and observing the resulting behavior. According to the causal theory of
explanation, causal capacities in operation can be observed directly in single cases, without
the assumption of prior explanatory laws, patterns, or paradigms that describe the causes.
Once the operation of a cause can be convincingly isolated and observed in the lab, the
scientist can confidently attribute the associated causal capacity to the entity observed, and
assume that the capacity will be carried to other situations outside the lab as well. This is
what Anderson et a/, did in their cloud chamber experiments. They were able to isolate, in
their cloud chambers, a particle exhibiting great penetrating and light-ionizing behavior,
and were able to infer from their data that the particle could be neither an electron nor
proton. Furthermore, they were able to measure the new particle's mass with some
precision, and attribute this mass to the new particle. Finally, they inferred that this particle
was responsible for the behavior of some cosmic radiation outside the lab, again because
they were able to rule out alternative potential causes. The causal theory thus explains
quite nicely the resolution engendered by Anderson et a/.'s experiments.
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NOTES
1 . The focus of this paper is the understanding and explanation of natural phenomena. It is
clear that other kinds of understanding are important to science. Some examples include:
understanding a theory, an experimental technique, or a theoretical deduction. It is equally
obvious that these types of understanding are associated with respective kinds of
explanation (e.g., explaining a technique, a theory, etc.). In this paper, I am not concerned
with these other kinds of understanding and explanation, nor do I think there is reason to
believe that a theory of scientific explanation must include them within its scope.
2. All biconditionals and equations, for example, are logically symmetrical.
3. The ongoing debate about the origins of intelligence is such a controversy. A good
example of the latter is the theory of inheritance: debates about the nature and mechanism
of inheritance, which had endured for centuries, were resolved in decisive stages between
1 885 and the 1 950s.
4. See Hume (1 739) and (1 748).
5. This is not to say that the terrain in philosophy of science has not changed over two
centuries. What we have seen, in fact, is a very gradual turning away from Hume, the
details of which will be rehearsed below.
6. Other requirements, of course, may have to be met; for example, neo-positivists often
add conditions designed to capture explanatory asymmetries.
Neo-positivist accounts of explanation include Hempel's Covering-Law model,
Salmon's S-R model, and Friedman's and Kitcher's unificationist theories.
7. Cartwright (1989) and (1992). Cartwright views her ideas about causal knowledge to be
a development, in some respects, of the Aristotelian conception of science (1 992).
8. My intellectual debts to Cartwright and others has a further consequence that I wish to
emphasize at this point. Although the causal theory I defend was inspired by Aristotle's
theory of explanation, the theory is not Aristotelian, for it relies on modern developments in
the theory of science, including Cartwright's account of causal knowledge. The differences
between the causal theory I defend and Aristotle's views are discussed in detail in section
4.2.4.
9. The historical survey to follow should not be presumed to be complete. Though I think it
to be of interest, what follows is, at this point, only the bare beginnings of a plausible
historical story for which I have gathered some evidence.
1 0. This is an altered version of Ian Hacking's description of the six key ideas underlying
positivism (1983, 41ff.).
1 1 . See Wolff (1960) on Hume's theory of mental propensities.
1 2. Some evidence for this will be presented in Chapter V.
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13. Cf. Mach (1883/1976, 457ff.).
14. See Mach (1883/1976, 458ff.).
1 5. These are not the only pragmatic virtues of theories. Mach argues, for example, that
theories are tailored to the interests of scientists, i.e., theories are always an abstraction of
those aspects of the facts of interest to us, and an abstraction from those that are not.
1 6. These two philosophers deserve to be called Humean positivists because they accepted
the six doctrines of Humean positivism listed above; in addition, they hold a conception of
theories similar to that just described.
1 7. See Duhem (1914/1954), especially chapter 1
.
1 8. This proposal — that one goal of explanation is to achieve a stable, unified conception
of nature — has been pursued at length by Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1976, 1981, and
1989).
19. Here I follow Ayer's remarks in the introduction to Ayer (1959, 1 0ff.).
20. See, for example, Schlick (1930/31), reprinted in Ayer (1959), pp. 53-59, and Ayer's
introduction to the same volume.
21 . My discussion of the logical positivist criterion of significance follows those of Hempel
(1950), reprinted in Ayer (1 959, 108ff.)and Scheffler (1 961
,
133ff.)
It should be noted that I use the term, "proposition," loosely and interchangeably
with "statement," "sentence," etc. "Proposition" thus implies nothing about the significance
of the statement.
22. See Hempel (1950), reprinted in Ayer (1959). My citations are from the reprint in Ayer
(1959).
23. The same criticism applies to a requirement of complete falsifiability.
24. Hempel and Oppenheim also cite Mill, Jevons (1 924), Ducasse (1925), Hull (1943),
Hospers (1 946), and Feigl (1945) as important predecessors to the view of explanation they
develop.
Karl Popper was perhaps the first neo-positivist to pursue a theory of explanation as
theoretical treatment. Not surprisingly, he also promoted the view that the significance of
theories transcends that of observation.
Popper, like many philosophers who were to follow him, refused to accept the
Humean prohibition against causes and causal explanation in science. Unlike many
subsequent philosophers of science, however, he did not believe that causation could be
reduced to laws of regular association, nor did he believe that causal explanation in science
could be reduced to theoretical treatment (Popper, 1934/1959, 61). Nonetheless, he
accounts for explanation in terms of theoretical treatment:
To give a causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement which
describes it, using as premises of the deduction one or more universal laws,
together with certain singular statements, the initial conditions. For
example, we can say that we have given a causal explanation of the
breaking of a certain piece of thread if we have found that the thread has a
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tensile strength of 1 lb. and that a weight of 2 lbs. was put on it. If we
analyze this causal explanation we shall find several constituent parts. On
the one hand there is the hypothesis: 'Whenever a thread is loaded with a
weight exceeding that which characterizes the tensile strength of the thread,
then it will break'; a statement which has the character of a universal law of
nature. On the other hand we have singular statements (in this case two)
which apply only to the specific event in question: 'The weight
characteristic for this thread is 1 lb.'
,
and The weight put on this thread was
2 lbs.'.
We have thus two different kinds of statements, both of which are
necessary ingredients of a complete causal explanation. They are (1)
universal statements
,
i.e., hypotheses of the character of natural laws, and
(2) singular statements, which apply to the specific event in question and
which I shall call initial conditions'. It is from universal statements in
conjunction with initial conditions that we deduce the singular statement,
This thread will break'. We call this statement a specific or singular
prediction (1934/1959, 59-60).
It is this view of explanation that Hempel later developed and clarified, and although
Popper was perhaps first to characterize explanation as deduction from general laws
combined with antecedent particular facts, it is Hempel's formulation of this view that has
dominated subsequent discussions of explanation. For this reason, Hempel's account — the
Covering-Law Model of explanation — is the focus of our discussion.
25. Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, p.136.
26. Hempel and Oppenheim 1 948. The authors formulate these conditions in the logically
more rigorous terms of a model formal language, but we will stick to the their informal
account.
27. Hempel and Oppenheim concede that the concept of a "purely qualitative" predicate is
vague. Its mention as a constraint on the formulation of laws serves merely as a reminder
that problems developed by Goodman (1983, especially pp.72ff.) must be dealt with to
achieve a satisfactory account. Roughly, Hempel and Oppenheim wish to rule out the use
of predicates, e.g., "grue" (the meaning of which is "is green before time t and is blue after
t), that do not pick out natural kinds.
28. See "Aspects of scientific explanation" in Hempel (1 965). I use the name "covering-law
model" as an umbrella term covering all of Hempel's models, including the D-N and l-S
models.
29. Criticism of the D-N and l-S models of explanation can be found in many places; some
of the more important sources are Scriven (1 958, 1 962, 1 975); Eberle, Kaplan, and
Montague (1961); Scheffler (1961); Bromberger (1966); Salmon (1971); and Cartwright
(1983). What follows makes use of these sources and others.
30. The problem they consider is that raised by Goodman 1 954/1983.
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Or one may see the problem of relevance as being a problem of selecting the relevant law
from a set of lawlike suitors.
32. This criticism has been pursued by Scriven (1962, 1975) and Cartwright (1980, 1981).
33. This is true of causal laws, I will argue below, only if causal laws are read as regularities.
If causal laws are read as capacity ascriptions, on the other hand, they can be accepted as
true.
34. This example is taken from Cartwright (1992).
35. I use the term "narrative explanations" in a broad sense: it refers to any explanation in
which the fact-to-be-explained is not inferred from the explanatory information provided.
36. Later I will argue that laws like (P) are best understood as capacity ascriptions, as which
they can be taken to be true. Capacity ascriptions do not provide premises, however, from
which one can deduce the occurrences of actual events, as the Covering-Law Model
requires. Thus, although reading laws as capacity ascriptions will allow one to certify
scientific laws as being true, it will be of no help in satisfying the deductive requirement of
the Covering-Law Model of explanation.
37. Examples have been discussed by Scriven, Jeffrey (1969), van Fraassen (1980), and
Salmon (1984).
38. Hempel develops his distinction between D-N explanations and statistical (l-S)
explanations in "Aspects of scientific explanation" in Hempel (1965).
39. See Hempel (1 965), 41 2ff. The kinds of explanation treated as being incomplete are to
be distinguished from inductive-statistical explanations, which, while also being non-
deductive, are so because they rest on statistical premises describing events of an
indeterminate nature, i.e., in which no amount of added information will allow one to
deduce the explanandum.
40. Kim (1 963) argues that the difficulties presented by Eberle et a/, can be avoided by
placing restrictions on the accessory conditions (C) allowed as premises in the deduction of
the explanandum from laws.
41 . Troublesome counterexamples can be generated without end. Consider the following
three testable, true laws:
(1) the Pythagorean Theorem;
(2) all men who take birth control pills fail to get pregnant;
(3) all emeralds are green.
These laws can be employed to derive (to "explain," according to the Covering-Law Model)
the following claims:
(1
') The distance between the earth and the sun is 93 million miles.
(2') Jim failed to get pregnant.
(3') This emerald is green.
It is obvious that the deductive arguments imagined here cannot be accepted as
explanatory, although they would satisfy the requirements of the Covering-Law Model.
42. The example is taken from Barnes (1992).
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43. The example discussed by Hempel is that of the derivation of a pendulum's length from
its period (Hempel, 1965, 352).
44. In addition, I am suspicious of those who wish to draw a sharp distinction between
scientific and everyday understanding: the contrast between the two domains of
understanding lies not in explanatory approach, I submit, but in differences in precision,
sophistication, and most importantly, the mathematical and technological tools brought to
bear on the problems.
45. Darwin (1962), p.476, quoted in Thagard (1978).
46. In general, an inference to the best explanation refers to an inference from the
explanatory power of the theory to its truth.
47. In considering historical examples in which considerations of unification seem to play a
role, it is important to distinguish three sorts of appeals to unifying power:
(1) potential unification as an impetus of theory construction: the promise of
unifying power can lead scientists to construct theories of a certain type; e.g., the
success of Newtonian mechanics led scientists in many fields to pursue mechanical-
corpuscular theories of all kinds of phenomena;
(2) unifying power as criterion of theory acceptance; this is one sort of appeal made
by Darwin in the passage above; and
(3) unifying power as criterion of the explanatory power of a theory.
(3) is our only genuine concern in this paper.
48. Van Fraassen's theory is discussed in the next section of this paper, and will not be
discussed in connection with Kitcher's account.
49. See Kitcher (1976). The "essence of scientific explanation," according Friedman, is that
science increases our understanding of the world by reducing the total
number of independent phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or
given. A world with fewer independent phenomena is, other things equal,
more comprehensible than one with more (1974, 1 5).
As an example of a unifying theory, Friedman offers the kinetic theory of gases:
Where we once had three independent brute facts-that gases approximately
obey the Boyle-Charles law, that they obey Graham's law, and that they
have the specific-heat capacities they do-we now have only one-that
molecules obey the laws of mechanics. Furthermore, the kinetic theory of
gases allows us to integrate the behavior of gases with other phenomena,
such as the motions of the planets and of falling bodies near the
earth. ..because the laws of mechanics also permit us to derive both the fact
that planets obey Kepler's laws and the fact that falling bodies obey Galileo's
laws (14-1 5).
At the center of Friedman's account is the idea that explanatory laws "reduce the number of
independent phenomena." Friedman conceives this reduction as the logical reduction of a
set of lawlike sentences by another, smaller set of laws.
50. Kitcher's emphasis on seeing familiar patterns in previously unfamiliar phenomena is
reminiscent of the view of Ernst Mach, cited above.
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5 1 . Kitcher (1 989, 434). Kitcher cites two other properties required for the best
systematization. First, the derivation patterns of E(K) must be acceptable relative to K: every
premise of every derivation must be a member of K, and each derivation must be
deductively valid. Second, E(K) must be complete with respect to K: every derivation that is
acceptable relative to K
,
and which instantiates a pattern in E(K), must be contained in the
set D of derivations produced by E(K). The importance of this condition, says Kitcher,
is to debar explanatory deviants who use patterns selectively. If someone claims
that an argument instantiating a particular pattern explains why Mars follows the
trajectory it does, admits that there is an acceptable derivation instantiating the same
pattern that will yield as its conclusion a description of the trajectory of Venus, but
refuses to allow the latter derivation as explanatory, then. ..that person has
incoherent vies about explanation" (Kitcher, 1989, 434).
The feasibility of this condition depends, of course, on the rules for instantiating patterns.
On Kitcher's rules, see below.
52. Kitcher concluded from this that no fewer laws appear in Newtonian explanantia than
in explananda. Hence, explanantia do not reduce the number of laws appearing in
explananda, contra Friedman.
53. Kuhn (1 970), pp.43-51
,
187-191. Where Kuhn discusses the schematic character of
scientific laws such as Newton's second law, and the process by which young scientists
come to understand the scientific theories they are taught, his fundamental thrust belies the
conception of filling instructions as explicit and complete rules for replacing dummy
variables. Kuhn argues that acquiring an adequate understanding of some theoretical
achievement in science has little to do with learning any set of rules. Rather, students are
forced to struggle to solve a series of related problems. Through such exercises, a student,
with our without the help of an instructor, comes to see a variety of situations as being
similar in certain respects. Once he or she has grasped the similarities, he or she is then
able to relate, as do scientists in his or her field, the symbols of the scientific theory to
nature, and thus apply the theory to solve problems. This kind of learning, argues Kuhn, is
not achievable by verbal means, e.g., by learning rules. Moreover, the knowledge acquired
through this process always remains partly tacit; it cannot, in other words, be fully
articulated.
A look above at the Darwinian explanatory scheme illustrates this point. Consider
the filling instruction, "replace... E with a characterization of the environment in which
members of C* lived." Imagine how one might write a rule that dictates the content of
characterizations of the environment. Every environment exhibits an indefinite number of
properties, only a subset of which are relevant to any given organism; moreover, the subsets
of relevant environmental properties obviously differ for distinct populations of organisms.
Clearly, a set of rules for characterizing the environments of ancestral organisms cannot be
written. Just as obviously, biologists do describe the relevant properties of environments
when constructing adaptation (natural selection) explanations. How do they acquire the
ability to do this? The manner of acquisition described by Kuhn seems feasible: through an
extended process of professional training, which includes learning about specific kinds of
habitats (which requires time in the field) and how to apply ecological theory to exemplary
problems in the ecology of organisms (especially the ecology of those organisms of special
interest to the biologist), the biologist acquires an understanding of the aspects of
environments that are relevant to the development and reproductive success of various
organisms. This understanding of environments is knowledge that is not fully articulated by
any set of rules: when one goes into the field to study the environment of some group of
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organisms, there is no complete and explicit set of rules that may be applied to determine
which aspects of the environment are relevant. Kuhn's point is thus not simply that no
young scientist, as a matter of fact, comes to understand a theory by learning any set of
explicit rules for applying a theoretical scheme of explanation. His conclusion is deeper:
that the knowledge acquired by the student is not constituted, nor fully described, by any
such set of explicit rules.
54. Perhaps this is the reason for Kitcher's deductive chauvinism, i.e., he believes that
counting can be done only if the patterns are deductively valid. But it seems to me that
non-deductive classifications would allow one to count consequences just as easily.
55. Separately, one might ask whether complete and explicit filling instructions can ever be
formulated. See note 9.
56. Kitcher offers the following formal criteria with which to judge the comparative
unifying power of sets of explanatory patterns:
(C) Let U, U' be sets of patterns, and S, S' their complete instantiations with respect
to K. Then U has greater unifying power than U' if one (or both) of the following
conditions is met:
(Cl) The consequence set of S', C(S') is a subset of the consequence set of S, C(S),
and there is a one-to-one mapping f from S to S' such that for each pattern p in S, p
is at least as stringent as f(p), and such that either f is an injection or f is a
surjection and there is at least one pattern p in S such that p is more stringent than
f(p).
(C2) C(S') is a proper subset of C(S) and there is a one-one map f from S to S'
(injection or surjection) such that for each p in S, p is at least as stringent as f(p)
(p.478).
The consequence set of S is the set of conclusions of all instantiations in S (434). (Cl) says
that the U has greater unifying power than U' if: (i) U ' s consequence set is at least as large;
(ii) the number of explanatory patterns in U is less than or equal to the number of patterns in
U'; and (iii) the explanatory patterns in U are more stringent than those in U'. (C2) says that
U has greater unifying power than U' if (i) U's consequence set is larger than that of U'; (ii)
the number of explanatory patterns in U is less than or equal to the number of patterns in
(J'; and (iii) the explanatory patterns in U are as stringent as those in U'.
57. The formal version of the these conditions are as follows:
(T) Let <s,/> be a pair whose first member is a schematic sentence and
whose second member is a complete filling instruction for that sentence,
and let <s',/'> be another such pair. Suppose that s and s' have a common
logical form. Let g be the mapping that takes each nonlogical expression (or
schematic letter) is s to the nonlogical expression (or schematic letter) in the
corresponding place in s'. For any schematic letter t occurring in s, <s,/> is
tighter than <s',/’> with respect to t just in case the set of substitution
instances that / allows for t is a proper subset of the set of substitution
instances that /' allows for g(t); <s,i> is at least as tight as <s ,/ > with
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respect to t just in case the set of substitution instances that / allows for t is a
subset of the set of substitution instances that /' allows for g(t). <s,i> is
tighter than <s ,/ > just in case (i) for every schematic letter occurring in s,
<s,i> is at least as tight as <s',/'> with respect to that schematic letter, (ii)
there is at least one schematic letter occurring in s with respect to which
<s,i> is tighter than <s ,/ > or there is a nonlogical expression e occurring
in s such that g(e) is a schematic letter, and (iii) for every schematic letter t
occurring in s, g(t) is a schematic letter. If only conditions (i) and (ii) are
satisfied, then <s,/> is at least as tight as <s’,/'>.
Let p, p' be general arguments patterns sharing the same
classification. Let <p
),...,p„> and <p' ;/ ...,p'n > be the sequence of
schematic sentences and filling instructions belonging to p and p',
respectively. Then p is more stringent than p' if for each / (1 <_ j <_ n), p
(
is
at least as tight as p \ and there is a k such that p k is tighter than p\
(R) Let p, p' be general argument patterns such that the sequence of
schematic sentences and filling instructions of p is <p„...,p n > and the
sequence of schematic sentences and filling instructions of p' is
<p„...,p
r/ q (,...,qvpr+ „....,p n >. Suppose that the classifications differ only in
that for p one or more of the pr+i is to be obtained from previous members of
the sequence by derivations involving some further principles of a general
kind, C, while for p' that (or those) pr+l are to be obtained from the same
earlier members of the sequence and from some of the qk by specified
inferential transitions. Suppose further that in each case of difference the set
of subderivations allowed by p' is a subset of the set of subderivations
allowed by p, and that in at least one case the relation is that of proper
inclusion. Then p' is more stringent than p (479-480).
58. These concerns are discussed in Kitcher 1981, §8. Page references are taken from the
reprint of this article in Pitt 1 988.
59. This problem is analogous to that mentioned by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948, 1 59,
n.28), and discussed by Friedman (1974, 16ff.).
60. For an important discussion of this tendency among contemporary biologists, see
Gould and Lewontin (1984).
61 . Having viewed the basics of Kitcher's account, those familiar with Hempel's or
Friedman's theories of explanation might ask if Kitcher's theory could not be equally well
constructed with reference to laws rather than to patterns of explanation. The explanatory
store could thus be said to consist of the basic scientific laws used in explanation, and
Kitcher's criteria for unifying power could be applied to judge the acceptability of laws for
use in the explanatory store: acceptability would be based on the paucity and stringency of
laws and the wealth of their consequence sets. This approach would be much like
Friedman's (1974), but Friedman's criteria of reduction-that the unifying set of laws
contains fewer laws than the unified set-would be replaced by the criteria of paucity and
stringency of patterns and wealth of consequences. Since Kitcher defends deductive
chauvinism, it is not clear what patterns add to the picture anyway: beyond its classification
— which appears to be redundant because all patterns are held by Kitcher to be deductive
— a pattern consists only of the schematic statements of the pattern, e.g., schematic laws of
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different kinds, and their filling instructions. So why bother with explanatory patterns?
First, Kitcher believes simply that the explanatory patterns, and not the laws,
associated with a scientific theory are the correct loci of the reduction that constitutes the
unifying power of theories (1976, 212). In addition, Kitcher is looking ahead to dealing
with some philosophical difficulties, among them the problem of asymmetries of
explanation. The problem of asymmetries of explanation is a special form of the problem of
explanatory relevance, and results from the symmetrical (e.g., biconditional) form of many
laws. FHempel noted, for example, that according to the general theory of relativity, galaxies
are receding from us if and only if their spectra exhibit a shift into the red part of the
spectrum. In such cases, each side of the symmetrical law may be derived from the other,
yet the explanatory relation goes, so to speak, only in one direction. Kitcher hopes his
conception of explanatory patterns will be able to account for such asymmetries: although
deductive logic allows, in the case of symmetrical laws, derivations in either direction,
Kitcher's explanatory patterns serve to limit the explanatory relation to one direction only.
Explanatory patterns thus function to fix relations of explanatory dependence.
62. This example is a version of the flagpole example cited by Bromberger (1 966), and
discussed many times over by numerous philosophers.
63. We must extrapolate from (T*) and (R*) because they hold only under conditions in
which the classifications of compared patterns are identical or nearly identical. It is not
clear that either of these conditions would hold in the present case. Nonetheless, (T*) and
(R*) suggest that stringency is a function of the size of the number of substitution instances
of a pattern.
64. I am here assuming the idealization that the tower stands perpendicular to the ground,
which is flat. Obviously, other patterns may be applied, depending upon the information
available, e.g., a trigonometric pattern employing the equation (if I remember correctly)
cotangent 0 = O/A
,
where 0 is the angle of incidence of the rays of light from the top of
the tower at the ground at the tip of the shadow, O is the height of the tower, and A is the
length of the shadow.
65. This point will be treated in detail in the chapter on explanatory controversy.
66. Such a dispositional predicate might look something like this: "t is the right triangle
formed: if any solid straight linear surface (e.g., a tower) of length x were illuminated,
casting a perpendicular shadow of length y, the tip of which was length z from the top of
the illuminated surface; or if any circular cell were placed on a microscopic measuring grid
in such a way that its diameter of length x forms a right triangle with lines of lengths y and z
on the grid; or if a mammalian intestine of length x were straightened and pinned adjacent
to two measuring sticks, forming a right triangle with sides of length y and z, etc."
67.
Kitcher (1989, 412). Concerning the projectibility of predicates, Kitcher says, the
challenge is to distinguish laws from mere accidental generalizations, not
only by showing how to characterize the notion of a projectible predicate
(and thus answer the questions raised by Goodman's seminal 1 956) but also
by diagnosing the feature that renders pathological some statements
containing only predicates that are intuitively projectible (for example, "No
emerald has a mass greater than 1000 kg.").
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68. Kitcher recognizes this problem to some extent. He recognizes similar problems, at
least, which arise in cases of theoretical change. Theoretical change, he concedes, which
includes shifts to theories with greater explanatory power, may force linguistic change on
the community (1 989, 488). In cases of potential theoretical change, therefore, appeals to
accepted linguistic usage (e.g., the projectibi I ity of predicates) will be unavailable when
competing candidates are compared for admission to the explanatory store. Kitcher thus
worries that his theory will be unable to avoid problems of explanatory relevance in these
cases. Regarding such cases, he says:
If we alter our language so as to change judgments about projectability, then
we must respond to any existing arguments against the projectability of
predicates that the new language takes to be projectable...
Consider the trick of gerrymandering a new "pattern" by disjoining
predicates. Let A, B, be disconnected predicates of L and suppose that L'
[the new language] proposes to treat "/\x v Bx" as a projectable predicate.
Suppose that C, D are predicates such that "(x)(Ax ^ Cx)" and ”(x)(Bx j Dx)"
are generalizations accepted both in K and K' [the old and new sets of
beliefs], and such that C, D, like A, B, are disconnected predicates of L.
Now I take it that part of the reason for thinking that "Ax v fix" is not a
projectable predicate is that one could not confirm the generalization
”(x)((Ax v Bx) (Cx v Dx))” by observing a sample consisting of instances of
A that are also instances of C. To make the proposed transition from L to L\
it is not sufficient simply to declare that "Ax v fix" is now to be counted as a
projectable predicate. One will also have to answer arguments based on
past inferential practice. Any such answer will, I believe, involve the
modifications of views about confirmation in such a way as to yield
widespread changes in the corpus of beliefs — K' will have to differ from K
in systematic ways — and some of the proposed changes will fall afoul of the
proviso governing the modification of K to K' (492-3).
Kitcher's argument in this paragraph seems to be as follows:
(i) If the predicate "Ax v fix" is projectible, then Aa & Ca confirms the generalization
(x)(Ax v Bx) 3 (Cx v Dx));
(ii) Current confirmatory practice says that Aa & Ca does not confirm (x)(Ax v Bx) =>
(Cx v Dx)).
(iii) Therefore, asserting the projectibility of "Ax v fix" would entail certain changes
in confirmatory practice.
(iv) These changes in confirmatory practice would entail widespread and
unacceptable changes in the corpus of beliefs.
I confess that I do not know what to make of this argument. For one, I cannot conceive of
what grounds could be offered in support of (ii) that are independent of the presumed
unprojectibility of Ax v fix.
69. Barnes' presentation is not consistent with Kitcher's account. For example, he speaks of
the identical unifying power of the Predictive and Retrodictive Patterns. On Kitcher's view,
however, unifying power is a property of sets of patterns over K, not of individual patterns.
Therefore, my presentation is slightly different than Barnes'.
70. Such derivations, however, were not always considered to be explanatory. See
Mischel (1966), Finocchiaro (1980), and below.
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71 . If necessary, imagine we are speaking of the E(K) prior to the acceptance of the theories
of relativity.
72. Kitcher points out that making explanatory dependency primary allows one to
accommodate notions of explanatory dependence in mathematics and formal sciences,
which he discusses at some length (422-425), as well as notions of causal dependence. He
views this as an advantage v/s-a-v/s causal theories of explanation ( i . e
. ,
theories in which
relations of causal dependence are primary) because causal theories of explanation are
unable to account for explanatory relations in mathematics and formal sciences.
73. Here it should be noted that even if one is inclined to reject the claim that causality is
necessarily unidirectional in time, this argument is unaffected. For causal asymmetry has
been accepted by most physicists who have employed Newton's laws since the 1 7th
century.
74. Authors include Scriven (1962, 1975), Mischel (1966), Bromberger (1966), van
Fraassen (1980), Gardenfors (1980), Tuomela (1980), Achinstein (1983), Sintonen (1989).
This list is by no means complete.
75. See especially Scriven (1962) and (1975). I intend here only to survey some of the
ideas presented by Scriven, and not to claim that Scriven's views of 1962 are identical with
those of 1 975.
76. Van Fraassen (1980, 1 2). He develops his account of explanation on pp. 97-1 57.
Further development appears in van Fraassen (1983), where he discusses explanation and
theory acceptability.
77. Because I have not had access to Hannson's original paper, my discussion here relies
on the discussions of van Fraassen (1980, 1 27-8) and Stegmuller (1983, 950ff.).
78. The importance of focus and contrastive force can be seen in the following old joke:
Question: "Why do firemen wear red suspenders?"
Answer: "To hold up their pants."
79. Again, if one wishes to develop the theory of explanation independently from the
theory of why-questions, one faces an analogous problem: explanations must respect the
emphasis and contrastive force of explananda.
80. Hannson calls these "reference classes," but I will use van Fraassen's terminology
("contrast classes") to distinguish clearly between contrast classes and relevance relations.
81. In addition to a theory of why-questions, Hannson offers a complementary theory of
explanation: an explanation shows why the member of the contrast class that underlies the
why-question (the explanandum) is to be favored over the alternative members of the
contrast class. "Favoring" is conceived by Hannson in probabilistic terms: the explanandum
is favored if, given the answer (explanation), its probability is higher than the average
probability of the members of the contrast class. Van Fraassen (1 980, 1 28f.) shows,
however, that this proposal runs into the same problems of relevance exhibited by
Hempel's models of explanation.
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82. Cf. Bromberger (1 966).
83. This is the contrast class suggested by Kettlewell's (1955, 1956) famous studies of
melanism in moths.
84. Van Fraassen (1980, 129).
85. Van Fraassen's theory can be cast directly as a theory of explanation rather than as a
theory of why-questions. An explanation would thus be characterized as a three-tuple
< P,C,R >
,
where P is the explanandum, i.e., the statement presumed to be true and in
need of explanation; C is the contrast class {P,-iQ,-i5,...}; and R is the appropriate
relevance relation. For example, P, the explanandum, might be, "These moths have
melanic coloring," where the contrast class, C, is {These moths have melanic coloring,
These moths do not have pale coloring}, and the relevance relation, R, is "evolutionary."
I mention this because it is doubtful that all explanations (or answers) are, or may be
construed as, answers to why-questions. For example, one can explain how the human
circulatory system works without answering any why-question. One might therefore infer
that van Fraassen's theory is of no use in elucidating explanations that are not answers to
why-questions. I believe this would be incorrect.
86. Van Fraassen (1980, 1 43). Van Fraassen's theory of why-questions is not all there is to
his theory of explanation. He also provides criteria for selecting the best answer once the
topic, contrast class, and relevance relation of the why-question are settled. Given the
topic, contrast class, and relevance relation of a why-question, a theory of explanation must
also tell us, says van Fraassen, how answers are to be evaluated as telling, good, or better,
especially with respect to other potential answers to the same question. Assuming that
potential answers A, A', A",... bear the correct relevance relation to topic 6, van Fraassen
suggests three further types of evaluation. First, one must evaluate and compare the
likelihood that each of the potential answers is true:
we rule out Because A altogether if K [background knowledge] implies the
denial of A; and otherwise ask what probability K bestows on A. Later we
compare this with the probability which K bestows on the cores of other
possible answers.
This type of evaluation does not rule out explanatory propositions with low initial
theoretical probability. Once an unlikely event has already occurred, the evidence
indicating that the event has occurred may be overwhelming. In such a case, K would
bestow a high probability on A (the proposition describing the initially unlikely event).
Since a proposition that is likely to be false is a weak candidate for an explanation, this
preference for propositions whose truth is best supported by the evidence is justified.
Second, one must judge the extent to which each of the potential answers favors the
topic B against the other members of the contrast class. Favoring is the idea underlying
Hempel's criterion of grounds for believing and Salmon's criterion of statistical relevance: a
good answer, A, shows that B was to be expected, and that the other members of the
contrast class, <B,C,...,N>, were not.
Third, one must evaluate the degree to which the each of the potential answers is
made irrelevant by other answers, i.e., by being screened-off by others.
None of these is decisive, says van Fraassen.
It should be clear that these (epistemic) criteria provide no help in solving our
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remaining philosophical problems of explanation, e.g., the problems of relevance. For
example, van Fraassen's own criticism of Hempel's models and of Hannson's conception of
favoring-that they cannot handle problems of relevance and asymmetries of explanation-
hold equally against his criteria of favoring.
87. One problem that the theory handles, but which I will not discuss, is the rejection of
requests for explanation. Requests for explanation may be rejected, on van Fraassen's
theory, if one or more of the presuppositions of the question is false. I will not discuss this
aspect of the theory because it is endemic to the theory of questions in general, and not just
to why-questions. All questions, not just why-questions, have presuppositions, the rejection
of which can lead to the rejection of the question. This part of van Fraassen's theory is
therefore of little importance to scientific explanation.
Van Fraassen's theory also suggests how one might treat some cases of explanatory
relevance. One of van Fraassen's own examples is the case of the unlucky mayor who has
contracted paresis, which is supposed to appear only in a small percentage of persons with
untreated syphilis. Besides untreated syphilis, no other contributing factor is known.
Because only a small percentage of those who have untreated syphilis contract paresis, the
fact that the mayor has untreated syphilis does not allow one to deduce, or to confer high
probability on, the conclusion that the mayor has paresis. According to Hempel's D-N and
l-S models of explanation, therefore, the mayor's untreated syphilis cannot explain the
mayor's paresis.
Yet it would seem that such an explanation is not always implausible (Scriven),
though a certain tension is evident. Van Fraassen's theory of why-questions suggests how
one might account for this intuition. One must simply consider the contrast class of the
why-question. If, for example, the question being asked in the particular context is, "Why
did the mayor, and not the other townspeople, contract paresis?", then the answer,
"Because he had untreated syphilis," presents a satisfying explanation. On the other hand,
if the question is, "Why did the mayor, and not other syphilics in the state, contract
paresis?", then no explanation can be given. Van Fraassen's theory thus accounts for the
changing explanatory relevance of the mayor's untreated syphilis by pointing out that
different contrast classes make different demands on the answer.
Note that in these cases we are assuming that the relevance relation in each case is
obvious. See the following discussion of relevance relations in van Fraassen's theory.
88. Van Fraassen endorses this consequence of his theory (1980, 1 38).
89. See Salmon and Kitcher (1987, 319).
90. A similar analysis, achieved independently of mine, is offered by Kitcher and Salmon
(1987).
91 . Or of possible contrast classes. Relevance relations seem, however, to be of greater
interest for the philosophy of science.
92. Moreover, the authors of these theories would probably be satisfied if their theories
captured the basic features of explanation in modern science alone.
93. The intentions of the investigator determine, nevertheless, which piece of the causal net
is to be described by an explanation.
94. See Sneed (1976), Balzer and Sneed (1 977), and Stegmuller.
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95. Sintonen places what-questions together with who and where-questions (he calls them
wh-questions). I would argue that many what-questions are as difficult to understand as are
why-questions. Some what-questions are straightforward, e.g., "What color is the sky?"
Others, however, present difficulties analogous to those of why-questions, e.g., "What made
the man ill?"
96. In Gardenfors formal presentation, the belief value of £, B(E), is derived from two
further measures of probability. His analysis can be summarized as follows. The epistemic
state of a given person is conceived of as a set, W, of worlds u, v, w, etc., allowed to be
possible by the person (Gardenfors talks about world-states rather than worlds, but I believe
our presentations are identical in other relevant respects). Gardenfors assumes, for
simplicity, that the set of individuals remains the same across possible worlds.
Two probability measures are to be introduced. First, for each possible world, w,
there is a belief function, L(w), which is a measure of the probability that w is the actual
world. In addition, for any subset (or class) of individuals, A, there is, for each possible
world, w, a measure of the probability that an individual belongs to A in w, PJA). Given
these two probability measures, it is possible to determine the expected probability that an
individual is A in the actual world by multiplying, for each possible world, w, the
probability that an individual is A in w by the probability that w is actual, and then adding
the resulting values for each possible world. Thus, the expected probability that an
individual is actually A, RJA), is
RJA) = Xwe\N PJA) * L(w), provided that L(w) is not 0.
The belief value of explanandum E is derived from this second-order probability in the
following way: the belief value, B(E), of explanandum, E, in epistemic situation, K, is equal
to RJQ/C), where £ is the sentence, Qa, and C is the intersection of all classes C, such that
it is known in K that "C,a" is true and nothing else of relevance to Qa is known (i.e., where
C is the narrowest reference class).
97. Gardenfors leaves open the problem of what initial degree of belief in explanandum £
is required for "Why £?" to arise as a legitimate question when £ has occurred.
98. Gardenfors recognizes that his theory is not sufficient (422), though not necessarily for
the reasons presented here.
99. Some philosophers, e.g., Wesley Salmon, believe, moreover, that explanatory
information can even decrease the expected probability of the explanandum.
1 00. The three varieties of the semantic view of theories are the set theoretical, the state-
space, and the structuralist approaches. Beth, Suppe, van Fraassen defend a state-space
approach to a semantic view of theories; see Beth (1 948, 1 949, 1961), Suppe (1 967, 1 972a,
1972b, 1974, 1976), and van Fraassen (1970, 1972, 1980). Suppes defends a set-
theoretical approach (Suppes, 1967). The structuralist view is developed and defended in
Sneed (1 976), Balzer and Sneed (1 977), Stegmuller (1 979), and Balzer, Moulines, and
Sneed (1986). My own presentation of the structuralist view follows that of Sintonen (1 989)
and Stegmuller (1983).
101. This example is discussed by Stegmuller (1983, 1036ff.).
1 02. For the original discussion of paradigms and exemplars, see Kuhn (1970), especially
the "Postscript."
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103. Sintonen himself recognizes that distinct kinds of applications are grouped together in
the set of intended applications, for he points out that l
p "generates analogies, explanatory
ideals, and other cognitive values of the scientific community" (1 989, 266).
104. On what grounds could one distinguish explanatory from non-explanatory
applications of theory? One possibility would be to distinguish explanatory from non-
explanatory applications on pragmatic grounds of the following sort. Explanation consists
in demonstrating that some as-yet-unexplained phenomenon is truly a model of the theory.
Other applications, it might be argued, are only re-applications of theory performed after the
task of explanation has been fulfilled. The difference between explanatory and non-
explanatory applications of theory is then this: Explanation occurs only if the phenomenon
has not yet been shown to be a model of the theory. Other applications, however, can be
made only after the phenomenon has already been shown to be a model of the theory.
Unfortunately, this attempt fails, for whether or not a phenomenon is explained, or
predicted, or its values calculated, etc. is not determined by whether or not the
phenomenon has been shown to be a model of a theory. Having shown that some heat
systems are models of theories of fluid dynamics, we can calculate some parameters of heat
dispersion. But we have not thereby explained the dispersion of heat in the systems, for it is
well known that the mechanics of heat dispersion are quite different than those of fluid
dynamics.
105. In her important paper, "Causal laws and effective strategies" (1979), Nancy Cartwright
also argued that the distinction between causal and non-causal laws cannot be captured by
statistical relevance relations.
1 06. Recently, Salmon has himself introduced a theory of causation that eschews the use of
counterfactuals (Salmon, 1994). Salmon's new theory will be discussed below.
107. See, for example, Salmon (1 984), 121, 262, and 274.
108. The definition is from Webster's Third International Dictionary (Springfield,
Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, 1993).
1 09. This is not the only formulation that Hume gives. On the very same page, for
example, Hume gives two additional definitions of "cause," one of which has the form of a
counterfactual conditional, the other of a psychological law.
1 1 0. For a discussion of Hume's theory of mental activity, see Wolff (1 960).
111. This argument is adapted from Cartwright (1992), 48.
1 1 2. For detailed argumentation in support of this point, see Salmon (1984, 1 74-1 75), and
Cartwright (1989, chapters 1 and 2).
1 1 3. This ignores the important distinction between an empirical correlation and a true
statistical correlation, and the validity of the inference from the former to the latter.
1 14. A special case of this problem is symmetrical laws, which generate the problem of
asymmetries of explanation for accounts such as Hempel's, which view explanation as the
deduction of explananda from laws of regularity.
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1 1 5. See Cartwright (1 989, chapter 3).
1 1 6. See Cartwright (1 989, chapter 2) for a discussion of this point.
1 1 7. Meanwhile, independent evidence may support the conclusion that both paths are
operative.
The regularity view also can account for neither the way that causal knowledge is
used to design experiments, nor the manner in which causal inferences are made from them
(see Cartwright, 1 992). This will be discussed below.
1 18. They cannot be considered causal because they provide no information about causal
capacities or causal interactions. All true laws, nonetheless, are connected to causes in the
sense that they have a causal explanation.
119. An episode from the IQ controversy, and its significance for the theory of explanation,
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
1 20. The necessary and sufficient condition view of causation, which holds that a cause is
a necessary and sufficient condition of the occurrence of the effect, is a variation of the
regularity view. It suffers from the same inadequacies as does the regularity view, and this
is true of its most sophisticated form, the INUS-condition proposed by Mackie. As a result,
this view will not be explicitly discussed here. An extensive critical discussion of INUS
conditions can be found in Cartwright (1989), 25ff.
121. The example is taken from Cartwright (1979).
1 22. A recent article in Science (v.269: 1 64-1 69) discusses the problems of biases and
confounding factors in drawing causal inferences from statistical analyses in one important
area of medicine — epidemiology.
1 23. Reichenbach (1 956), Suppes (1 970, 1 984), Salmon (1971), and many others have
appealed to screening-off as a statistical condition of causation.
1 24. Adapted from Suppes (1984), 50. A partition is "a collection of incompatible and
exhaustive events. ..[Wjhere we have an explicit sample space, it is a collection of pairwise
disjoint, nonempty sets whose union is the whole space" (Suppes, 1 984, 50).
1 25. (NSO') is adapted from Suppes (1984, 50). Salmon (1 984, 1 82) argues that causes
can be simultaneous with their effects. If this is so, it would seem advisable to change
(NSO 1 ) to require a look at partitions simultaneous to, as well as earlier than, the purported
causal event to which (NSO 1 ) is applied. Unfortunately, if causes are allowed to be
simultaneous with their effects, then even if (NSO r ) were amended accordingly, it would be
easy to find counterexamples similar to Salmon's billiards example, i.e., cases in which a
cause, C, is screened off from its simultaneous effect, E, by a simultaneous and coincident
effect, P. We will therefore simply note the problem that simultaneous cause-effect
relations would pose for (NSO 1 ), but ignore the issue of whether causes can be
simultaneous with their effects.
1 26. Skyrms (1980), Cartwright (1989), and many other authors discuss the problems of
averaging out.
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1 27. Assuming the moths face significant predation.
128. For probabilistic alternatives to (S) and (NSO T ), see Salmon (1971) and (1984), Skyrms
(1980, 1 08ff.), Eells and Sober (1 983), Glymour et a/. (1 987), Humphreys (1989), and many
others. For critical discussions of many of these, see Salmon (1980) and (1 984) and
Cartwright (1989).
1 29. Specifying the notion of a "complete causal set" is not easy. Suppes (1 984), for one,
doubts that it can be done. We will ignore this problem. Weaker versions of (SC) are also
possible and plausible; see, e.g., Skyrms' pareto-dominance condition (1 980, 1 08).
1 30. For an extensive defense of this proposition, see Cartwright (1989).
131. Indeed, Goodman points out that any counterfactual, "If A had been, the B would
have been," can be rewritten as a logically equivalent factual. As a result, the
counterfactual account shares the problems of the regularity analysis of causation: it cannot
handle overdetermined causes or mixed capacities, and it underdetermines causal structure.
Similarly, I believe the regularity view shares a problem typically noted only with
respect to counterfactual analyses: the problem of truth conditions. The problem, in
Goodman's words, is
to define the circumstances under which a given counterfactual holds while
the opposing conditional with the contradictory consequent fails to hold.
And this criterion of truth must be set up in the face of the fact that a
counterfactual by its nature can never be subjected to any direct empirical
test by realizing its antecedent (Goodman, 1954, 4).
I would argue that truth conditions are also a problem for laws of regularity, and this
problem is revealed by the fact that most causal laws, if read as laws of regularity, are true
only ceteris paribus. Thus, there is little, if any significant difference between the regularity
and counterfactual views of causation. I cannot argue this point here, but Goodman would
apparently agree:
In one sense the name "the problem of counterfactuals" is misleading,
because the problem is independent of the form in which a given statement
happens to be expressed. The problem of counterfactuals is equally a
problem of factual conditionals, for any counterfactual can be translated into
a conditional with a true antecedent and consequent; e.g., Since that butter
did not melt, it wasn't heated to 1 50 degrees F [Cf. the counterfactual: If the
butter were heated to 150 degrees F., it would have melted]...
[T]he truth of statements of this kind depends not upon the truth or
falsity of the components but upon whether the intended connection
obtains. ..[I]t must be born in mind that a general solution would explain the
kind of connection involved irrespective of any assumptions about the truth
or falsity of the components (Goodman, 1 954, 4-5).
1 32. Here I rely on Aune's discussion of Russell (1 985, 48ff.).
1 33. This transformation of the problem has, in fact, nothing to do with the distinctive
underlying ontologies, for the problem of causation associated with the process-ontology
can easily be restated in the terms of the event-ontology, whereby the problem is to
distinguish causal from non-causal events. The role played by Salmon's change to a
process-ontology is thus heuristic.
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134. Again, Salmon's theory does not suffer on this account as an epistemological criterion
ot causal processes. Knowledge of causal processes may be acquired, he could argue by
ootstrapping from prior causal knowledge, which is applied in experimental situations to
test the counterfactuals relevant to judging whether a mark has been introduced into and
transmitted by, some particular process.
1 35. Here Salmon refers to the specified interval as "half-open" to allow for interactions
that affect the amount of the quantity that is being transmitted.
136. See especially Cartwright (1989) and Cartwright (1992).
1 37. By contingent I mean that the connection is not logically necessary.
138. Cf. William Alston (1971).
1 39. Some of what follows I learned from Hugh Mellor's discussion of dispositions in
Mellor (1974).
1 40. The causal interactions may be spontaneous, e.g., the spontaneous decay of a particle.
Thus, there is nothing about this claim that is inconsistent with quantum mechanics.
141. Fora discussion of this point, see Mellor (1974).
1 42. In what follows, I discuss only the regularity view, thereby ignoring other possibilities,
e.g., the counterfactual and INUS views of causation. I do so not just because the regularity
view is more common than the others, but because the counterfactual and INUS accounts
are, at their base, regularity accounts. Counterfactual conditionals, for example, are merely
laws of regularity in which the antecedent is false.
143. Cartwright discusses the need for causal laws in "Causal laws and effective strategies"
(Cartwright, 1979).
1 44. Even if there were, it is clear that the application of Coulomb's Law is not restricted to
particles with zero mass.
1 45. This point is argued in detail by Cartwright (1 989, 1 992), some of whose arguments I
trace in the following paragraphs.
1 46. This failure is most evident in the case of single-instance experiments. In single-
instance experiments, the circumstances of the experiment are so carefully and precisely
controlled (and difficult to repeat) that just a single instance of behavior is sufficient to
establish the phenomenon. It is dubious to assert that such experiments yield knowledge of
regularities, for the inductive basis is too slim: when a small number of instances — or even
just one — have been observed, one cannot be said to have observed a regularity.
Cartwright (1989) discusses the Stanford gravity-probe B experiment as an example of a
single-instance experiment.
1 47. This case will be discussed in greater detail in the chapter on explanatory controversy.
1 48. Though it must be noted that descriptions of structural properties sometimes stand
alone as explanations. See discussion of this point below in section 5.1 1 .5.
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1 49. "Mass" is a quantitative measure of a body's inertia. Inertia is the property of
remaining at rest or of continuing to move in a straight line at a constant velocity so long as
no force acts upon the body.
Interestingly, the law of inertia is one of those laws, like Coulomb's, which is never
instantiated in nature, and cannot, therefore, be understood (usefully) as a regularity. This
makes clear that mass is a capacity rather than a tendency or propensity.
1 50. Again, note the caveat discussed in section 5.11.5.
151. In their important paper, Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) argue, for example, that
predictive and explanatory grounds are identical in logical form, differing only with respect
to the temporal relation between the statement of the explanandum and the grounds for
believing the explanandum to be true.
1 52. Here I rely on discussions by Hempel (1950) and Mellor (1974), especially Mellor's
defense of dispositions.
1 53. The manifestation of a disposition does not imply that it is somehow directly
observable, but only that there is evidence of it. For example, the solubility of sodium
chloride is not observable, though one can observe a sample of sodium chloride dissolving
in water.
1 54. Though not real, dispositions are nonetheless useful, according to Ryle. On his view,
dispositions, like laws, should be viewed as "inference-tickets."
1 55. Ryle clearly has events in mind, for he speaks of "incidents" and "goings on" (1949,
124-5).
1 56. Much of the following criticism of Ryle was garnered from Mellor (1974).
157. It might be thought that this criticism of Ryle's view rests on choosing a
nondispositional property that is "theoretical," e.g., molecular structure, rather than one that
is non-theoretical, e.g., octagonal shape. This is untrue. For "shape" does not display itself
directly, any more than does molecular structure: in each case, events must be found that
indicate indirectly the property of the thing, e.g., in the case of shape, one might turn on the
light above the object, and count its angles.
1 58. Here I gratefully acknowledge my debt to my colleague and friend, Andrew Blais, who
first pointed me in the direction of Michotte's work.
159. Here I rely heavily on the account offered by Michotte and Thines (1963/1991), which
emphasizes the importance of this assumption among early experimental psychologists.
1 60. Some aspects of Kolers' (1 972) experimental results are discussed by Goodman (1978),
72ff., whose discussion I have made use of here.
161. Such examples can be multiplied without end. Motion is not the only phenomenon
for which the brain adds information in generating a perception. Other examples of
augmentation occur in the perception of changing shape (Kolers 1 972), and of contours
(Kanizsa 1976).
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1 62. See, for example, Jeremy M. Wolfe’s preface to The Mind's Eye, which is an
anthology of recent Scientific American (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1986)
articles on the psychology of perception. Wolfe divides the process of cognition into three
steps, reception, extraction, and inference. "Inference" includes the processes I have
labeled supplementation and organization.
1 63. Michotte used two kinds of apparatuses to perform this experiment: a rotating disc
behind a screen into which a slit had been cut, and a set of two projectors behind a viewing
screen. He found the responses of observers to be similar in each case.
1 64. Michotte reports that under different conditions, two kinds of causal perceptions
could be distinguished: one of direct causation, e.g., "launching," and one of indirect
causation, e.g., "triggering." Thus, observers consistently distinguished between
perceptions of launching, triggering, and non-causal events.
165. It should be noted that Michotte did believe, however, that other kinds of causation
could be perceived (or, if you will, that causation could be perceived in other ways).
Especially important is what he termed, "tactile-kinesthetic" causation, which was also
studied by Piaget.
1 66. Friedman (1992, 84-86) argues that many early positivists, influenced by the
discoveries of Gestalt psychologists, conceded that observation was not simple and
immediate.
1 67. See Chapter III for a discussion of Kitcher's theory of explanation (Kitcher 1 976, 1981,
1 989). It should be noted that Kitcher is not anti-cause in the way that Humean positivists
are: he accepts that one aim of science is to grasp the causal structure of the world. But he
believes that inferences to causal knowledge are based, not on observation and experiment,
but on criteria of the systematic unification of our beliefs. Although he does not say this,
Kitcher's unificationist theory of explanation may therefore be viewed as a theory of the
epistemology of causal knowledge.
1 68. Cartwright (1 989) is the first, as far as I know, to distinguish carefully between the four
different aspects of causality that follow. I owe my understanding of these distinctions to
her analysis.
169. I distinguish here between adaptive traits, fitness, and adaptations. "Fitness" refers to a
phenotype's (or genotype's or group's) propensity to survive and reproduce. ("Fitness" is a
probabilistic measure of the likelihood that a phenotype's capacity to survive and reproduce
will be operative in some environment). A trait is "adaptive" in environment E if it makes a
positive contribution to the fitness of the phenotype in environment E. A trait is an
adaptation if it has evolved as a result of natural selection.
1 70. Until quite recently, biologists believed natural selection to be the driving force of all
evolutionary change. It would thus be unsurprising if Kettlewell simply assumed this to be
true in the case of melanism. In this case, however, Ford (1940) had also provided grounds
to believe that melanism is an adaptation.
In any case, it is clear that condition (i) is satisfied, for the necessary variation in
coloring still exists among the species of Lepidoptera. In addition, Kettlewell reports
evidence that melanism is heritable (1955, 324), thereby satisfying (ii). His own
experiments, moreover, verify that the third and fourth conditions are satisfied, as well.
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1 71
. Kettlewell's reasoning often suggests a kind of eliminative deduction: background
knowledge suggests an exhaustive list of potential causal factors; all but one of these factors
is then ruled out by decisive evidence; the operation of the remaining factor is also
confirmed by additional evidence, where possible.
1 72. See Brody (1972), Kim (1974), Kitcher (1 985), Railton (1978), and Ruben (1 990), the
last of which cites other authors as well.
1 73. A second belief about causation that causal processes must be continuous in
spacetime—also gets the causal theory into trouble within the realm of quantum mechanics,
especially Bell s inequalities, and what they purportedly reveal about causation. My lack of
knowledge of quantum mechanics prohibits me from discussing Bell's inequalities in detail.
Readers who desire an extensive discussion of causation and quantum mechanics can find
one in Cartwright (1989, 23 Iff.).
I would point out, however, that the lessons of Bell's inequalities seem to be
unclear, at best. As far as I can tell, Bell's inequalities show, at most, that some causal
processes are discontinuous in spacetime. This would certainly be a puzzling fact about the
world, if verified beyond a doubt, but it would not militate against the role of causation in
quantum mechanics: it would mean only that causation in the quantum world has
unexpected and puzzling properties. In short, I see no strong reason to assert that causal
processes must be continuous.
1 74. It would, nonetheless, be troubling to maintain that an effect could occur before its
cause.
1 75. Socrates' dying and Xantippes' becoming a widow are events that occur
simultaneously, but at locations distant from one another. Causal influence, however, is
propagated: it cannot, the argument goes, act simultaneously over a distance. The relation
between the two events, therefore, cannot be causal.
1 76. See R.A. Fisher (1931), as well as E. Sober's discussion in Sober (1983).
1 77. See, for example, Mackie (1974, 1 54-9), or Ruben's discussion of Mackie's argument
in Ruben (1990, 214ff.). The view presented here is independent of Mackie's argument.
Ruben also cites Cummins (1976) as a source of counterargument to Mackie's view.
1 78. This reply may be tailored to answer Kitcher's claim that the explanation of why neon
is inert is non-causal (Kitcher, 1 985). To explain this property of neon is to explain why
neon does not chemically interact under most conditions. The explanation would refer to
the low capacity for chemical reaction (e.g., neon's low energy state), as well as the general
lack of conditions under which it would interact with other elements (e.g., inadequate
activation energies). Explanation by reference to a lack of causal capacities or facilitating
conditions is as much a causal explanation as one that refers to the presence of causal
capacities and their operation. Kitcher's example is thus no counterexample to the causal
theory of explanation.
1 79. As Sober points out, Fisher's argument contains significant presuppositions that will
not concern us here. See Hamilton (1 968).
180. Ruben (1990, 218). Ruben credits the example, as well as much of his discussion of
identity explanation, to Achinstein (1 983, 233-237).
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1 81 . I use "controversy" as a general term that includes the entire spectrum from
constructive debate arising from disagreement to raging, emotionally charged altercations.
1 82. One exception to this trend is Kitcher (1989), who takes up questions of the evaluation
of explanatory force in contexts of theoretical change.
183. My argument is an elaboration and extension of an argument made by Robert
Ackermann (Ackermann, 1985, 62ff.). Ackermann argues that neither Kuhn's theory of
science, nor more traditional empiricist or rationalist philosophies of science, provide any
cognitive reason for the existence of controversy in science.
1 84. Koertge (1976), p.366-7. Her argument is targeted against Lakatos (1 971/1 978).
1 85. This is the view of Lakatos (1 971/1 978), though he adds a particular theory of
scientific progress, the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.
186. See, for example, Railton (1981) and Kitcher (1989).
1 87. A good beginning source of contributors to the controversy is N.J. Block and G.
Dworkin, The IQ Controversy
,
Critical Readings
,
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1976). See
also L.J. Cranach, "Five Decades of Public Controversy over Mental Testing," American
Psychologist
,
30, no. 1:1-14. A large bibliography is provided by Aby (1990).
188. See Cranach (1 975).
189. E.g., with the recent publication of The Bell Curve by R.J. Herrnstein and C. Murray.
1 90. Jensen writes: "The chief goal of compensatory education — to remedy the
educational lag of disadvantaged children and thereby narrow the achievement gap
between "minority" and "majority" pupils — has been utterly unrealized in any of
the. ..compensatory education programs that have been evaluated thus far" (3).
191. In support of this figure, Jensen cites Dreger and Miller (1960, 1 968) and Shuey
(1966), all of which are reviews of a large amount of literature.
192. Jensen writes:
'In the actual race of life, which is not to get ahead, but to get ahead of
somebody, the chief determining factor is heredity.' So said Edward L.
Thorndike in 1 905. Since then, the preponderance of evidence has proved
him right, certainly as concerns those aspects of life in which intelligence
plays an important part (1969, 28).
193. Jensen concludes:
all we are left with are various lines of evidence, no one of which is
definitive alone, but which, viewed together, make it a not unreasonable
hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly implicated in the average Negro-
white intelligence difference. The preponderance of evidence is, in my
opinion, less consistent with a strictly environmental hypothesis than with a
genetic hypothesis, which, of course, does not exclude the influence of
environment on its interaction with genetic factors (82).
One must agree with Lewontin's assessment of this passage:
241
Anyone not familiar with the standard litany of academic disclaimers..
.will,
taking this statement at face value, find nothing to disagree with since it says
nothing. To contrast a "strictly environmental hypothesis" with a "genetic
hypothesis which. ..does not exclude the influence of the environment" is to
be guilty of the utmost triviality. If that is the only conclusion he means to
come to, Jensen has just wasted a great deal of space in the Harvard
Educational Review. But of course, like all cant, the special language of the
social scientist needs to be translated into common English. What Jensen is
saying is: "It is pretty clear, although not absolutely proved, that most of the
difference in IQ between blacks and whites is genetical" (1970a, 88-89).
1 94. These two "basic assumptions" that underlie compensatory education are described
by Jensen as follows:
The "average children" concept is essentially the belief that all children,
except for a rare few born with severe neurological defects, are basically
very much alike in their mental development and capabilities, and that their
apparent differences in these characteristics. ..are due to rather superficial
differences in the child's upbringing at home, their preschool and out-of-
school experiences, motivations and interests, and the educational
influences of their family background...
The "social deprivation hypothesis" is the allied belief that those
children of ethnic minorities and the economically poor who achieve
"below average" in school do so mainly because they begin school lacking
certain crucial experiences which are prerequisites for school learning —
perceptual, attentional, and verbal skills, as well as the self-confidence, self-
direction, and teacher-oriented attitudes conducive to achievement in the
classroom. And they lack the parental help and encouragement needed to
promote academic achievement throughout their schooling (1969, 4).
1 95. Jensen gives the following reasons for focusing on IQ rather than on scholastic
achievement: it is more easily and "efficiently" measured; it can be measured early in a
child's life, when he or she has no scholastic achievement to speak of; and IQ is "known to
predict scholastic performance better than any other single measureable attribute..." (4-5).
196. A "phenotype" is any set of morphological, physiological, biochemical, behavioral, or
other properties of an organism that develop through the interaction of genes and
environment. A "genotype" is any set of genes possessed by an individual organism. See
Futuyma (1986, 43, 552, 554).
1 97. Indeed, the main rhetorical thrust of Jensen's article is negative argument:
Why has there been such uniform failure of compensatory programs where
they have been tried? What has gone wrong? In other fields, when bridges
do not stand, when aircraft do not fly, when machines do not work, when
treatments do not cure, despite all conscientious efforts on the part of many
persons to make them do so, one begins to question the basic assumptions,
principles, theories, and hypotheses that guide one's efforts. It is time to
follow suit in education? (3)
1 98. Studies cited by Jensen show that IQ is highly variable early in life, but becomes
increasingly stable, and is very stable beyond 8 years old (1969, 1 8; Jensen cites Bloom,
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1 964). Because the stability of IQ is consistent with both the genetic hypothesis and its
opponents, we will concentrate on Jensen's claim that the IQ differential between races has
a genetic basis.
1 99. Variance may be defined as the mean value of the square of an observation's
deviation from the arithmetic mean of the population. My discussion of heritability relies
on Futuyma (1986), 1 98ff. and Suzuki et a/. (1 986), 51 9ff. It should be noted that Lewontin
was one of the co-authors of Suzuki et a/.
200. This formula is a simplified and slightly altered version of that presented by Jensen
(1969, 34). Note that the names "genotypic" (or genetic) variance and "environmental"
variance are misleading, given that V, contains both environmental and genetic factors.
It is also important to understand that heritability is a measure of the proportion of a
population's variation that is assignable to genotypic variation: it does not tell us what
proportion of any individual's phenotype is due to genetics or to environment. If the
heritability of height for human beings were .80, for example, it would be nonsense to
conclude that for a person whose height is 70 inches, 56 inches are due to genetics and 14
to environment (nutrition, etc.).
201 . The difficulties are so onerous that some geneticists believe them to be
insurmountable, at least at the present. Suzuki et a/. (1986), for example, conclude that:
In general, the presence of greater environmental correlation between close
relatives makes heritability estimates uninterpretable. It is for this reason that
there are no legitimate estimates of heritability for human quantitative traits
(520).
Again, it should be recognized that Lewontin is a co-author of Suzuki et a/.
202. As suggested above, genetic variance can be analyzed into at least three components:
additive variance, dominance variance, and epistatic variance. Additive genetic refers to
the average effect of an allele on the value of a trait, while dominance and epistatic variance
refer to deviations from the sums of these averages due to dominance and epistatic relations
between genes.
To take a simple case, there is additive genetic variance in a population if the
average phenotypic value of two genotypes is different. All the genetic variance is additive
if the value of the heterozygote lies directly intermediate between those of the
homozygotes. Conversely, where there is no additive genetic variance, there is no
difference, on average, between the phenotypic values of the genotypes. Consequently,
where there is no additive genetic variance, there can be no natural selection. One
consequence of this line of argument, which originated with Fisher, is that natural selection
tends to remove additive genetic variation within a population. Similarly, Lewontin is
arguing that if the proportion of genetic variance in IQ that is additive is high, then it is
unlikely that IQ distribution has been the result of a lengthy process of natural selection.
203. Electroscopes come in many forms; a simple gold-leaf electroscope consists of an
enclosed case containing two gold leaves suspended from a metal rod that is separated from
the case by an insulating sleeve. When the metal rod is touched by a charged material, the
leaves acquire the charge, which causes them to fly apart as the charges repel each other.
The leaves will remain apart for a period of time, but, as scientists had long noticed, the
leaves will always settle slowly back together as they lose their charge (even after the effects
of known sources of discharge, e.g., through the insulating sleeve, are reduced to nil). This
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description of electroscopes and the problem of ionization is taken from Rossi (1964, 2ff.).
204. My understanding of this period is due in great part to Galison (1987), Rossi (1 964),
and Brown and Hoddeson (1 983). Rather than cite these authors at every sentence of my
rehearsal of the history of the period, I hereby acknowledge my debt to them.
205. The most acrimonious (and widely reported) of these disputes was perhaps the one
between Millikan and Compton concerning the existence of the so-called latitude effect
(Kevles, 1977, 240ff.).
206. These problems were resolved via Carlson-Oppenheimer's theory of particle showers
and the discovery by Neddermeyer and Anderson, and Street and Stevenson, of the mu-
meson. Although scientists quickly accepted that local cosmic radiation was due to these
phenomena, questions about their origins were not answered until the late 1 940s.
207. Before considering these experiments, it will be useful to place the experiments in
context by summarizing the basics of physical knowledge in the mid-1 920s. Physicists
knew that atoms consist of a relatively heavy, positively charged nucleus surrounded by a
cloud of relatively light, negatively charged electrons. The approximate sizes of atomic
nuclei had been measured, but physicists knew little of nucleic structure. It was known that
some atomic nuclei decayed into more fundamental particles-protons-that were identical
to hydrogen nuclei, and there was speculation that all nuclei were built out of protons (it
was known that the masses of some nuclei were nearly whole-number multiples of the mass
of a proton). There were suspicions, however, that there is more to atoms than protons and
electrons.
Classical mechanics had been recognized to be inadequate as a theory of atomic
constituents, and a new theory, quantum mechanics, was being developed to describe the
behavior of electrons and other atomic phenomena. Radiation was generally divided into
two types, corpuscular and electromagnetic, though by the late 1920s it was widely
recognized that all radiation behaves in some respects as particles and in other respects as
waves. Corpuscular radiation included beta-rays (high-speed electrons emitted in
radioactive decay), alpha-rays (helium nuclei emitted in the decay of certain atoms), and
cathode rays (electrons discharged from a cathode). It had been known since the late
nineteenth century that corpuscular radiation was capable of ionizing gases. Known
electromagnetic radiation included visible light, infrared and ultraviolet rays, X-rays, and
gamma rays (another product of radioactive decay). In 1 923, Arthur Compton discovered
that photons of electromagnetic radiation could also generate ionization indirectly through
the scattering of high-energy electrons (the Compton Effect).
By the mid-1 920s, therefore, two sources of ionization were recognized:
corpuscular radiation and the Compton Effect. Cosmic rays were known to ionize
atmospheric gases. After Compton's discovery, most cosmic ray researchers assumed that
cosmic rays were made up of high-energy photons (Rossi, 1964, 14ff.).
208. Once again, I emphasize that the following accounts rely heavily on Galison (1987)
and Rossi (1964).
209. See R.A. Millikan and G.H. Cameron (1926, 1928a, 1928b, and 1928c, 1928d).
210. A Geiger-Muller tube is a metal cylinder with a thin wire running the length of its axis.
The cylinder is filled with a gas at very low pressure, and there is an electric potential
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between the wire and the walls of the tube. Under the right conditions (e.g., a large enough
potential) the presence of a single ion pair in the cylinder is sufficient to set off an electric
discharge that is easily measured by an electroscope.
211. Early cloud chambers were basically glass boxes containing a moveable wall attached
to a piston. The piston was used to expand the volume of the chamber, which causes the
temperature in the chamber to drop. The chamber was filled with gas, often a vapor
mixture of water and alcohol. When the chamber expands, dropping the temperature, the
vapor condenses into a cloud. If the expansion is carefully controlled, producing a smaller
temperature change, the vapor will condense only around ions in the chamber. As a result,
an ionizing ray crossing the chamber shortly before expansion will leave a condensation
trail along its path of travel. The density of the ion (and, hence, condensation) trail is a
function of the ray's charge and velocity.
2 1 2. See Compton (1936) for a summary of the evidence.
213. This was not the only problem facing quantum electrodynamics (QED). In 1934, J.R.
Oppenheimer wrote:
[T]heoretical physics — what with the haunting ghosts of neutrinos, the
Copenhagen conviction, against all evidence, that cosmic rays are protons,
Born's absolutely unquantizable field theory, the divergence difficulties with
the positron, and the utter impossibility of making a rigorous calculation of
anything at all — is in a hell of a way [letter to F. Oppenheimer, published in
Smith and Weiner (1980, 181) and cited by Galison (1987, 107],
Because our interest is the discovery of the mu-meson, the other problems of QED have
been ignored.
214. Compton and Bethe (1934) mobilize the evidence in favor of the proton hypothesis.
The fact that Anderson (Neddermeyer and Anderson, 1937) took such great care to rule out
the electron hypothesis shows that he believed it to be the more promising.
21 5. Fussell produced photographs taken in a cloud chamber fitted with a series of thin
plates, in which one could see both the production of pairs of electrons and the cascading
build-up of showers, just as one would expect from the Carlson-Oppenheimer analysis.
21 6. An example of the latter is controversies about the validity of experimental data,
whether they are spurious artifacts of the experimental setup or not.
21 7. Newton and his contemporary scientists argued, for example, about whether an
inquiry into the causes of gravitation would be a legitimate scientific pursuit, or whether
gravitation should forever lay beyond the grasp of the scientific mind.
218. The covering-law explanation suggested here would, of course, be statistical in form.
2 1 9. This argument was first presented, so far as I know, by Nancy Cartwright (1 989).
Cartwright argues that features of single-instance experiments in physics refute the regularity
view of (causal) laws. She provides a nice example in her description of gravity probe
experiments at Stanford.
220. As noted above, there is another part of Van Fraassen's theory, which is an account of
how to evaluate competing answers that satisfy the pragmatic criteria. Here, two criteria are
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basic: the probable truth of each answer, and the degree to which the answer "favors" the
exp anandum. "Favoring" is an epistemic notion: it is a measure of the degree to which the
explanandum is to be expected, given the truth of the answer.
Van Fraassen's theory of answer-evaluation thus relies on epistemic notions already
embodied in neo-positivist approaches, including the Covering-Law model and its statistical
versions (including Salmon's S-R model) and thus may be criticized on the grounds that
apply to the Covering-Law model.
221 . This no doubt understates the potential for controversy within scientific communities,
for the theoretical outlooks of scientists are more plastic and less stable than Kuhn seems to
suggest. For discussion of this point, see Ackermann (1985), 44ff.
222. See Appel (1987) for an enlightening description of this debate, as well as further
references.
223. This is not to say that theoretical commitments played no role in the acceptance of the
mu-meson's existence and role in cosmic radiation. It has been suggested above, for
example, that Oppenheimer and Carlson's successful modeling of the shower component of
cosmic radiation using the Bethe-Heitler theory played a role in convincing physicists that
the penetrating component could not be electrons. The effect of their work, however, was
to demonstrate the limits of the quantum theory.
224. See Kevles (1977, 240ff.).
225. Under Kitcher's theory, the scope of a pattern is determined by its schematic
sentences, rules for filling in variables, and order of premises. To attempt to explain or
settle a controversy over explanatory scope by reference to these properties seems useless,
however, for each explanatory hypothesis already asserts that the phenomenon-in-question
falls within its explanatory domain; presumably, the rules for filling in variables, making
inferences, etc., would already reflect this claim. Kitcher's theory thus offers little guidance
where explanatory controversies arise over accepted patterns of explanation.
226. To his credit, Kitcher is perhaps the only theorist to have explicitly discussed the
evaluation of explanations in the context of theoretical change (Kitcher, 1 989). But when
Kitcher discusses the comparative evaluation of explanations in changing theoretical
contexts, he is most concerned about the problem of predicate projectibi I ity. Remember
that to defend his theory against spurious unifications by explanatory patterns with
gerrymandered predicates, Kitcher appeals to a criterion of predicate projectibi lity. His
discussion of theoretical change is spurned by the fear that the criterion of predicate
projectibility will break down in these contexts, thereby weakening his defense of the
unification theory.
At this point in our discussion, we are not concerned with gerrymandered
predicates but with the question of why explanatory controversy occurs, and how it is
settled, where there is the potential for theoretical change.
227. L.M. Brown and L. Hoddeson (1983, 21). Millikan quote is from Hawking (1 980). It
should be noted, moreover, that when Anderson discovered the positron, he did not
understand it as a validation of the Dirac theory.
228. Of course, in other places Kitcher appeals to examples of basic patterns that are more
specific, e.g., "Darwinian simple selection, or a "Mendelian pattern, circa 1 900." For the
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moment, we will ignore this troubling ambiguity.
229. This criticism is perhaps more forceful in later cases in which entirely new particle
properties (e.g., strangeness), and not merely new constellations of properties (e.g.,
intermediate mass and charge), were added to explain phenomena.
230. It is true that, at the London-Cambridge conference of 1 934, Anderson argued that
good evidence ran against each of these alternatives. But not all scientists were in
agreement. Later that year, for example, Bethe and Compton published a defense of the
proton-hypothesis, arguing that both geomagnetic data (the latitude and east-west effects)
and the cloud chamber photographs of penetrating particles were best explained as the
effects of protons (Bethe and Compton, 1 934).
23 1 . Whether or not these theories can be shown, by application of Kitcher's criteria, to
have been the best unifying systematizations of their times is another question, which, as I
suggested above, would not be easy to answer.
232. Finocchiaro distinguishes two kinds of unintelligibility: explanatory and conceptual.
Explanatory unintelligibility exists when a theoretical component lacks explanation, i.e., is
not derivable from what is understood. Conceptual unintelligibility exists when the
component lacks clarity, in the sense that it is not statable or expressible in terms that are
understood. Explanatory intelligibility implies conceptual intelligibility, says Finocchiaro,
but the converse does not hold; for example, inertia, says Finocchiaro, was conceptually
intelligible for Newton, but not explanatorily. On Finocchiaro's view, Newton's hypothesis
of gravitation suffered from both kinds of unintelligibility. Most importantly, it was
conceptually unintelligible because gravitation could be described only as a kind of mutual
attraction, which could not be understood in mechanical terms.
233. Here Finocchiaro cites Hesse (1961) as the source of this view. This historical process
of the acceptance of gravitation as intelligible stretches, says Finocchiaro, from Leibniz to
Kant, and was the result of arguments showing that gravitation, attraction, and action-at-a-
distance are no less intelligible than collision, repulsion, or contact action, all of which
were already accepted as intelligible (248). In other words, the concept of intelligibility
changed so that appeal to gravitation was made consistent with the methodological ideal
that all concepts used be reducible to other concepts that are already understood. This
change in intelligibility is to be distinguished from the additional later change that was the
result of the explanation of gravity by Einstein's theory of general relativity (see above for
the distinction between explanatory and conceptual intelligibility).
Finocchiaro is wrong, I think, to locate gravitation's change of status in the
acceptance of mathematical theory as being intelligible in itself, at least if intelligibility is
understood in the explanatory sense. Mathematical theory is never explanatory in itself.
234. See, for example, Bowler (1 983) and (1988), and Mayr (1 983, 540ff.).
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